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10 
INTRODUCTION1  
 
Tracing unlikely connections, such as those between butterflies and typhoons, stockbrokers in 
Boston and divinity students in Cambridge, ant colonies and human brains, cells and the 
universe: this is how complexity has been discovered, or better, revealed by current science. 
Through an analogous process, of tracing connections that at first seem unlikely, I approached 
my own object of research, which, in very broad terms, is contemporary cinema. 
‘Contemporary’ here carries particular significance, as cinema is today at a crucial stage of its 
development, where it needs to choose between two alternatives: on the one hand, homeostatic 
preservation of what it already is (which is perhaps harder than ever, partly because of the 
centripetal forces of media convergence) and, on the other hand, contamination with different, 
sometimes unlikely, disciplines and discourses, and evolution towards an unpredictable but 
fascinating future.  
 
Description of research object  
 While alternative forms of narration have made their appearance in mainstream cinema 
since the 1970s, when ‘post-classical’ Hollywood made its presence noticeable, in the mid-
1990s a bolder tendency of experimentation with the narrative form emerged from the 
outskirts of popular production. The films of this recent cinematic tendency have often been 
discussed as “complex narratives”,1 borrowing this already-existing label from literary 
criticism and narratology.2  Since the commercial success of Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction 
(1994), “complex” films have widely expanded, to the point that we can now, more than a 
decade after their spread, talk about a new ‘norm’ promoted worldwide, both by large 
Hollywood studio productions and by the so-called world cinema. Complex narrative structure 
connects films as diverse as Run Lola Run (Tom Tykwer, 1998), The Matrix (Andy and Lana 
Wachowski, 1999), The Sixth Sense (M. Night Shyamalan 1999), Memento (Christopher 
Nolan, 2000), or Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Michel Gondry, 2004).3 It is not so 
much the novelty of the alternative narrative means that such films use that makes them worth 
of investigation;4 what makes them intriguing is rather their quantitative proliferation and 
popularization, which crosscuts geographical and genre boundaries and manifests an enduring 
presence—as recent productions indicate, from Enter the Void (Gaspar Noé, 2009, 
                                                
1 Parts of the Introduction were later used in the chapter ‘Puzzled Hollywood and the Return 
of Complex Films’, in Buckland, Warren (Ed.) Hollywood Puzzle Films. New York: 
Routledge 2014.           
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France/Germany/Italy/Canada) or The Sky Above (Sérgio Borges, 2011, Brazil) to Inception 
(Christopher Nolan, 2010, USA/UK).  
 Trying to cluster the common characteristics of these complex films, I would say that 
they tend to contain many protagonists and parallel and interconnected stories, a different, for 
some scholars “loose”, form of causality, with chance or coincidence becoming a central force 
in the plot development, and a nonsequential temporal and spatial structure. As Warren 
Buckland puts it, complex films “embrace nonlinearity, time loops, and fragmented spatio-
temporal reality” (2009: 6). This unconventional structuring of complex films is assumed to 
have a significant impact upon the viewer and his or her interpretative strategies. David 
Bordwell, who places these films in a third era of Hollywood narrative experimentation (from 
the mid-1990s until today),5 refers to many of them as “puzzle films”, i.e. films that prompt 
the viewers “to discuss ‘what really happened’, to think back over what’s has been shown, or 
to rewatch the film in the search for clues to the key revelations” (2006: 80).  
 Due to their expansion, contemporary complex films form a significant object of 
research, and many media and cultural critics have been occupied with their various facets 
since at least 2002.6 From then on, the umbrella term “complex” has been used in parallel with 
different other terms that address more particular aspects of these films: “alternative plots” 
(Ramirez-Berg 2006), “forking path films” (Bordwell 2002), “multiple draft” films (Bordwell 
2002; Branigan 2002), “network narratives” (Bordwell 2006), “psychological puzzle films” 
(Panek 2006), “twist movies” (Lavik 2006), “possible world films” and “trance films” 
(Perlmutter 2002 and 2005), “psycho-temporal transport” films (Stewart 2006), “modular 
narratives” (Cubitt 2004; Cameron 2008), “neo-baroque” films (Ndalianis 2005, Cubitt 2004), 
“puzzle plots” (Buckland 2009;), “mind-game films” (Elsaesser, 2009), “database narratives” 
(Kinder 2002), “transmedia narratives” (Jenkins 2007). All these terms try to capture different 
aspects and functions of the contemporary films that I prefer to continue calling complex, for 
reasons that I will soon explain.  
   
Why (again) complex narratives now 
In this dissertation I am not going to dismiss the adjective “complex” that has been 
used to describe the narrative structure of many contemporary films, but rather build on it, 
looking for an adequate theoretical framework to approach this complexity. In literary and 
narrative theory, complexity has so far been referring to the presence of features that 
transgress the linear order of the story. This gives complex narratives a somewhat paradoxical 
nature, also displayed by contemporary complex films, because they rely on ‘anti-narrative’ 
means in order to tell their stories. Classical narratology has always been coping with 
numerous cases of complexity, although its tendency to prioritize the ‘linear’ causal-logical 
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and temporal succession of events in its definition of narrative, makes it, in my view, no 
longer a satisfying framework to accommodate the complex and non-linear structure of 
complex films, particularly at this point in time when the latter seem to become, as I already 
indicated, the norm rather than the exception.7 Therefore I see an ever-more demanding need 
to address the nonlinearity of contemporary films as such, as well as its particular modes of 
textual and cognitive organization.  
 Narrative has been defined either as the object of narration, the story in its particular 
articulation, or, especially since the 1980s with the influence of cognitive science (see Bruner 
1986), as a mode of representation and reasoning as old as humanity itself. Both narratives and 
the narrative mode of reasoning create links between events prioritizing the whole over the 
parts. Individual events make sense only as long as they are placed into a meaningful whole, 
supporting its constitution by being the causes of other events (Polkinghorne 1988). Events 
only make sense when the whole is completed, and their placement in the chain of causality 
and temporal continuity is made definite. Even more so, this whole is presupposed in the 
beginning of every narrative, so that following it as readers, viewers or recipients in general, 
we already know that the events will make sense eventually, as they form parts of a larger 
system. The above assumptions are interwoven with the notion of narrative, both when the 
latter is conceived through the (classical) structuralist perspective and when it is conceived 
through the more recent cognitive perspective. 
 ‘Classical’ literary narratology, extending from the Russian formalists to the French 
structuralists (see Herman 2009: 26), does not address only the ‘narrative’ (story) but also the 
process of narration and the complex interplay of the two that every literary text incarnates. 
Even though I also consider narrative anything but a one-dimensional concept, I find the 
insistence in using the term “narratives” to address contemporary complex films problematic. 
On the one hand, I find that narratology, especially at its best moments, cannot be confined to 
what is defined by the term narrative and the presumptions it carries and reproduces. In some 
of the most influential narratological models, such as the one of Genette, narrative becomes a 
collective and complex formation, and a struggle of multiple forces (like those of récit, 
histoire and narration). Narratology can be seen as the study of the complex contact between a 
text and a recipient, and its insights are of great value in this respect. On the other hand, in my 
own study it has been necessary to use narratological models in order to show how the 
definition of narrative is not applicable in the films I studied and why it is at the limits of 
narrative and beyond them that contemporary complex films find their place. 
 Contemporary complex narratives contain, from the perspective of narratology, ‘non-
narrative’ or ‘anti-narrative’ elements. This brings them in contrast not only to a classical type 
of narrative, represented in cinema by the Hollywood tradition but also, as I see it, to the core 
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element in the definition of narrative, which is to some extent reproduced even in post-
classical and cognitive strands of narratology, and which has to do with narrative’s beginning-
middle-end schema and causal-logical sequence. This sequence is not necessarily supposed to 
be constituted through the text itself; the syuzhet might as well appear disordered and out of 
sequence; narrative theory of course acknowledges this, but it still presupposes that the 
reader/spectator cognitively constitutes (or attempts to constitute) a sequence. In cinema, the 
beginning-middle-end schema of narrative has started being ‘officially’ challenged already 
since the dawn of the post-classical Hollywood era (see Elsaesser 2009b), and is being more 
decisively transgressed through the subsequent emergence and prevalence of ‘complex 
narratives’. These films, although telling stories and appearing as narratives in this respect, 
they nonetheless point at the inadequacy, futility, or, using Genette’s expression, ‘border’ and 
limitation of narrative—as a mode of composing a story, as a cognitive process of 
intelligibility, and as a theoretical approach to these films.  
Using the adjective ‘complex’ as a starting point, I will argue for the usefulness of 
applying and prioritizing an alternative theoretical framework in the analysis of complex 
films, which will not be that of narratology—especially its classical strand but also the 
existing postclassical approaches,8 the usefulness of the latter notwithstanding—but the one of 
complex systems theory. When detached from the narratological framework, the ‘complex’ 
can refer to the study of wholes that are created by pieces (which can also be the pieces of the 
so-called “puzzle” films) and most importantly, determined by them. Such piecemeal 
structures can be called systems, and are currently at the forefront of research conducted 
within the expanding domain of complex systems science and theory. 
 
The complexity of systems  
 Complex systems theory is a transdisciplinary field with contributions from very 
diverse sciences, from physics and biology to sociology. Because of the heterogeneity of these 
contributions it is difficult to define a unified field of complex systems study, and in this 
respect it is more accurate to refer to complex systems theories in the plural. There are 
however certain commonalities that bring these theories together, the most fundamental of 
which is perhaps their interest in the dynamics of organization that pre-exist structures. This is 
indeed what the study of systems boils down to, namely the complex interactions between 
elements that create an organization, either biological, social or technological. Ludwig Von 
Bertalanffy’s General Systems Theory (GST, 1937), and cybernetics, in its development 
through the post-World War II era, have been the most representative strands of systems 
theory as a transdisciplinary domain, and precursors of contemporary complex systems 
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theory.9 However, there had been even earlier works in the Russian and German world, such 
as Alexander Bogdanov’s Tektology (1912-1917), that anticipated many systemic ideas.10 In 
the recent decades, the development of information science and computing has significantly 
contributed in providing tools for a more unified science of complex systems; tools that 
mainly consist in computer modeling and simulation. Such tools have been in use since World 
War II and have become very popular especially since the 1970s, but the further development 
of technology (for instance, of sensors that enable data input and creation of feedback circuits) 
and software design, as well as the increase of computational power, have made complexity 
simulations all the more sophisticated.11  
 Not only the increasing cross-disciplinary research in complex systems but also the 
publication of several books addressing the lay reader are indications of the popularization of 
complexity theory, especially since the 1990s. It is no longer cybernetics that prevails in the 
area of systems research but new domains have emerged such as chaos theory in the 1980s and 
network theory in the 1990s, helping to draw towards a general science of complexity that 
encompasses these already interdisciplinary strands (see Mitchell 2009). In the development of 
systems theories throughout the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, “complex” seems to 
have become an indispensible part of the word “system”. This is indicative of a gradual turn, 
already manifest during the development of cybernetics as Katherine Hayles (1999) shows, 
from ‘top-down’ control and maintenance of a systemic organization to a ‘bottom-up’ 
constitution of the system, subject to dynamic transformation and unpredictable perturbations. 
Ian Bogost distinguishes between two different kinds of systems and maintains that this 
distinction also characterizes systems theory. Classical systems theory privileges top-down 
instead of bottom-up approaches, while in the new complex systems theory, the emphasis is 
placed on units and their decisive role in structuring the system. Units are agents of 
complexity as long as they interact and form aggregates that are more than the sum of their 
parts, and by further becoming themselves subsystems of larger organizations, in an ever-
expanding chain of growing complexity.  
 From the aspect of the sciences of complexity, complex systems are considered 
aggregates and constellations: they are compositions of many individual elements into 
“constitutive” (and not “summative”) complexes.12 Many different systems, biological, 
technological, social or psychological can be considered as complex: from the human immune 
system to the brain’s neural network, from cities to commercial firms (see Holland 1995; 
Johnson 2002; Mitchell 2009), and from the World Wide Web to the Internet Movie Database 
(IMDb).13 Even though complex systems always form ‘wholes’ larger than the sum of their 
parts, these wholes produce their self-organization only through the aggregation of 
heterogeneous units.  
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 It has been suggested that the interest in systems complexity that crisscrosses different 
cultural fields is the expression of a ‘paradigm shift’ in the way we analyze media texts, but 
also ourselves and the world we inhabit. As Peter Coveney puts it: 
over the past 30 years or so, an alternative conceptual picture has emerged for the 
study of large areas of science which have been found to share many common 
conceptual features, regardless of the discipline, be it physics, chemistry or 
biology. Self-organization and complexity are the watchwords for this new way of 
thinking about the collective behavior of many basic but interacting units. In 
colloquial terms, we are talking about systems in which “the whole is greater than 
the sum of parts”. (Coveney 2003: 1057)  
In my study I highlight the fact that the complexity discourse has already affected film theory 
and practice, and therefore I suggest that we can also analyze media texts, such as films, 
through this lens. Such a complex systemic thinking and analysis of cinema and its individual 
filmic formations, as I will argue, is not only made possible, but actually necessitated by the 
highly interconnected and complex function of contemporary societies, where it is impossible 
for any type of discourse or cultural institution, such as the one of cinema, to stay unaffected 
by its placement in a network of institutions that overall functions as a complex organism. 
Being an agent in this network, cinema organizes itself in ways that allow it at once to cope 
with the complexity of its environment and to further develop its own complexity. By 
struggling to incorporate practices coming from different media in the production and 
distribution of films (from ‘cell phone cinema’ to online file sharing) but also in the conditions 
of spectatorship, which have become more mobile and fragmented and demand more 
interactivity, cinema achieves higher internal differentiation. Complex films as expressions of 
this complex cinema are more than just complex narratives; they are the units through which 
cinema re-invents itself and adopts to the highly volatile conditions of network society.  
  The framework offered by complex systems theory helps us see the transdisciplinarity 
of certain phenomena, not only across media but also across other fields of knowledge. As the 
complex systems framework places the phenomenon of complex films in a wider cultural 
paradigm shift towards complexity, films themselves can be seen as nodes in larger cultural 
networks, and expressions of wider changes in knowledge and experience of the world. 
Complex systemic approaches to contemporary cinema reveal that complexity not only 
challenges our presumptions about cinematic texts and their reception, but also paves the way 
to study how films themselves form aggregates out of which new modes of story world 
production and reception, new practices of filmmaking and new ‘spectatorship contracts’, as 
Elsaesser would have it, emerge within the media sphere. Complexity science not only offers 
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us a different framework and a different vocabulary to analyze complex films, but also 
proposes a different epistemological (in terms of ‘how’ we approach our object of study) and 
ontological (in terms of ‘what’ is this object) approach to cinema altogether. 
  
Pieces and aggregates 
 As with complex systems theory, which flourished partly because of the advances in 
computing (the “butterfly effect” which marked chaos theory was after all discovered during 
the process of computer modeling of weather systems), the appearance of “complex” 
narratives also has informational and technological causes. The possibility to take into account 
(and compute) the most minimal components of a system (such as the flapping of a butterfly’s 
wings, in the metaphor of the butterfly effect) revealed how their impact might be tremendous 
for the shape that a system might take over time. As it happened in chaotic systems research, 
in the media field too, information technologies now create the possibility to distinguish the 
individual units/components of the image (e.g. the pixel). There are certain scholars who have 
argued that contemporary complex films somehow incorporate digitization, introducing a 
“database aesthetics” in their narrative form (Cameron 2008: 42; see also Cubitt 2004, Kinder 
2002, Manovich 2001), and thus, treating their narratives as composed by pieces (of data) that 
can be individually accessed and reordered. Allan Cameron has stressed that complex films 
thus display modularity, which is a form of aggregation, and also a characteristic feature of 
new media (Manovich 2001). These films also highlight and remix their individual 
components, somehow reproducing at the plot level their ontological transformation.  
 Modularity also characterizes complex systems approaches—which consider systems 
dynamic and tentative organizations subject to the different interrelations between the 
components/subsystems (Varela 1990: 20). A crucial difference between the modularity of 
systems and that of databases is that in complex systems the components self-organize, and 
therefore display an agency of their own, instead of that of an external user. By contrast, the 
components of a database do not have any inherent systemic qualities; they show such 
qualities only if there is an external agency that enables the aggregation of the components. 
Yet, as I will maintain throughout this study, the theoretical approach of complex systems is 
adequate for the analysis of complex films, as it releases the degrees of freedom in the 
interactions of the components that they contain, and furthermore, their self-organizing 
potential in creating meaningful wholes. Self-organization is here suggested to take place at 
the interface between the text’s form and the cognitive activity of the recipient, the area which 
narratology, especially in its cognitive strands, addresses using the term “narrative”—with the 
defining characteristics that I have already problematized.  
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 The insertion of the theoretical tools of complex systems theory serves the need to 
address the dynamic filmic and cognitive formations that emerge through the connection of 
heterogeneous and spatially distributed elements. These new tools can therefore significantly 
contribute, conceptually as well as methodologically, to the analysis of complex narrative 
films. A complex systems theory for complex films would translate between the two mutually 
unintelligible levels of the strictly computational properties of the digital, which lends its form 
to contemporary films, and the human consciousness that still needs to incorporate it into a 
meaningful system. This process of translation would however not subordinate the one to the 
other. In current media theory, the dilemma between narrative and database and their different 
media forms and types of data organization is one of the most controversial topics (see 
Manovich 2001). This dissertation will move towards transcendence of this dilemma, which is 
incarnated in the paradoxical form of complex films, as Marsha Kinder among others has 
indicated in her theorization of database narratives. In my view, the solution is not to use 
complex films (or “database narratives”) as agents of reconciliation between narrative and 
database, but to study in what ways these films fail to fully accommodate either of these two 
different cultural forms. Responsible for this ‘failure’ is that complex films are neither 
databases nor narratives; they are complex systems. On the one hand, databases are not easily 
compatible with the idea of a system, because their elements do not form a coherent whole. On 
the other hand, narrative has always been compatible with the idea of a meaningful and 
‘closed’ system. In its theorization, through the interplay between syuzhet and fabula (Russian 
formalism) or récit, histoire and narration (Genette), narrative is a textual and cognitive 
organization that tests its elements (events in the text) against a backdrop of a certain order 
(the one implied by the fabula or histoire), which follows the rules of causality and temporal 
and spatial continuity. In the light of the recent expansion of the ideas of complexity, many 
theorists argued that narrative has always been complex, mostly referring to the cognitive 
processes of the authors and the viewers in their mental structuring of a storyline.14 However, 
what the contemporary (and highly self-reflexive) movies of the complex film tendency make 
possible is to trace how they build their complexity through processes of aggregation of 
individual components. These processes can be described in complex systemic terms, and yet 
differ from the modes of systemic organization associated with narrative. What I suggest is 
thus not a simple inversion of the causal sequence, one that, instead of imposing the order of a 
preexisting narrative structure on the dispersed textual components of films, would start from 
the latter in order to prove narrative as an ‘emergent’ order. This is, after all, what narratology 
has always been doing in an often fascinating way. Rather, my approach points at a departure 
from narrative and a set up towards unpredictable and new directions beyond it.  
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Remarks on my theoretical approach, structure and methodology   
 Cinema offers a fertile ground for my research, not only because it is from this medium 
that the theories of complex narratives have resurfaced, but also because in cinema “narrative 
integration” has been playing such a restrictive role in film production. Because of this 
standardization of the narrative model in cinema, the contemporary play with the narrative 
form creates more significant perturbations than in other media that have a fragmentary nature, 
such as television. Moreover, that proportion of cinema theory that is based on narrative 
cinema, such as Bordwell’s, often tends to over-emphasize the forces that are centripetal in the 
“experimentations” of contemporary cinema (pointing back to narrative and its modes of 
organizing meaning),15 rather than centrifugal (pointing beyond narrative).  
 In the history of film theory there have been significant systemic approaches to film, 
like the structuralist approach of Christian Metz, influenced by Saussurian semiotics. 
Bordwell’s and Thompson’s approach to films is also systemic in principle, since they define a 
film’s form as a system: “film form is a system—that is, a unified set of related, 
interdependent elements” (2008: 65). In the present work I do not follow a semiotic 
framework for systems, but one that, as already broached, was gradually shaped through the 
development of systems theories, especially in the second half of the 20th and the beginning of 
the 21st century, and the rising interest in systems’ complexity. Moreover, I stress the complex 
and not just the systemic properties of films. It is only through the former, as I will argue, that 
the connection between films, cinema and other systems can be highlighted.  
 When it comes to the discussion of contemporary “complex narratives”, and especially 
“forking-path”, “puzzle” and “network” narratives, Bordwell reaches to the science of 
complex systems, but stays mostly at the surface of ‘thematic influence’ that these films have 
received from it. For instance, he sees Run Lola Run as indicative of the popularization of 
chaos theory (in the form of “the butterfly effect”) and various “network” narratives to be 
influenced by the popularization of network theory, in the form of “six degrees of separation” 
(Bordwell 2006: 93, 100). Although my own approach, like Bordwell’s, is also influenced by 
these theories, my goal is to show that complex films do not reflect complex systems, but 
function themselves as such, in the context of their complex environment, that of the 
institution cinema and its own embeddedness to more extended systems. Thus, films do not 
fulfill their purpose when they become coherent wholes of interdependent elements in the 
mind of the spectator. These wholes rather stay open and function as nodes in the networks 
that connect films with other films, cinema with other media systems, and media systems with 
the complex system of global economy and cultural production. Establishing a link between 
complex films and complex systems and highlighting their structural similarities, is to show 
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that individual films—as textual systems—participate in complex networks of systems that 
function in a homologous way.16 Therefore a change of theoretical and potentially of 
methodological framework is necessitated to address individual films as constituent units of 
complex cinema.  
 A comprehensive study of the complex workings of complex films would move 
beyond the textual level, taking into account the ways that the ‘senders’ and ‘receivers’ of 
these film-texts participate in their complexity. The inclusion of qualitative and quantitative 
data about film production and distribution conditions, audience reception, or individual film 
perception (which now flourishes in neuropsychology with the help of sensorimotor data-
mining and fMRI representations) would make the study of the complexity of individual films 
or of groups of films more comprehensive. My theoretical study could be used not to draw 
definite conclusions but to construct hypotheses about how complex processes found in 
specific film texts might also be the case at larger scales of cinematic organization. In this 
study, I take the individual films as units of analysis. Thus, I consider film texts the small units 
that compose the institution cinema. Since complex systemic approaches favor bottom-up 
methods and “unit operations”, I believe that the study of these small cinematic units as 
complex systems in their own right might provide insight into how they influence and 
determine the current development of cinema.   
 In the course of my research, I observed how in contemporary complex films the 
diegesis is internally ‘multiplied’ into several temporal loops, frames, agencies, perspectives 
and story-threads. It is this textual multiplicity that makes the theoretical and methodological 
approach of these films as complex systems plausible. The ‘non-linear’ arrangement and 
composition of heterogeneous units in complex film texts arguably affects and transforms the 
way their diegetic worlds are organized. In my methodological approach, the organizing 
principles of time, causality and space are not taken as starting points and pre-existing axes 
that configure the films’ diegetic organization. Rather, these principles cede their place to 
processes that emerge from the complex interrelations and aggregations of units into emergent 
structures that engage the viewer in a different way than narrative does.  
 The dissertation is divided into three parts and each part opens with a chapter about an 
individual film. The complexity of the films I analyze is revealed by a method of following the 
gradual articulation of their elements—the aggregates that their diegetic pieces form. In this 
way the films function as heterogeneous and expanded surfaces on which complexity builds 
up. The complex systems framework also informs the structure of the dissertation, in terms of 
chapter arrangement: within each part, the films are put forth as units of analysis, while 
bridges to other films of the “complex narrative” tendency and to the relevant theories 
(narratological and systemic) are gradually built in the chapters that follow.  
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 The second chapter of each part deals with the problem of the paradoxical nature of 
complex films, highlighting their ‘anti-narrative’ features. Thus, after analysing each film, I 
problematize the fact that characteristics that have traditionally been considered as antithetical 
to narrative, such as self-reference, loose causality and description, proliferate in them, as well 
as in other contemporary complex films. This paradox calls for a deeper investigation into 
narrative’s own internally subversive dynamics, and therefore, its limitations.  
 In the third chapter of each part, the anti-narrative features proliferating in complex 
films are reinterpreted as organizing forces through the framework of complex systems theory. 
Thus I derive from selected parts of the theory and philosophy of systems, three fundamental 
processes of complexity, namely reflexivity, emergence and pattern formation, and show how 
time, causality and space —traditionally considered the organizing principles of narrative—
can now be thought as the products of these complex processes. Reflexivity, emergence and 
pattern are arguably modes of—distributed and dynamic—organization characterizing both 
the textual/filmic arrangement of story worlds and their cognitive processing by the viewers. 
Thus, the complex systems framework provides me with lenses to reflect upon complex 
processes involved in contemporary films that cannot be confined to the label ‘narrative’, and 
to suggest a new, alternative model for the analysis of these films.  
 
Chapter outline  
Part 1: Reflexivity 
 Part 1 opens with an analysis of the film The Final Cut (Omar Naim 2004). 
Transforming the fictional device found in the film’s diegesis, namely the ‘implant’, into a 
theoretical device, I treat the temporal loops of the film as implants of self-reference that 
gradually compose the film’s organization in a modular, but also non-linear and increasingly 
complex way.  
 In Chapter 2 I examine the function of self-reflexivity in contemporary complex films 
against the backdrop of the traditional theorization of self-reflexivity (or self-reference) in 
narratology and film theory. These traditions have considered self-reflexivity to be an anti-
narrative device. Particularly since the 1970s, self-reflexive means in cinema have been 
considered to counteract the ‘illusion’ that every fictional story is supposed to create. 
However, a significant part of the recent literature on complex films seems to be suggesting 
that their feature of self-reflexivity creates curiosity and care for the story world instead of—or 
even along with—critical distance. Distinguishing between metanarrational and metafictional 
reflexivity I suggest that the self-reflexivity found in contemporary complex films is primarily 
metanarrational, and establishes feedback between the film and the viewer, inviting the latter 
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to participate in the constitution of the diegesis. This function implies that, even when it does 
not serve the construction of a coherent narrative, self-reflexivity still is an important factor of 
organization.  
 Chapter 3 draws on the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann, where “reflexivity” is the 
process of temporal organization of systems. This organization is effectuated through 
continuous self-observation (or self-reference) of a system. Connecting this self-observation 
with metanarration in contemporary complex films, I argue that these films, through multiple 
instances of self-reference, make events “re-enter” the filmic process (for example, through 
flashbacks and flash-forwards), and thus constitute their temporality in a non-sequential way.  
 
Part 2: Emergence  
 Chapter 4 is an analysis of the film Burn After Reading (Ethan and Joel Coen 2008), 
testing it against the backdrop of the films theorized as complex, and especially those 
characterized by Bordwell as “network narratives”. Looking at the different types of causality 
involved in the diegesis of Burn After Reading, I differentiate between an anthropomorphic 
micro-level of causality and a nonhuman macro-level. I argue that the film requires from its 
viewer to combine these different causal levels in a nonlinear way in order to construct a 
‘network’ of action between multiple characters-nodes, and to follow their heterogeneous 
trajectories that never form a comprehensive whole.  
 Chapter 5 is an examination of the workings of causality in the contemporary complex 
films that contain multiple characters, and which have been characterized as “ensemble”, “hub 
and spoke” or “network” films. The defining characteristic of classical narrative films, i.e. 
their cause and effect chains of events, appear in these “complex” films loosened, giving their 
place to contingency. Criticizing the way Bordwell discusses this “loose causality” of network 
narratives as ultimately returning to the “customary path” of classic narration, I argue that 
causal processes taking place in complex networks may also be at work in network films. In 
the latter, traditional causality (in the form of cause and effect chains) is suspended, while a 
synergetic causality emerging from the interactions between characters becomes prominent. 
These interactions are not only narrative but systemic, as long as they increase the 
informational flow of the diegesis, and create dynamics that connect the micro-level of 
anthropomorphic agency and the macro-(structural) level of formal transformation, in a 
nonlinear—and not customary— way.  
 In Chapter 6 I draw on the science of complex networks in order to explain how the 
model of causality suggested in Chapter 5 is one conceived in terms of emergence, i.e. the 
self-organization that spontaneously results from the complex interactions between the various 
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units of a system. Emergence in complex networks is not independent from the micro-agents; 
it is rather the result of their aggregation, which channels their agency to a different structural 
level. Such “pattern-based” causality (Goldstein 1996) arguably gives more precision to the 
“loose causality” observed in complex films.  Moreover, it casts doubt as to whether narrative, 
as a concept associated—in cognitive terms—with the construction of a causal-logical 
sequence between events, may be the end-result of the transformative dynamics that complex 
films release.  
 
Part 3: Pattern 
 Chapter 7 approaches the film Gomorrah (Gomorra, Matteo Garrone 2008) as a 
complex film. I suggest that in terms of cinematography and montage, but also in its narrative 
construction, Gomorrah demands from the viewer effort in order to orient themself in the 
filmic environment, by shifting between different spatial registers and creating connections 
between disparate perspectives. These connections gradually produce, textually but also 
cognitively, a complex space, which seems to extend beyond the closed diegetic universe of 
the film.  
 In Chapter 8 I examine the way that space and its ‘complexity’ has been theorized in 
narratives and films. I argue that the films of the complex narrative tendency tend to have a 
discontinuous spatial composition, which becomes apparent with regard to multiple units of 
analysis (frame, shot, scene, episode). To show how this discontinuity produces space, I revisit 
the narratological concept of description, which has always stayed at the margins of narrative, 
but now seems to become a form that encompasses the latter. I argue that description responds 
to the spatial heterogeneity of complex films, and at the same time triggers the viewer’s 
activity of constituting a diegetic world by making connections between the distributed pieces, 
and weaving patterns out of them.   
 The concluding Chapter 9 attempts to clarify some contradicting notions of pattern that 
have been used in theoretical approaches of complex films. Combining a spatial definition of 
pattern (drawing on the literary theory of the “spatial form” by Joseph Frank) and an emergent 
one from complex systems theory, I argue that complex films create patterns both intra-
diegetically (through their bottom-up organization by the aggregation of heterogeneous units) 
and extra-diegetically, by aggregating heterogeneous cinematic traditions of narrative order 
and contingency. Complex films thus build for cinema an organization that is coherent enough 
to navigate, orient itself and evolve in a complex environment.  
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PART 1: REFLEXIVITY 
An individual film, The Final Cut (Omar Naim, 2004, US/Canada/Germany), will be used as 
starting point for the study of particular processes of complexity in films of the “complex 
narrative” tendency. This film, although it has attracted scant attention from theorists of 
complex narrative films, shares common characteristics with other films of this tendency, and 
particularly stands out due to its intense self-reflexivity. While the issue of self-reflexivity in 
the context of complex films will be extensively discussed in Chapter 2, The Final Cut will be 
a useful point of reference throughout Part 1. In my plot-oriented analysis of the film in this 
first chapter, I will illustrate particular motivations, techniques and functions of self-
reflexivity, so as to prepare the reader for the discussion of this concept in the next two 
chapters of Part 1. The self-reflexivity of The Final Cut is intertwined with the non-sequential 
temporal structure of the plot, and raises question about the fundamental characteristics of 
narrative cinema, related to issues of time and the ‘cut’ of editing. The fact that The Final Cut 
does so from the perspective of mainstream Hollywood cinema is symptomatic, as I see it, of a 
shift in cinematic institutional practices, which strive to accommodate more and more 
complex forms of narration. 
 
1. Implanted time: The Final Cut and the reflexive loops of complex 
narratives*2 
 
 “Your life wasn’t what you thought it was… Would you live it differently?” The 
taglines of The Final Cut prepare the viewer that the future and the past are mutually 
dependent in this film.17 The story of The Final Cut is set in the near future of a developed 
Western city,18 where nanotechnologies and their applications in biomedicine have made it 
possible to record all human audiovisual perception with the surgical installment of a biochip, 
called the “zoe-implant”, in the brain of unborn foetuses. As the person is born and grows up, 
this biochip, entirely organic, becomes fully integrated in the brain tissue to the point that it 
becomes a functional part of it, “virtually undetectable”. According to the plot, most of the 
time the bearers of the implant are unaware of this “miraculous gift” that their parents gave 
them before birth until they reach adulthood. But by the time they turn 21, EYE-tech, the 
company that produces and distributes the zoe-implants, advises parents to reveal to their 
children that all their memories so far have been, and will continue being recorded, until the 
                                                
2 A version of this chapter has been published as an article in New Review of Film and Television 
Studies, 9(4), 2011, pp. 415-434. It is available online at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17400309.2011.606531  
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end of their lives. The implant cannot be extracted while the carrier is alive without risking 
severe brain damage. After death though, this biochip can be surgically extracted and used as a 
peculiar memory stick. As soon as the chip is inserted into a specifically designed computer, it 
makes possible to retrieve footage from all recorded memories and to make movies out of 
them.  
 These exclusively biographical movies, called “rememories”, are publicly projected in 
special ceremonies dedicated to deceased implant carriers. The projection takes place in 
church chambers that have been turned into cinema theatres for this purpose, while friends and 
relatives of the deceased constitute the audience. Made out of personal perceptional archives, 
the rememories not only produce a flattering postmortem portrait of the deceased, gracing 
them with an honored memory, but they also promise to keep their memory literally ‘alive’, as 
the rememories will remain available for projection and viewing. However, we soon realize 
that it is EYE-tech that owns the footage and controls the rememories. Through them, it is not 
really the memory of the deceased that stays alive; rememories are rather constructed from 
personal memories re-experienced by a stranger: a “cutter”.  
 According to the plot, professional cutters edit the footage retrieved from the extracted 
implants and decide whether something is worth being included in the rememory or not. The 
main character of The Final Cut, Alan Hakman19 (played by Robin Williams), is such a cutter, 
a specialized editor of rememories. Socially alienated, he lives through the lives of others, 
being totally attached to his editing equipment—the “guillotine”, as it is ironically called in 
the cutters’ jargon—with the help of which he cuts and edits the bits and pieces of other 
fragmentary life-times. A “sin-eater” as he calls himself after an ancient tradition,20 he has to 
carry all the ethical burden of his ‘cutting decisions’ about the traces that a human life leaves 
behind.  
 Placed in a science fiction context, The Final Cut appears as an Orwellian cinematic 
tale about the integration of technology and biology. The appropriation of biodigital 
technologies by sinister corporations is pictured as enabling the omnipresence of surveillance 
to expand from public spaces to the most intimate space, that of the interior of the human 
body, and particularly to the center of human agency and self-control: the brain. Human 
agency thus seems to be in peril—as we are constantly reminded in the course of the film—but 
strangely, in the near-future society where the story is set, the unprecedented violation of 
private life that EYE-tech performs is not imposed by some authoritarian regime, as it often 
happens in dystopian science fiction, and especially in works such as 1984. Rather, at first it 
appears as socially acceptable and even desirable, since this miraculous technology is 
supposed to have the seemingly innocent purpose of making rememories. From this 
perspective, The Final Cut’s futuristic speculation updates the centralized model of control of 
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the Orwellian tradition into the current actual conditions of the contemporary globalized 
societies, where human lifetimes are recorded, uploaded and distributed (in platforms such as 
Youtube and Facebook) through what seems to be a ‘bottom-up’ process, starting from the 
users’ full complicity and desire. At the same time, The Final Cut points at the connections 
between this tendency towards increased commodification and control of ‘self-broadcasting’ 
and the cinematic apparatus. Modernity prescribed the merging of machine-time with human-
time as an economic necessity. At the other side of Taylorism’s mechanization of the worker 
in the line of production, cinema also played its crucial role in the commodification of life-
times, as it has been the pioneer technology of the modern shift to the capitalization of leisure, 
to this merging of the machine-time with the human time (Cubitt 2004: 51). From this 
perspective, the idea behind The Final Cut’s story, that of a quasi-cinematic camera being 
implanted into the human brain and becoming an undetectable part of it, rendering life-time 
into commodity, seems like the extreme consequence of a development that started more than 
a century ago.  
 In The Final Cut’s world, human lifetimes are literally turned into commodities, 
implant footages that can be stored in hard disks and distributed by a corporation, for the time 
being serving relatively innocent rememories, but with unknown future implications. EYE-
tech is pictured as exploiting the apparent people’s ‘need’ to achieve immortality by recording 
their ephemeral perception in lasting materials. At the same time, a web of omnipresent and 
distributed surveillance is being created by the implant carriers themselves, who, without 
intention, record all the people they encounter, along with their own personal thoughts and 
secrets, into their zoe-implants, which ultimately end up in the archives of EYE-tech. Human 
life becomes a commodity wrapped into an appealing high-tech package that seems to have 
already seduced the individuals populating the not-so-futuristic society of The Final Cut.  
 
Cyberpunk’s rememory  
 According to The Final Cut’s plot, EYE-tech faces resistance by some rebellion groups 
of neo-punks or “anti-zoe hippies”, as they are called in the film, who organize a wide range 
of reactions, from protests against the corporation to “terrorist” attacks (arsons against EYE-
tech’s factories). The anti-zoe hippies have also invented an “electrosynth tattoo”, made out of 
a particular kind of ink that interferes with the implants, “blocking them from recording audio 
or video”. Part of the more radical branches of the anti-implant resistance is Alan’s antagonist, 
Fletcher (Jim Caviezel), an ex-cutter who quit his job and decided to fight against the EYE-
tech Corporation. Fletcher now exerts his bitter critique on Alan, trying to shake his devotion 
to his guillotine. But Alan faces his work on implants with cynicism: “I didn’t invent the 
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technology”, he responds to Fletcher’s accusations. “If people didn’t want it, they wouldn’t 
buy it, Fletcher. It fulfills a human need”.  
 However, we soon find out that what drives Alan’s devotion to the rememory industry 
is not cynicism but guilt. Alan carries his own sins that he would wish to erase, just as those of 
his clients. It is revealed that when he was a kid he caused the death of another boy (Louis); 
and the memory of this old ‘sin’ determined his life and his choices ever since. Now offering 
his clients a relief from the burden of their sins, which otherwise would taint their memory 
forever, Alan provides them with a decent commemoration, making out of their life-footage a 
coherent and taintless narrative, one which he would obviously desire for himself.  
 Beyond its sci-fi genre classification, The Final Cut seems to partake of a wider 
cinematic tendency, the one of complex films. The film’s connection with the “complex 
narrative” tendency is multifaceted. One way to approach the film’s complexity is through its 
“puzzle” or “mind-game” character. Mind-game films, according to Elsaesser, often involve a 
series of ‘tricks’ or “mind-games” that the films play with their characters but also with the 
viewer. They carefully prepare a twist that comes to fundamentally alter the story so far, and 
to make it demanding reinterpretation through a different lens;21 and IC technologies are often 
deployed to mediate these reflexive surprises. The narratives usually start with a hero who 
thinks that he has control over his life, a presupposition that soon turns out to be groundless. 
The heroes of mind-game films, like Alan, while observing (or manipulating) the lives of 
others get to realize that their own life is also being observed. They identify with the role of 
the ‘operator of the machine’ (in this case, the guillotine), but soon find out that in reverse, 
someone else operates upon them.  They are neither the omnipotent rational agents, nor the 
masters of the mechanism, but ‘automata’ themselves. The Final Cut’s tagline “your life 
wasn't what you thought it was”, could thus be the motto of puzzle films.  
 The crucial twist in The Final Cut comes when Alan accidentally discovers that he 
himself carries a zoe-implant in his brain. This finding brings him face to face with his own 
cyborgization and potential exploitation by EYE-tech. He edits implants while his own 
implant (and, consequently, his lifetime) is meant to be edited. The revelation that he is an 
implant carrier—something prohibited to cutters by their professional code, as the film has 
already informed us since the very beginning—is for Alan a shocking self-reflexive 
experience. So we see him smashing the mirror in which he first faces his reflection, 
‘disappearing’ into the city’s crowd encircled by echoing voices, leaning against a wall and 
collapsing helplessly on the pavement. He is found confronted with his own limits, as posed 
by his image, his voice and his body, respectively. Alan realizes that his placement in the 
system is not one of an autonomous observer of others’ life-times: EYE-tech’s project of life-
commodification includes him in its raw products. After this realization, the definite 
	  
 
28 
boundaries that Alan perceived as separating and protecting him from the world get instantly 
blurred. And the secret of the machine’s (as well as of his own) existence is kept in the—
ironically—dusty paper archives of a corporation that renders every single moment of his life-
time into footage ready to be ‘cut’.  
 It would be useful to take into account some special genre characteristics of The Final 
Cut that reveal a continuity between the current cultural tendency of complex films and a 
somewhat older cultural tendency, that of cyberpunk. Such continuity is especially 
illuminating when the issue of agency is raised in the context of complex narratives. The 
characterization of The Final Cut as “cyberpunk” not only by relevant specialized websites 
(like the cyberpunkreview.com), but also by commercial sites (like blockbuster.com) comes as 
no surprise when one takes into account its two core themes. Both themes have also been 
characteristic of cyberpunk, as a—mainly 1980s—genre and a cultural movement: the merging 
of technology with the human body (implants and other kinds of prostheses have thrived in 
cyberpunk science fiction) and the resistance against the appropriation of technologies by 
powerful corporations, especially with the use of technology by marginal individuals or 
subcultures in a rather creative way (for example, the “electro-synth tattoos” of The Final 
Cut). The narrative imbalance of The Final Cut, between the ‘active’ pole of the anti-zoe-
implant resistance and the ‘passive’ pole of Alan’s own cyborgization, points at the same 
problem that was central in cyberpunk stories: it seems hard to fight against the EYE-tech’s 
exploitation of the implants when these devices have already been implanted in the brains of 
those who attempt to resist. Information technologies have been internalized and the 
traditional locus of resistance (the subject) has been displaced.22 So, how can one use 
technologies to fight against their control by corporate and state interests when one is being 
invaded by technologies? At the dawn of the expansion of information technologies and 
networks, cyberpunk brought to the fore a tension between technologically mediated self-
reflexivity—what has been called cyberpunk’s “prosthetic consciousness”, “a reflexive 
awareness of supplementation”, according to Robert Rawdon Wilson’s formulation (1995: 
242)—and agency, at least in the form of oppositional action. Being controlled at the same 
time one resists, one also has to doubt his or her own motives and means of resistance. Thus, 
not only in cyberpunk but also in contemporary meta-cyberpunk, complex stories, the twist-
moment, which always involves a degree of self-reflexivity, is at the same time a moment of 
revelation and uncertainty about one’s own autonomous mind-body potency. Uncertainty and 
ambivalence, often exacerbated to the point of paranoia, have been characteristic features of 
both complex/puzzle films and cyberpunk stories.  
 Hybrid films such as The Final Cut appear concerned not just with the technological 
incarnations of information, but also, and perhaps more, with their own ability to communicate 
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as potentially informational entities. Complex films are self-reflexive regarding their own 
cyborg nature—which has for long been underlying modern narratives—and “make explicit, 
to varying degrees, the technological underpinnings of the narrative mechanism” (Cameron 
2008: 25). As Allan Cameron puts it, complex films “reveal both the projection of subjectivity 
into the domain of technology and the projection of technology into the domain of narrative” 
(26). Having incorporated in their narrative form and the mode of their production the 
cyborgization of subjectivity, complex narratives make the play between human and 
nonhuman, real (actual) and virtual, internal and external, body and mind, even more fleeting 
than it already was in cyberpunk. Self-reflexivity is not only found inside their stories but also 
in their way of constructing the diegesis and the means they use to make the viewer’s 
experience similarly uncertain and fleeting.  
 Like cyberpunk works, The Final Cut also deals with the problem of agency and 
cyborgization at the diegetic level, but beyond that, it becomes, in a sense, an allegorical 
reflection upon the cyborgization of contemporary complex films. In the rest of this chapter, I 
will focus on the different levels of self-reflexivity that are involved in The Final Cut, both 
inside and outside the diegesis.23 I find self-reference in this film being interwoven with a kind 
of ‘cyborg’ temporality, a hybrid of the linear narrative temporality and of the spatialized, 
‘modular’ construction of time that the “culture of the database” (see Manovich 2001) 
privileges.  
 
Self-reference and recomposable memory  
 The twist of The Final Cut, which comes with the revelation that Alan is an implant 
carrier, gives a push to its main subplot to develop. Before knowing about his own implant 
(his ignorance is explained by the fact that his parents died before having the chance to inform 
him about its existence), Alan has just started to doubt how coherent the narrative of his own 
life is. The conception of himself as a sinner—apart from “sin-eater”—is disrupted, when in 
the footage of a zoe-implant he is currently working on, he comes across a man who looks 
familiar. His expressions and gestures remind him of Louis, the boy he always believed dead 
by his own fault. Alan’s memory and self-conception thus asks for reconfiguration, and this 
only gets possible with the discovery of his own implant, which has been storing all his 
experiences so far. Thus, unlike what would happen in more traditional cyberpunk stories, The 
Final Cut’s main character has to confront not the implant industry, but instead, himself and 
his past. The name of the implant suggests that Alan’s entire adult life (zoe in Greek) might be 
seen as an implanted prosthesis. As he admits in a moment of self-collapse: “One memory; 
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one single incident has made me who I am”. But the validity of this memory now needs to be 
put under scrutiny.   
 A similarly self-reflexive contemplation of the validity of memory seems to have been 
the occasion that gave birth to the idea of The Final Cut. The film’s sci-fi trope was rather the 
‘topping’ that the director and scriptwriter, Omar Naim, used in order to enrich the concerns 
that emerged during his first steps in film editing, about the gap between collective and 
personal memory, official and unofficial (lived) history. Naim was born in 1977 in Lebanon, 
and The Final Cut has been his first feature film, which he managed to develop after 
submitting his script proposal to the French project “Equinox”, right after finishing film school 
in Boston.24 Naim explains: “The Final Cut is about editing and memory. […] It’s the 
Lebanese notion of mass memory, and people’s very subjective memory and view of the 
world. […] This subsequently dictates how society functions. I extrapolated that into sci-fi 
theory” (Naim 2004a). 
 Being still a student in film school and working on his documentary thesis Grand 
Theater: A Tale of Beirut (1999),25 Naim came up with the idea that gave birth to The Final 
Cut when the confrontation between realism and editing became hard to handle:  
I think the idea came in several different stages. First of all I was editing my 
documentary film at school. I was the only person in the editing room. The school 
had just got the first Avid so I spent nine months there and I sort of became the 
school’s editing guy. So I was editing everyone else’s movies because I had access 
to it. While editing my documentary it really became clear that this sort of myth of 
objectivity in documentaries is just myth. It’s all the style and manipulating, it’s 
drama. So that was one part of it. The second part was that I was away from my 
family who were on the other side of the world and I started thinking that if my 
life goes on like this, I’m going to start seeing them less and less. So I thought 
what I should do is shoot these really long interviews with my parents, like 
twenty-hour interviews that way I could get all their little antidotes [sic] and 
stories out of them and I could always watch that and enjoy their company. But I 
never did that because that it’s [sic] not them. That would be replacing my actual 
memories. Fading as my memories are already. We all take pictures of each other 
and we all have home movies and there is a need we all have to visually preserve 
our lives. That combined with this realization about editing is how this idea came 
about. (Naim 2004b)  
 The Final Cut’s narrative self-consciousness, which Garrett Stewart finds exceptional, 
characterizing the The Final Cut as the “most narratologically self-conscious of films” 
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(Stewart 2006: 184),26 seems to be springing from its maker’s self-reflection as film editor on 
this unavoidable condition of filmmaking that editing is, and on his own personal relation—
interwoven with his cultural background—to cinema’s treatment of time and memory. In The 
Final Cut, this finite character of editing is coupled with an ethical questioning of the 
‘validity’ and truthfulness of the cut. As Fletcher asserts in the film (perhaps playing the role 
of Naim’s mouthpiece), the rememories “distort personal history, therefore all history” and 
rewrite the past “for the sake of pleasant memories”. With the fictional invention of 
rememories, and because of their claim to ‘truth’, the distortion of cutting is pushed to the 
extreme. The life-accounts that these commemorations produce are not only supposed to be 
‘real’, but also final—thus unchangeable.  
 The nostalgia for the pre-cut acquisition, also evident in Naim’s interview, is acted out 
in The Final Cut, both diegetically (by the function of the guillotine) and formally (by the 
structure of the plot). The latter is enabled by The Final Cut’s own carefully implanted fallacy, 
the false memory presented to the spectator at the beginning of the film. This “one single” 
memory that made Alan “who he is”, the memory of Louis’s lethal accident, has already been 
revealed to us in—what only much later proves to be— a flashback (and a false memory) 
placed at the beginning of the film, before the opening titles.27 During a family visit in the 
countryside a summer long ago, Alan, at the age of ten, meets Louis, who asks him to join him 
in his play. The two kids soon get involved in an adventurous and playful exploration of the 
nearby area. They enter an abandoned construction in the middle of a field, and start exploring 
the unknown territory. Bold and adventurous, Alan is the first who steps on a wooden plank 
that bridges two floors of the old construction and successfully crosses the gap, without 
putting much effort. On the opposite, Louis, who appears as a rather passive and hesitant 
follower, is scared to cross, but Alan insists pushing him to make it. So Louis attempts to cross 
over, but, half way to the other side, the plank starts shaking and he loses his balance. 
Grabbing the edge of the opposite floor where Alan already stands, the rest of his body 
hanging in midair, he calls for help. But Alan stands frozen and does not reach out to catch the 
boy. So Louis falls down to the cement floor. Alan runs downstairs to find Louis’s body lying 
on the floor, with a red pool of blood spreading under it. Terrified, he steps back and runs to 
the exit, passing in front of a wall where a few moments earlier, while he was still playing 
with Louis, he had engraved his name: ALAN. This scene from his childhood, the memory of 
this lethal accident that he unintentionally caused, haunts Alan for the rest of his life. It is the 
moment around which the pattern of his life unfolds in a web of guilt.  
 In this initial scene there is already a loop structure: a moment where the scene folds 
back upon itself—with the emphasis put on the name of Alan written on the wall of the 
warehouse, in the beginning and in the end of this interior scene. The closing of this sequence 
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with Alan’s name engraved on the wall suggests that this inscription is permanent, and will 
stay on the wall proving Alan’s guilt. However, at this point the film deceives us—it is the 
inscription of the whole scene’s memory that will be challenged afterwards. This is not the 
only case of such implanted circularity.28 The Final Cut is a film that constitutes its 
organization through a similar loop—and through a layering of ‘implants’.    
 The main loop structure of The Final Cut is the one that makes the plot proceed 
towards the revisiting of this starting sequence. The memory of the lethal event that he 
accidentally caused is supposed to have made Alan “who he is”, and the biochip that he 
discovers in his brain will give him—at a later point in the story—a unique opportunity to 
navigate through his own memory archive and revisit the incident that produced this memory. 
Even though according to the plot Alan attempts to join the resistance of anti-zoe hippies in 
order to block his implant’s recording, his will to ‘fight’ his implant and resist his life-time’s 
exploitation by EYE-tech has to rival with a personal realization: the one that the implant has 
the power to help him solve the mystery of his own past. Thus, blocking the implant’s function 
with the electro-synth tattoo is not enough for him; Alan will soon attempt to access his own 
footage.   
 Managing to convince some colleagues to help him, Alan gets connected to his implant 
through electrodes, ‘pirating’ the data that the implant’s camera sends to its microprocessor. 
Now he can really see through the camera-eye placed inside his brain. As his human eyes 
watch the camera’s live inscription, Alan gets a view of the world through a lower-definition 
digital eye. The signal is directly transmitted to a guillotine placed in front of him running its 
editing software, and Alan has to use it in a careful and timesaving mode. He has only five 
minutes at his disposal, or else he risks dying. He uses the touchpad to navigate back in time, 
trying to arrive at the age of ten, when the crucial incident happened. He sees himself again as 
a boy in the mirror, he witnesses his parents’ funeral, his first kiss, and, while time is running 
out, he finally arrives at the scene at the old warehouse, where we already saw him playing 
with Louis, in the beginning of the film. Here the spectator, primed with a memory of this 
scene since the opening of The Final Cut, participates on equal terms in the recognition of the 
correct scene. Alan watches again himself and the other boy sword-playing and eventually 
arriving at the dangerous spot, the wooden plank that bridges the opposite levels of the 
construction. But this time things seem slightly different: Louis appears now much more 
dynamic. Playing with the swords, he shouts to Alan: “come and get me!” When Alan crosses 
the gap on the plank, he asks Louis to meet on the ground floor, but Louis insists to cross too. 
Alan once more tries to stop him: “No. Wait. Wait. It isn’t steady anymore”. But Louis does 
not listen; he has already started walking on the plank, which now begins to shake. Standing in 
the middle of the plank, Louis screams: “I can’t move!” Then Alan tries to give him 
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directions: “Ok Louis, you can make it. Just a few more steps”. But Louis loses his balance. 
“Grab my hand!” he shouts. Alan reaches out to grab him but it is too late; Louis falls in the 
void. Alan only manages to grab an amulet that Louis was wearing around his neck.   
 Only seven seconds are left for Alan to discover what finally happened that day. He 
watches himself running down the stairs and arriving wheezy at the ground floor. Time is 
running out and his colleagues shout at him to unplug the electrodes. But Alan does not listen; 
he has come to the point where he as a boy faces the body of his friend lying on the floor. 
Then something unexpected happens. Alan accidentally steps over a can full of paint, the can 
is overturned and the red paint spreads all over the floor around Louis’s body. Alan sees 
himself stepping back, so much absorbed under his shock and watching his shoes leaving 
traces on the thick red liquid that spreads underneath them, that he does hear the quiet 
coughing of Louis.  
 Time has run out and an electric shock throws Alan off his chair. His friends run to 
help him. When he finds his senses a few minutes later, he is not anymore the sin-carrier that 
he used to be: “I saw him. I tried to help. I told him to turn around. But he wouldn’t listen. He 
fell but, he was breathing…!”, says full of relief. “It wasn’t blood. It was paint. Now I 
remember”.  
 The ‘final’ cut made by Alan’s memory, the scene that he ‘chose’ to remember, might 
have been distorting but not definite. Assisted by his zoe-implant, Alan manages to revisit and 
alter this one single memory that configured his subjectivity. Thus, the huge gap at the core of 
his life so far gets finally bridged, not with a wooden plank but with electrodes connecting him 
to a biodigital implant in his brain. Here The Final Cut seems to be fulfilling not only the 
desire of Alan for a taintless past but also, in a way, the fantasy of Naim to recuperate through 
recordings the living presence of his beloved ones.   
  
 Due to their decomposable and recomposable form that mimics the structure of the 
database, Cameron characterizes complex narratives as “modular”. The process of accessing 
individual units in a synthesis and modifying, removing or using them to make a different 
construction, gives the overall synthesis a modular character. The recomposability of 
“modular narratives” extends, according to Cameron, to the ethical plane, especially in films 
with reverse temporal structure, as it creates the possibility of redemption for their characters 
(2008: 35).29 One could argue that such a tendency towards redemption is also apparent in The 
Final Cut’s modularity. The main hero of the film edits others’ lives and finally, assisted by 
his implant, manages to do the same with his own life. Thus, he gets the chance to weave a 
life-story relieved from guilt, purified like the rememories he makes for other people. But the 
possibility for this ‘new’ life does not take place intentionally, or following some kind of plan. 
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It is rather discovered, as if it had always been lying before his eyes, even though a distorting, 
subjective gap between the actual world and the mnemonic trace of its imprint, prevented him 
from seeing it. Rather than consciously driving his destiny, Alan attunes his agency to the one 
of the plot’s “mind-game”, which finally offers him the reassurance that this gap can be 
closed; that his technological prosthesis (the implant) can access and ‘correct’ his mnemonic 
imprints, and thus restore the feedback between his existence and the world that embeds it.  
 Because of its crucial role in the film’s modular function, the zoe-implant technology 
is treated in The Final Cut with an underlying but profound ambivalence: despite all the moral 
critique that the plot communicates against the zoe-implant and its terrifying consequences 
regarding issues of privacy and truth distortion, in the end the implant proves to be exactly the 
only way left for Alan to find the truth about his own past and to feel relief in escaping from it. 
Although the criticism against it intensifies, making the anti-zoe protesters demand their right 
to “remember for themselves”, as we read on their placards, The Final Cut does not seem to 
doubt the value of the implant’s “miraculous gift”, but only the human—immoral—treatment 
of it, in other worlds, the plausibility of the cut.  
 The protagonist of The Final Cut sees through the implant that his whole life so far has 
been founded on a mistake, a trick of his memory. At the same time, the implant provides him 
with a vision of himself before the moment of his subjectification in guilt.30 This new vision 
fundamentally alters his perception of himself, and the pieces of his life’s puzzle are finally 
brought together. The pre-cut footage of the zoe implant’s biocamera is not falsified; on the 
contrary, it may set the carriers free from their own ‘human’ distortions. The implant provides 
the ability to store, retrieve, and ultimately circumvent the distortions of the unconscious. It 
offers Alan an almost transparent experience, mediated by the objectivity of the biodigital eye 
of the camera, and liberated from the subjective factors of guilt, trauma, or repression.  
 Stewart regards The Final Cut as the culmination but also the “dead end” of a cycle of 
films of “psychotemporal transport”, or “recuperative time travel films”, to which he includes 
films such as Johnny Mnemonic (1995),31 Minority Report (2002), Eternal Sunshine of the 
Spotless Mind (2004) and The Butterfly Effect (2004). Stewart’s analysis of The Final Cut 
illuminates the allegories of the zoe-implant technology, with its ability to violate “the passing 
present by a perversely redoubled self-presence” (2006: 177), effectuated by the biocamera’s 
recording. But the recuperative function of the film also lies in the potential offered by the 
zoe-implant’s digital ‘backup’ memory to revisit and ‘correct’ history, an option that in The 
Final Cut does not appear to be something more than a fulfillment of a mind-game. “In the 
end, he sees everything”, promises another tagline of the film (IMDb); when Alan is finally 
able to “see everything” by combining his human limited memory with the ‘objective’ 
machine-memory of the implant, he comes to his own life’s “final cut”. The cracking of the 
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film’s code, the solution of its mind-game, seems to have a similar totalizing effect: the 
solution was part of the game all along.32 It looks as if The Final Cut has fulfilled its plot’s 
purpose; it extracted its own implant. 
 
Between the cut and the ‘paste’ 
 Modularity does not only characterize the story of The Final Cut (in the sense of the 
‘recomposable’ destiny of the main hero), but also the plot and its structure. The opening 
scene—the memory of the play with Louis—is the film’s own implant; it functions as a 
memory trace implanted by the film with the single purpose to be extracted later. In The Final 
Cut’s narrative puzzle, a problematic piece creates a distorted picture, and its replacement 
allows a different picture to appear. Thus, multiple (mind-)games are being played between 
the film and the viewer: not only Alan has to alter the perception/interpretation of his own life-
story, but also the viewers are prompted to reinterpret the film’s story. Both the self-identity of 
the character and the story become modifiable and modular, while the medium of such 
modularity appears to be digital.  
 The implant’s footage bears the marks of real-time recording, and keeps track of the 
date, time and seconds of the inscription. It also displays the name of the carrier. The 
guillotine’s software classifies the footage into distinct scenes and tags them with categories 
(for instance: “childhood”, “puberty”, “sleep”, “career”, “fears”, “marriage” etc.). The 
categorization that the guillotine performs—which The Final Cut visualizes spatially through 
an impressive split-screen scene—makes it easy to navigate memory, access isolated scenes 
and, potentially, replace them. The function of the guillotine is imitated by The Final Cut’s 
plot structure. The film ‘implants’ an object (the false memory in the beginning), and 
structures its narrative so that it will retrieve and revisit the implanted clue (like Alan will do 
with the help of the guillotine) that will falsify not only the character’s but also the viewer’s 
mnemonic inscription of the event. Like Alan, the viewer will have to retrieve from his or her 
own memory the initial scene and compare it with the one presented towards the end of the 
film. The Final Cut thus imitates the modularity associated with digitization and nonlinear 
editing: informational inscription (as binary code) of sensory input makes it spatially 
accessible and modifiable, and alters the procedure of cinematic post-production. The Final 
Cut’s “guillotine” seems to be functioning in a similar way with contemporary nonlinear 
editing systems (NLE), enabling the instantaneous accessing of any frame or part of the film 
without the need to re-edit the rest (Evans 2005: 14). Although nonlinear editing systems do 
not delete (‘final cut’) footage and keep archive of multiple editing versions (EDLs or edit 
decision lists), the narrative of The Final Cut appears as much reluctant to abandon the idea of 
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editing’s permanent distortion as it is tempted to challenge the same idea through its diegetic 
and formal modularity. This oscillation resonates with The Final Cut’s own technical 
production, as the movie was shot both in film (35 mm) and in digital video (the scenes of the 
zoe footage) (Naim 2004c). Moreover, The Final Cut was an experiment in digital projection 
for the production company Lions Gate and the theater chain AMC. The announcement on the 
website of AMC reads as follows: “AMC will present the film digitally, using AMC’s 
proprietary Digital Theatre Distribution System (DTDS). The digital file of the movie will be 
distributed to AMC theatre locations via satellite”.33 The selection of a film that thematically 
(but also in terms of production) treats—and blurs—the borders between analogue and digital 
memory seems ideal for such an experiment.  
 The Final Cut’s oscillation between the ‘cut’ (permanent distortion) and the ‘paste’ 
(modularity) is enhanced by its ambivalent stance towards technology. The trust to the zoe-
implant’s memory does not necessarily suggest a blind faith to its inscription: the latter can 
also be falsified, as there are, according to the story, also ‘defect’ implants, which “cannot 
distinguish what the mind sees from what the eye sees”, and thus record hallucinations and 
dreams, instead of the input from the external environment. The film’s ambivalent stance 
towards the technology of the implant is more an expression of disbelief towards the human 
inscription, because of its vulnerability to the ‘cut’. The Final Cut undermines the trust to both 
the ‘eye’ and the ‘I’. It thus displays characteristics of a new version of realism in which, as 
Elsaesser suggests, an “impersonal ‘thing’ or apparatus taking my picture, or capturing an 
event, is a better guarantee of my existence […] than the unmediated face-to-face, likely to 
give rise to misunderstandings” (2009d: 4).  
 Distortion, according to The Final Cut, happens already at the initial point of 
mnemonic inscription. The film’s own implant, the false memory in the beginning, has been 
distorting too. In this respect, narrative (as a coherent causal-logical whole on which Alan’s 
self-conception was based, starting from the incident in his childhood, as well as the logical 
sequence of events that the viewers gradually construct after the beginning of the film with the 
same incident), along with human perception and consciousness, is sensitive to subjective 
factors such as motives, traumata, purposes, distortions. If narrative always presupposes the 
intervention of the human factor (Bal 1985: 26), The Final Cut equates this intervention with 
distortion and loss. Where the narrative starts, both for the film (initial scene) and for the 
character (the memory of himself) there is always already a selection, a cut; and in the plot’s 
‘time travel’ finds expression an agency that wants to reach out to what remains unstructured 
and change the existing inscriptions.  
 As we might notice in The Final Cut, the paint’s overturning is not the only revelation 
of the zoe-implant: when Alan managed to access its footage, the implant showed him that he 
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had lived his life being enslaved not by machines (guillotines or implants) but by his own 
persisting fantasy of omnipotence. The implant’s footage suggests that he is not the final cause 
of his own life and misery, that he has no control over the others’ death (Louis’s) or life (the 
projects that he undertakes in his job as a cutter, attempting to grace the dead with 
immortality). Other factors, from the most significant to the most trivial, like that of an 
overturned can of paint, may change the outcome of situations. 
 In The Final Cut, “what the eye sees”—to use Alan’s own words—is highly dependent 
on “what the mind sees”. What Alan ‘cut’ out of his mnemonic trace has been the 
powerlessness of his body (which proved unable to help Louis), the time that slipped without 
him managing to catch up and react, the sounds (that revealed that Louis was still alive), all in 
all the markers of an affective experience that would shatter his fantasy of omnipotence; a 
fantasy which later Alan had to retain and base his self-conception on it, in order to justify his 
(distorted) mnemonic inscription, according to which he had instigated the death of another 
person. What Alan’s memory retained was just the sight of a red liquid spreading under his 
feet, which he explained as blood, deleting all the other input he had received and adequately 
modifying his self-conception by weaving a narrative of guilt and victimization to fit into. 
Alan’s going back to ‘the scene of the crime’ highlights what is no longer recoverable (his life 
so far) rather than what can be miraculously recuperated. The two modes of temporality at 
play in The Final Cut, the one found in the plot’s reversal of time, and the other in the 
narrative’s irreversibility (demonstrated by Alan’s determination by the chance events and 
accidents of his early life, where the ‘cut’ first took place) do not contrast each other, but are 
rather interwoven, since the film resists both linear recuperation and permanent distortion. 
 
Self-reflexivity and time 
 The Final Cut certainly does—though somewhat implicitly—prompt the viewer to 
become aware of the conditions of the film’s making. The narrative is implicitly self-
referential about issues such as the reality that films conceal, the selections that they make, the 
‘cuts’ through which they proceed. As already discussed, the film is a product of the conscious 
attempt of Naim to reflect on the procedure of filmmaking as ‘cutting’ of recorded footage that 
used to be live, and making out of it coherent—but inevitably distorted—stories. A text’s 
‘self-reflexivity’ has been associated with such a (more or less explicit) self-conscious/self-
expository move on behalf of the maker, that has a distancing effect upon the reader/decoder, 
suspending his or her immersion into the story and adding multiple layers of signification. 
Self-referential methods in art, literature and film have been considered tools that trigger 
critical reflection on behalf of the recipient. But this effect is not necessarily created through 
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straightforward means but also through loops and infinite regress within the text (such as the 
one of mise-en-abyme) that set in motion internal dynamics, which undermine the coherence 
and wholeness of the work. The Final Cut employs self-reflexive techniques that highlight its 
oscillation between modularity and distortion, recuperation and obsolescence, which at once 
complete and exceed the self-referential accounts of its maker(s).  
 As viewers of The Final Cut, we do not only realize the reverse temporal movement of 
the narration when this becomes diegetically enabled by the machine, the guillotine.34 Rather, 
the function of the guillotine can be considered a self-referential device of the film, which, 
through a diegetic mise-en-abyme, communicates its own structure: It is not only the implant 
that within the diegesis navigates through time, but the plot itself is used as a time-juggling but 
also time-generating machine. So, even if the function of the implant in the narrative with its 
direct recording of lived experience might be one that leaves no “time of affective deferral 
within which to maneuver original impression into psychic trace, event into memory, no time 
for the willful construction of mental temporality per se” (Stewart 2006:189),35 the recruitment 
of the implant as a structuring device does not redeem time but observes it, creating a 
temporalized experience. Thus The Final Cut turns the medium of the guillotine into a 
counterpart of its own complex organization.  
 But let us have a closer look at the film’s nonlinear temporality at the micro-level of 
scene constitution. Towards the end of The Final Cut, a succession of reflexive framings 
disorients us just before the film’s own ‘final cut’: As Alan runs to save his life from Fletcher 
who wants to use his implant against EYE-tech, a quick montage crosscuts two different kinds 
of POV shots: shots representing Alan’s visual inscription, stylistically assimilated into the 
visual style of the rest of the film, and shots reproducing the—visual and auditory—inscription 
of his implant (the recording not only appears as having the colder colors of video but it has 
actually been shot by a digital videocamera). A temporal layering is created, culminating at the 
point of Alan’s death (which we see through the footage of his zoe-implant when the recorded 
image dissolves into pixels), through this kind of juxtaposition of subjective, ‘filmic’ POVs 
from the character’s present, and ‘digital’ POVs that have already become past and are being 
watched by someone else, at a later point in the narrative’s temporal progression. Previous 
scenes of the film using the latter kind of POVs have primed us to consider them as images 
from zoe-implant footage, when it has already been ‘read’ by the guillotine. Not only the 
temporal but also the subjective indexicality of this crosscut scene is dubious, as we cannot be 
certain about who is looking either: it could be Alan, but then his vision could not have these 
marking signs (texture of image but also track of time and name), so it is likely that someone 
else looks through Alan’s eyes; and this look could only come from a later point in time. A cut 
to the next scene makes explicit the temporal layering of the previous chasing sequence. Now, 
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obviously after Alan’s death, we see Fletcher watching the footage of Alan’s implant. As 
Fletcher looks absorbed in editing, the camera moves behind him to include, him too, in a 
mise-en-abyme of gazes. In these two succeeding scenes, The Final Cut makes use of 
traditional cinematic reflexive techniques constituted from “various mise-en-abyme-
constructions [that] resemble looks into the mirror” (Elsaesser and Hagener 2010: 74). But this 
technical reflexivity, the creative possibilities of which have perhaps been exhausted by the 
modernist cinema of the past—and especially the European avant-garde filmmaking of the 
1960s and 1970s—is here intertwined with a time-juggling that juxtaposes past, present and 
future. It is not just the reflexive framing of gazes but also the temporal constitution of the 
scene that produces this vertigo.  
 The reflexivity of The Final Cut, multiplied by the insertion of a third ‘observer’ 
(besides the camera and the characters), i.e. the implant, facilitates the creation of backward 
and forward time-loops, distinguished both at the level of the story/fabula and at that of the 
plot/syuzhet. These loops create alternative views on what has already taken or will take place, 
deceive and play with the viewer and his or her cine-literacy (which has been based on well-
established narrative conventions), and present in a tacit way a narration that is self-conscious 
(as the ‘voice’ of the author and his self-reflexivity merges with the self-reflexive means of the 
filmic discourse) and demands an equally alert viewer.  
 In the last scene of The Final Cut, as Fletcher edits the footage of Alan’s implant, he 
watches on the screen of his computer the reflection of Alan in the mirror. Fletcher promises 
to the reflection of an already dead Alan that the latter’s life will finally “mean something” (as 
Fletcher intends to use Alan’s implant to trap a ‘big head’ of EYE-tech in a moral scandal, and 
thus harm the company’s profile). The film’s ending (or ‘final cut’) comes with an additional 
mind-game right before the closing credits. To what appears to be a point-of-view shot 
through Fletcher’s eyes on Alan’s face in the mirror (and now on the screen of Fletcher’s 
computer), the reflection of Alan leaves the frame, suggesting that it is neither Alan looking at 
his reflection, nor Fletcher looking through Alan’s eyes. At the point that the film ends, the 
mirror/screen waits for us, the viewers, to fill it, not with our reflection in it but with our own 
mnemonic records (as we just now remember that we can only see through the eyes of the 
implant carrier when watching POVs from an implant). However, these records are at once put 
in doubt: as soon as Alan leaves the frame, then who is looking at the mirror? This ‘mind 
game’ is of course not convincing as closure; it has rather been The Final Cut’s 
communicative condition all along, if we consider the false memories of the character. Only 
now it is the viewer who is more directly invited to this game. Self-reflexivity thus takes us 
into the loop, where (narrative) closure is no longer possible. As the German DVD title of the 
film suggests, “Dein Tod ist erst der Anfang” (the end is only the beginning).  
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2. Framing the revival of (self-)reflexivity in complex films 
 
 The notion of self-reflexivity, broached in the previous chapter through the analysis of 
The Final Cut, will now be put into focus, as one of the most characteristic features of 
contemporary complex films. The current return of self-reflexivity in cinema in my view 
entails important continuities but also breaks with the traditional theorization of the term in 
film theory and in narratology. In this chapter I will attempt to disentangle the complicated 
notion of self-reflexivity, and distinguish between different levels, functions and theoretical 
backgrounds. I find this endeavor necessary in order to understand what is complex in 
complex films, and how self-reflexivity is one of the fundamental processes in which the 
complexity of these films resides. But before getting to the particulars of self-reflexivity in 
complex films, I will first examine its role in the narratological and the film-theoretical 
traditions.  
  In grammar, a “reflexive” verb is one whose direct object is identical to its subject (The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language). Reflexive statements are 
“propositions or texts that in some way take into account their own manufacturing conditions” 
(Pels 2003: 164). In mathematics and logics, “reflexive” is called the relation between an 
element and itself. A common denominator of all these different aspects of reflexivity might 
be the “self-referential or ‘iterative’ aspects of any kind of thinking” (Sandywell and Beer 
2005). Taking into account the long and divergent genealogy of reflexivity—in disciplines 
such as philosophy,36 anthropology, sociology,37 and art theory—confusion might arise when 
one does not distinguish between two different levels of self-reflexivity: the one of first-degree 
self-reference, and the other of the iterative and dynamic process that self-reference of a 
second degree, or reflexivity, triggers.38 In this chapter it is mainly the first level of reflexivity 
that will be addressed, through the theorization of the concept in the traditions of narratology 
and film theory. However, reflexive paradoxes or ‘loops’ have also emerged therein, and the 
workings of this ‘systemic’ kind of reflexivity will be particularly addressed in Chapter 3.  
 
Self-reflexive discourse and the borders of narrative  
 Within the context of a multi-disciplinary interest in reflexivity, especially in the 
second half of the 20th century, narrative theory has primarily addressed the textual modes of 
self-reference. In Gérard Genette’s tripartite model of narrative,39 self-reflexivity would 
correspond to the analytical category of “narrating instance”, the manifestation of which, in 
the form of “discourse”, disrupts the “récit” (narrative). In his article “Frontières du récit” 
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(1966) Genette refers to discourse (discours), in other words, to the voice of the author and his 
or her self-referential accounts, as ‘intruding’ the text and suggesting a threat to the purity of 
narrative.40  
 The distinction between narrative and discourse was initiated by Aristotle, who 
considered separately certain types of poetry, “lyric, satiric and didactic poetry” (Genette 
1976), that were not representational, that is, they did not reflect external actions (real or 
fictional), but rather expressed the poet’s own thoughts. In the 1960s the French linguist and 
semiotician Emile Benveniste reintroduced the distinction between narrative as story (what he 
called histoire) and discourse. Benveniste defined the pure form of narrative as one that 
remains uncontaminated by the subjectivity of discourse:  
[…] the objectivity of narrative is defined by the absence of all reference to the 
narrator. “Truly there is no longer a ‘narrator.’ The events are chronologically 
recorded as they appear on the horizon of the story. Here no one speaks. The 
events seem to tell themselves”. (Genette 1976: 9, quoting Benveniste 1966, 
Problèmes de linguistique générale, pp. 237-250) 
Chronological sequentiality here also appears as a feature of “pure narrative”. Genette stresses 
that such instances of “pure” narrative,41 such as the ones that Benveniste finds in some 
passages of Balzac, are isolated, and that almost every text comprises of both narrative and 
discursive passages (1976: 10). This hybridization notwithstanding, a tension still lies within 
the discursive, and in this sense, self-referential passages of stories: “any intrusion of 
discursive elements into the interior of a narrative is perceived as a disruption of the discipline 
of the narrative portion” (10). This is not the case when narrative is embedded in discursive 
modes of expression. “Narrative inserted into discourse transforms itself into an element of 
discourse, but discourse inserted into narrative remains discourse and forms a sort of cyst, 
easily recognized and localized. One might say that the purity of narrative is more obvious 
than that of discourse.” (10-11) Continues Genette:  
[…] discourse has no purity to preserve since it is the natural mode of language, 
the broadest and most universal mode, by definition open to all forms. On the 
contrary, narrative is a particular mode, marked and defined by a certain number 
of exclusions and restrictive conditions (no present tense, no first person, etc.) 
Discourse can “narrate” without ceasing to be discourse. Narrative can’t 
“discourse” without betraying itself. (11) 
 In the literary ‘experiments’ of the 20th century, from Hemingway to Robbe-Grillet, 
Genette sees the need of writers to deal with these incompatible modes of utterance (discourse 
and narrative), either eliminating the one or the other; and in the novels of his contemporaries 
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Philippe Sollers or Jean Thibaudeau, where narrative seems getting absorbed in the act of 
writing, Genette finds indications of narrative’s prospective obsolescence:  
Perhaps the novel, after poetry, will definitively leave the age of representation. 
Perhaps narrative, in the negative singularity that we have attributed to it, is, like 
art for Hegel, already for us a thing of the past which we must hasten to consider 
as it passes away, before it has completely deserted our horizon. (12) 
The ideal, pure and isolated narrative, narrative by definition, is, already in the 1960s, 
considered—by one of the most prominent narratologists—dead. And one of the factors that 
contributed to the realization that this ideal form is no longer possible has been the self-
referential mode of utterance that discourse stands for. In the narrative model that Genette 
later developed, he analyzed the complex forms of “narrative discourse” (here, narrative is 
meant as a particular form of discourse in the sense of speech and ekphrasis, and not in that of 
self-reflexive discourse) in the dynamic interplay between narrated text (récit or narrative), 
story and narration.  
 
Metanarrational and metafictional reflexivity 
 Recent writings in narratology treat self-reflexivity through the categories of 
“metafiction” and “metanarration”. Metanarration takes place at the level of discourse (both 
diegetic and extra-diegetic) and involves “comments […] concerned with the act and/or 
process of narration”.42 While metafiction concerns instances of self-reflexivity particularly in 
narrative fictions, and has an anti-mimetic character, metanarration just “thematizes” the act of 
narration, and, when used in non-fictional narratives, can also serve the credibility of the 
narrated events (Neumann and Nünning 2010). Forms of metafiction can be self-reflexive 
without involving self-reflexive discourse. For example, according to Werner Wolf, mise-en-
abyme is a type of “implicit metafiction”, because it is a non-narrational instance of self-
reflexivity (see Fludernik 2003). Although here metafiction does not occur with the 
intervention of the narrator’s or author’s comments upon the act of narration (by discourse), it 
still is self-reflexive, because, through the unreal effect that it creates, fiction demonstrates 
itself as such. The reflexivity of metafiction is thus, according to Peter Stoicheff,  
[…] the product of its desire to expose the covert structures that allow fiction to 
masquerade as reality; it is always involved in the simultaneous process of 
manufacturing illusion and revealing its artifice. It thus becomes an eternal system 
of creating and deconstructing, whose self-interpreting pattern is realized in the 
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mise-en-abyme that eternally defers the revelation of truth or knowledge […]. 
(Stoicheff 1991: 89-90)  
 Both metafiction and metanarration have an anti-mimetic and in this sense anti-
narrative character, as long as the criterion of subjectivity is used. According to Genette, the 
anti-narrative function of discourse lies in the insertion of subjectivity to the otherwise 
seemingly ‘objective’ sequence of events (récit). The subjective factor intervenes through 
everything that undermines objectivity, either at the level of fiction (metafiction) or at that of 
the act of narration (metanarration).  
 When it comes to film, the boundaries between the two types of self-reflexivity that 
contemporary narratology distinguishes (metanarrational and metafictional), become blurred. 
The absence of direct instances of (extra-diegetic) discourse in film, makes it hard to 
distinguish self-reflexivity in the first place, let alone the difference between fictional and 
narrational self-reflexivity.43 Yet, there are ways in which film theory (and film narratology) 
has identified the particularities of filmic self-reference, and these will be later discussed in the 
context of contemporary complex films. The recent proliferation of these traditionally anti-
narrative instances in films points at modes of textual and cognitive organization that thrive on 
self-reference, and perhaps transcend narrative in the strict, ‘pure’ definition of the term, 
against which narratology has always been struggling, without however, in my view, having 
achieved a radical emancipation from it.  
 
Self-reflexivity in cinema  
 In cinema, the interruptions of the ‘purity’ of narrative by the narrating voice is not as 
common as it is in literature, because the cinematic narrator has less means available to 
address the viewer directly. Voice-over is of course one of these means. Despite the long 
presence of this technique throughout cinema history, voice-over has been faced with 
suspicion and occasionally with scorn by film critics because of its “hybrid” nature that brings 
film close to literature (Kozloff 1988). But, when speech, taking the form of self-referential 
comments of the narrator (who can be a protagonist at the diegetic level or the creator/author 
at the extra-diegetic level), and/or of direct address to the audience, is not employed, then by 
what means is self-reflexivity expressed in cinema?  
 Taking a step away from the self-reference of the author, and in this sense, following 
the art-theoretical tradition more than the literary one, film theory still had to account for the 
self-reflexivity of films themselves. This suggests an ontological rather than an 
epistemological stance, and in this respect Stanley Cavell offers a good starting point to 
approach cinematic self-reflexivity. Thus, for him self-referential are the ways that “movies 
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question and acknowledge themselves” (Cavell 1979: 123). Cavell traces in Hollywood films 
of the interwar period the forerunners of the reflexive practices that later flourished in cinema 
(124). Especially in comedies such as those of Buster Keaton and Groucho Marx, he detects 
the early self-referential capacities of films, usually taking two forms: “alluding to other 
movies” and/or “calling attention to the camera at hand” (124). Cavell sees continuity between 
these early Hollywood techniques and the subsequent flourishing of self-reflexivity via the 
modernist filmmakers of the Nouvelle Vague. Thus, the “sudden storms of flash insets and 
freeze frames and slow-motions and telescopic-lens shots and fast cuts and negative printing 
and blurred focusing” (122), proliferating in modernist films of the 1960s, are expressions of 
self-reference. Everything that calls attention to the technique and process of filmmaking, and 
thus to the agency behind it—if not necessarily to the particular ‘auteur’ handling this 
technique—is a form of cinematic self-reference. The mediation of speech is not necessary for 
films to be self-reflexive, and that is why film theorists often derive their examples from early 
silent films, belonging to the so-called “cinema of attractions”.44  
 David Bordwell in Narration in the Fiction Film has used the term “self-conscious” 
narration, instead of that of “self-referential” or “self-reflexive” narration. Borrowing the term 
from Meir Sternberg, he states that the self-consciousness of a film’s narration (which may 
appear in different degrees) depends “on how much it acknowledges the fact that it is 
presenting information to an audience.” A film’s hetero-reference (its reference to the 
audience) is intertwined with self-reference, as long as the acknowledgement of the audience 
also implies the acknowledgement of the film itself as a medium of communication. Bordwell 
finds that every typical fiction film shows a higher degree of self-consciousness in the opening 
and closing sequences than in its main part where the narrative unfolds (1985: 25). Here a 
tension between narrative and self-conscious narration is also being drawn, this time in the 
medium of film.  
 Although the way in which a film communicates is different from that of a printed text, 
it was especially literary and semiotic models of self-reference, which became influential in 
the decades of 1960s and 1970s, that determined the conceptualization of self-reflexivity in 
film theory. Moreover, the (post-)Marxist and structuralist tradition of film theory stepped on 
self-reflexivity’s anti-mimetic character, to associate the term with an ideologically loaded 
‘break with the illusionism of the spectacle’.  
 Roland Barthes had a significant contribution, as narratologist David Herman notes, in 
making reflexivity a “structuralist desideratum” (Herman 2000). According to Barthes, the 
narrational level implies a degree of self-reflexivity because its role is not to transmit narrative 
but “to make it conspicuous” (1975: 264). Barthes pointed at the dangers inherent in the 
tendency of bourgeois society to “naturalize narratives” by de-emphasizing the codes of the 
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narrative situation, its self-reflexive markers, as I would add. In his S/Z (1970) Barthes 
introduced a qualitative distinction between “readerly” (lisibles) texts, which create a sense of 
transparency and prime passive reception, and “writerly” (scriptibles) texts, which, through 
self-reflexive methods, call for the viewer’s self-conscious participation in the production of 
meaning (1974: 4).45 Seen through an anti-illusionistic perspective, self-reflexivity became a 
rather popular notion in film criticism of the 1970s, which was significantly influenced by 
structuralism. Apparatus theory, drawing not only on Barthes but also on Althusser and Lacan, 
considered cinema a medium intrinsically ideological, and pointed at the necessity to find 
ways to resist the imposition of the apparatus over the spectator’s consciousness. One of these 
ways has been found in self-reflexivity. 
 Self-reflexivity seems to have been a “desideratum” not only of structuralist film 
theorists but also of filmmakers during and after the 1960s. As Robert Stam points out, every 
work of art contains some degree of self-reflexivity, since there is no such thing as complete 
illusionism even during the reign of mimetic culture and the models of perception that it 
favored. Yet, there are certain periods in which self-reflexivity acquires significant dimensions 
or visibility and becomes embodied “in novels, plays, and films which break with art as 
enchantment and point to their own factitiousness as textual constructs” (1985: xi). In the case 
of film, one of these “peaks” of self-reflexivity was, according to Stam, the period from the 
late 1950s until the 1970s. It was then that the textual and intertextual nature of self-
reflexivity, as discourse and écriture, came to the fore, under the influence of the French 
“textuality turn”. Nouvelle Vague is a characteristic example of the proliferation of self-
reflexivity in films of that period and geocultural area. This peak of self-reflexivity in cinema 
has not been triggered only by the influence of structuralist thought, though. Rather, Stam 
points out the influence of artists and specifically that of Bertolt Brecht, who had already been 
a pioneer of self-reflexive techniques in theatre. Through the work of Brecht, self-reflexivity, 
which for Stam does not have an a priori politically progressive value, may be seen as a 
“politicized esthetic” (1985: 7). Brecht’s use of self-reflexive techniques aimed at a realism 
beyond mimetic representation, one that would “lay bare society’s causal network” (Stam 
1985: 17, quoting Brecht from “The popular and the realistic”, 1938, p. 109). By transforming 
the audience’s expectations, Brecht sought to prepare a new audience able to adjust to “new 
modes of social life” (Stam: ibid). Hence, Brecht’s use of self-reflexivity had a significant 
impact on “cinematic theory and practice, and especially on the films of Godard, [Alain] 
Tanner, and others” (10). In the self-reflexive turn of cinema in the 1960s and 1970s Stam sees 
the influence of a politicized and ‘activist’ conception of self-reflexivity, one which “breaks 
the charm of spectacle in order to awaken the spectator’s critical intelligence” (9).  
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 The accounts in art and film criticism show that there has been a growing tendency 
after the 1960s to consider (self-)reflexivity as “a crack in the mirror”, according to 
anthropologist’s Jay Ruby’s expression. “To be reflexive is to reveal that films—all films, 
whether they are labeled fiction, documentary, or art—are created, structured articulations of 
the film-maker and not authentic, truthful, objective records” (Ruby 1988: 44). Ruby also 
points at the need to distinguish between self-reflexivity and the self-referential accounts of 
the author. Traces of the makers’ self-reference can be found in almost every film, according 
to Ruby, but self-reflexivity goes beyond the self-referential, self-conscious or autobiographic 
accounts: it instructs the viewer about the process of world production, which is involved in 
every artistic or scientific creation (1988: 45).46 In my discussion of The Final Cut in Chapter 
1 I emphasized the continuity but also the distinction between the self-referential accounts of 
the filmmaker and the self-reflexivity of the film itself, through its complex structure.  
 As Monika Fludernik notes (2003), until recently the metafictional and metanarrational 
aspects of self-reflexivity have been used interchangeably, and as it becomes apparent, this has 
not only been the case in literary theory and narratology but also in semiotics and film theory. 
The metanarrational capacity of self-reflexivity, pointing at the way a narrative or a film is 
constructed, has evoked an allure of anti-illusionism that addresses every cultural text as a 
factitious, even when fictional, construction. Particularly in film, self-reflexivity, even when 
detached from the actual narrating ‘voice’ and Genette’s literary discourse, it is also found in 
tension with the supposed objectivity of ‘pure’ narrative, as well as with that of the filmic 
mode of representation, which has been considered inherently mimetic. Indicative of this view 
is the comment of Scott Lash, who notes that cinema is closer to mimesis than to semiosis, 
which is more tied to language: “If nineteenth-century realist narrative as cultural object is 
reflexive through highly mediated semiosis, then ideal-typically organized capitalist cinema—
in its diachronic, tonal visuality—is a cultural object which is reflexive through less mediated 
iconic representation” (1994: 138).47  
 The theoretical background of self-reflexivity sketched above determined the way it is 
until today conceived in film theory, and also in the cognitive strands of film narratology. As 
representative of the latter, Edward Branigan places (self-)reflexivity among other “anti-
narrative devices”, as he calls them, such as “irony, paradox, contradiction, novelty, or 
alienation” (1992: 84). The reflexive device is for him “prescribed to provide a critical and 
intellectual distance (‘opacity’) that frees the viewer from delusion.”  
 
Film complexity and self-reflexivity  
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 In the 1970s film theoretical discussions about self-reflexivity, the latter was quite 
normatively expected to be ‘authentic’, that is, to go beyond the borders of the medium’s 
formalism. This is because many theorists have argued that self-reflexivity might indeed 
attract the attention to the process of mediation, but does not always suggest an (ideologically 
progressive) exit from the factitious world of fiction or spectacle; on the contrary, it often 
creates a closed loop that blocks rather than enables the distanced critique of this world. As 
Dana Polan contends (1974), even when an artwork becomes highly self-reflexive, it is not 
necessarily politically progressive. Rather, its effect lies in the heightening of “interplay 
between credulity and skepticism” or “confirmation and contradiction”, which is an inherent 
quality of art. But every skepticism and contradiction can very well serve the intrinsic need of 
art for self-innovation rather than for social innovation. In this respect, self-reflexivity—and 
its role in modernist avant-garde techniques—is for Polan a form of “emphasized formal 
complexity” with no specific political nuances.  
 Contributing to the same Jump Cut issue with Polan (1974, no. 4), Chuck Kleinhans 
defines a film’s complexity based on the notion of self-reflexivity. Complexity for him stands 
for the “sophistication” of a film, defined against the simplicity of form and content. 
Kleinhans distinguishes between two types of self-reflexivity and consequently two types of 
“complex” films: those that are merely “self-reflective”, perhaps formalistically experimental 
but still within the confinements of bourgeois ideology (as an example of which he mentions 
Jean-Marie Straub’s Othon, 1969), and the others that are (also) self-critical and “didactic” (as 
exemplary of which he regards the films made by Godard and Gorin). Thus a complex film for 
Kleinhans may have two possible functions: it “either forces self-reflection on itself as film 
[…], or in a more Brechtian vein the film can be not merely self-reflective but self-critical in a 
larger context…making explicit its ideological basis to the audience”. Through its complexity, 
a film demands equally complex responses from its viewers. However, the self-reflexivity (or 
self-reflectivity, as Kleinhans calls it) of films is seen merely as a play with the genre codes 
and the conventions of form, to which the viewers get easily accustomed—as it happened for 
instance with the popularization of self-reflective techniques in television commercials after 
the mid-1960s—so that, after a certain point, as Kleinhans maintains, the same reflexive 
techniques can no longer evoke complex audience responses. Moreover, even when complex 
responses are produced, they do not necessarily have a political—or socially critical—
character.  
 Except for the Brechtian techniques of self-reflexivity, some of the more ‘implicit’ 
self-reflexive expressions and techniques have been considered to be postmodern tropes (or 
better, tropes compatible with postmodernism) of emphasized formal complexity. Thus, with 
the passage of time self-reflexivity got associated with postmodernism, and not only with 
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modernism and its avant-garde movements. An inevitable consequence has been that self-
reflexivity, especially since the 1980s, received criticism similar to the one that 
postmodernism itself received. As Stam notes, “the reflexivity of a certain avant-garde is 
eminently co-optable and easily reappropriated by the hegemonic culture. Even the 
deconstructed texts defended by Tel Quel or Cinétique end up, at times, by playing 
innocuously with purely formal categories such as representation, closure, or the illusion of 
presence” (16).48 From an anti-postmodern stance, self-reflexivity and its more implicit 
techniques is not considered a counterpart for thought’s emancipation but an agent of 
affirmation, less critical and more cynical, even a mode of participation in the flows of late 
capitalism (Elsaesser and Hagener 2010: 74-75). As literary critic Patrick O’Donnell notes 
(1996), “reflexivity, parody, mimicry, […] are the last encrypted refuges of an imperialism 
that converts everything into simulacra, images constructed upon images”.  
 Following this thread of criticism towards self-reflexivity, a second contrast is being 
formed: from the one between self-reflexivity and illusionism, to that between self-reflexivity 
and critical thought. These seem to be diametrically opposite conceptions of the term, 
however, they are both based on the assumption that there is an inherent mimeticism both in 
fiction and film (and their combination). Self-reflexivity might correct this ‘flaw’—and at 
times it has been used for this purpose—either explicitly and normatively or implicitly, by 
making the filmic or narrative text more complex than it is supposed to be.  
 There have also been narratological and film-theoretical approaches that value the 
formal complexity that self-reflexivity—even in its textually implicit expressions— 
effectuates and the more complicated relationship it establishes with the beholder. The 
blurring of boundaries between fiction and reality that reflexivity effectuates may be meta-
fictional/narrational but not necessarily anti-fictional/narrational. The creation of illusions and 
the exposition of factitiousness make the texts richer and inherently dynamic. Here self-
reflexivity also tends to transgress the reality-illusion dilemma, and with it, the normative 
mission it undertook through the apparatus theory tradition. According to what Jeffrey 
Williams, referring to post-modernist (literary) fictions, calls the “reflexive paradigm of 
narrativity” (1999: 145), self-reflexivity—both metafictional and metanarrational—expressed 
through features “such as narrator’s comments, so-called narrative intrusions, frames, 
embedded stories, etc.” (50), dissolves the distinction between interior and exterior, and 
“complicates the layering of the narrative text” (46). It also goes beyond “the simple exposure 
of the ‘illusion’ of fiction” (90). Reflexivity does not have an anti-illusionistic mission, neither 
leads to a ‘truth’ outside the text. A story’s origins are always deferred by reflexivity, thus it is 
not adequate to describe the latter “in illusionist terms, […] as self-consciously exposing 
fictionality” (102-103).  
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 But also in film theory and avant-garde filmmaking tradition, the implicit workings of 
self-reflexivity have been emphasized. Elsaesser and Hagener connect the notion of reflexivity 
with a metaphor of cinema as “mirror”, which was also popular in the 1960s and 1970s film 
theory. The mirror-metaphor expressed the self-reflexive aesthetics of “doubling and 
mirroring” that characterized auteur cinema in the 1960s (for example, in films such as Le 
Mépris, Blow Up, 8½). Here the reference is not only to the French new wave but to a broader 
range of avant-garde filmmaking. Thus, according to Elsaesser and Hagener, through 
techniques such as “nested narration (a film within a film), […] pictorial framing which 
highlighted the constructedness of the mise-en-scène, or through an accentuated paraphrasing 
of traditional plot stereotypes, genre patterns and pastiche citations” (75), cinema developed 
its own “language of crisis” in order to express a self-critical stance towards itself as an 
illusion-generating technology (74-77); this language proved to be productive for cinema 
instead of dismantling. Similar to the “reflexive paradigm” of Williams described above, 
according to Elsaesser and Hagener “the metaphor of the cinema as mirror blocks this passage 
to any world clearly labeled either ‘outside’ or ‘inside’, rendering the relationship of spectator 
and screen considerably more complicated” (2010: 56). The reflexive mise-en-abyme 
constructions, doublings and layers that made filmic texts more complex, are here considered 
to increase the complexity of the “encounter” between the film and the viewer. The 
contemporary use of self-reflexivity by ‘complex’ films might be indicative of the 
development of another language of crisis, which however has very different sources from 
those that influenced the filmmaking of previous decades. Contemporary expressions of self-
reflexivity thus need to be contextualized and analyzed with an eye to the past as well as to the 
current developments in the media sphere, and this might need a shift from the narratological 
to a different analytical perspective. 
 An anti-narrative device that ‘frees the viewer from delusion’, a formalistic 
experimentation that stays more or less indifferent towards its critical impact upon the 
viewers, or a mise-en-abyme that makes the border between inside and outside 
indistinguishable: against the backdrop of this broadly sketched genealogy of the theory of 
self-reflexivity, its function as a counterpart of complexity will be put under scrutiny in the 
following part of this chapter, in the context of contemporary complex films.  
 
Self-reflexivity in contemporary complex films  
 There have been analogies drawn between the modes of narration that have 
characterized post-classical Hollywood after the 1970s and those of recent complex films, 
with self-reflexivity (or self-reference) being an important axon of this analogy. Self-reference 
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is, according to Elsaesser, the characteristic that most evidently differentiates between 
classical and postclassical narration. Here self-reference and self-reflexivity is coupled with 
“knowingness” or “self-consciousness” of the narration, categories that have already been 
mentioned earlier in this chapter. Thus, post-classical films show an intensified self-
consciousness, which is combined with “a willingness to display this knowingness and make 
the audience share it, by letting it in on the game” (2002: 78). As Elsaesser points out: “It is 
this knowingness […] that gives, with its several reflexive turns, the label ‘post-classical’ its 
most defensible validity and, perhaps more problematically, its only stable application” (79).  
 Eleftheria Thanouli has extended the post-classical paradigm outside Hollywood, to 
the modes of contemporary world cinema narration, using examples of films that have also 
been discussed as cases of complex storytelling, such as Chunking Express (1994), Run Lola 
Run (Lola Rennt, 1998), Fight Club (1999) and Magnolia (1999). Thanouli finds in these films 
too, the characteristic self-reflexive ‘trademark’ of the post-classical paradigm. Post-classical 
self-reflexivity disrupts the continuous and linear style of classical narration, and Thanouli 
considers it a proliferation and intensification of past avant-garde techniques, through 
“disruptive visual effects” such as “fractured compositions, jump-cuts, different color schemes 
and jerky camera movements” (Thanouli 2008: 11). But also the techniques of “back 
projections, collages and optical tricks”, neglected in the past as “too artificial or self-
reflexive”, in contemporary world cinema make an impressive comeback, as Thanouli 
maintains (2006: 189). The self-reflexivity at the level of cinematography and montage (the 
level of the film’s ‘craft’, which also determines the textual form of its narratives), is 
accompanied by self-reflexivity at the level of narration: post-classical films appear to be 
highly self-conscious, in the sense that, as Thanouli maintains, “the narrating act comes 
forward” throughout the whole film, acknowledging the audience, providing them with clues 
to comprehend the story and showing its knowledgeability and spatiotemporal omnipresence 
(2006: 192).  
 Bordwell notices a high degree of self-consciousness in the films that he calls 
“network narratives”, in which he includes, among others, Pulp Fiction, Chunking Express, 
Magnolia and Babel. He considers marks of this self-conscious stance, techniques such as 
direct glances to the camera (e.g. Les Passagers) and devices such as crosscutting, intertitles, 
montage according to a motif, time-juggling, and openly suppressive narration (Bordwell 
2007: 210, 211). As it also happens in The Final Cut, the suppression of information by the 
film might become more overt at a later point, usually that of the plot’s twist: “a film might 
pretend that nothing is amiss and lead us to think that we have full information. Later, when 
we recognize that the narration has pulled a fast one, it becomes more overt” (210). But also 
the non-sequential ordering of events in a film is a form of overt, self-conscious—and self-
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referential—narration; a narration that also makes the viewer conscious of the presence of a 
narrative principle that manipulates the telling. The ‘knowingness’ of the narration is self-
referential at the discursive, metanarrational level.  
 Genette was perhaps the first who indicated the self-reflexive function of time-juggling 
(cases of “anachrony”) in (literary) texts. Referring specifically to “prolepses”—the premature 
reference to future events, the equivalent of which in cinema would be the device of 
“flashforwards” (Chatman 1980: 64)—Genette states that the latter are “not only data of 
narrative temporality but also data of voice”, which “bring the narrating instance itself directly 
into play” (Genette 1986: 70). This type of self-reflexivity is strongly communicated by 
contemporary complex, or “modular”, films too.49 
 Their unwillingness to ‘suspend disbelief’—considered to be a precondition for 
narrative immersion—gives contemporary complex films an intensely self-reflexive character. 
In parallel, there is a constant attempt to orientate the viewers’ attention towards mediation (as 
opposed to transparency) that characterizes not only the film’s world but also the world that 
the viewers live in, permeated by informational networks (Bisonnette 2009). In this context of 
“hypermediated realism” (Bolter and Grusin 1999), self-reflexivity not only points at how 
reality is being transformed and ‘augmented’ through various media, but also, and especially, 
how only through these we can access reality (just like the protagonists often attempt). The 
same holds for our ‘enjoyment’ of the films. Pleasure and connection to the story world comes 
through an awareness of the medium and its manipulation.  
 Even though it has perhaps exhausted the ‘radical’ potential it once contained, self-
reflexivity is all but absent from the stage of contemporary complex films, and many analysts 
broach this issue, with some of them emphasizing its ‘metanarrational’ and others its 
‘metafictional’ aspects, without however using these categories. Some also point at the 
articulation of self-reflexivity with complexity in these films, even though what does this 
complexity stand for is not precisely defined. As Erlend Lavik notes, the way that recent 
complex narratives in film and television attract the attention not only to their diegesis but also 
to the way their narratives are constructed, develops hand-in-hand with their complex 
structure: “those films that are cited in pretty much every account – 21 Grams, Adaptation, 
Fight Club, Memento, and Pulp Fiction, for example – are both unmistakably complex and 
reflexive; moreover, their complexity and their reflexivity are intertwined” (2007: 37). It has 
also been suggested that in complex films such as Pulp Fiction reflexivity becomes a game in 
which the viewer finds pleasure, and goes hand in hand with the films’ complex structure: “the 
way one’s understanding of the story develops along with one’s understanding of the structure 
of the film” (Plantinga 1994).  
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 Such entwinement of self-reflexivity with film complexity raises questions regarding 
its traditional theorization as an ‘anti-narrative’ device. In the 2006 special issue of The Velvet 
Light Trap on narrative and storytelling, Jason Mittell considers the kind of “operational 
reflexivity”, as he calls it, that complex narratives show as a “narrative special effect” (35) that 
differentiates contemporary complex narratives from modernist reflexivity whose effect was 
the distance from the spectacle. Mittell notes:   
This is not the reflexive self-awareness of Tex Avery cartoons acknowledging 
their own construction or the technique of some modernist art films asking us to 
view their constructedness from an emotional distance; operational reflexivity 
invites us to care about the storyworld while simultaneously appreciating its 
construction. (2006: 35) 
 Mittell’s “functional” self-reflexivity stands closer to metanarration than metafiction. 
In his view, complex narratives are not so much criticizing the factitiousness of fiction but 
demonstrating the power of discourse and of narration itself.  
This operational aesthetic is on display within online fan forum dissections of the 
techniques that complex comedies and dramas use to guide, manipulate, deceive, 
and misdirect viewers, suggesting the key pleasure of unraveling the operations of 
narrative mechanics. We watch these shows not just to get swept away in a 
realistic narrative world (although that certainly can happen) but also to watch the 
gears at work, marveling at the craft required to pull off such narrative 
pyrotechnics. (35; emphasis mine) 
 At this point a paradox is raised. Taking into account that, as Genette has 
demonstrated, discourse and its markers have an anti-narrative role, then the paradox can be 
put like this: How can narration be empowered by the same means that narrative (the récit) is 
dismantled? In this line of thinking, the proliferation of discours in contemporary films could 
be seen as indicative of the end of narrative, as Genette had already predicted in his 
commenting upon the (post)modernist experimentations of nouveau roman. The problem for 
me lies, as I have already pointed out, in the definition of the word narrative itself, and its 
connotations of a certain objective and ‘realistic’, in the sense of mimetic realism, 
representation, which would imitate the causal-logical and spatio-temporal sequence of events 
in an idealized version of the real world. By adding many layers and dimensions of analysis, 
Genette and other prominent narratologists demonstrated that narrative involves a complex 
textual and cognitive weaving.50 However, it is the laws of causality and spatiotemporal 
sequentiality, presupposed or expected in narrative, that introduce an internal tension with all 
the ‘anti-narrative’ characteristics of texts, such as the one of self-reflexivity.  
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 One possible solution to the problem of how an anti-narrative device makes narration 
more interesting and engaging would be to omit the word narrative and replace it with the 
notion of diegesis, which indeed, may well be enforced by the discursive, anti-narrative 
techniques. Particularly the notion of the cinematic diegesis that Elsaesser has suggested 
proves useful: according to him, the diegesis, traditionally conceived as the world that a 
story/narrative creates, has to include, in the case of cinema, not only the space inside the 
screen (the depicted world and its temporal, spatial and agential markers) but also the subject 
and body of the viewer, in the actual (theatrical) situation, and the way s/he relates to the 
screen (2006). In this model of diegesis, the deictic markers that establish this relation, i.e. the 
film’s discourse, become also part of the diegesis, of the constitution of a filmic world. 
Therefore, according to this view, the anti-narrative self-reflexive devices, part of a film’s 
discourse, are actually enforcing the diegesis. In contemporary complex films self-reflexivity 
involves the viewer more actively into the construction of the diegesis, which includes the 
story world (another term that has been used by Herman as an analytical category that 
combines story and discourse—see Herman 2002—and is, according to my opinion, more 
functional than that of narrative) and the spectator’s world. Reflexivity triggers the complex 
constitution of this expanded diegetic world, rather than its decomposition; it becomes an 
organizing principle, as soon as it engages the viewer in the construction of the diegesis.  
 From here the metanarrational and the metafictional aspects of self-reflexivity can be 
placed in a continuum, as metafiction is also present in contemporary complex films, 
especially those characterized as “puzzle” or “mind-game”. In the contemporary ‘mirrors’ of 
complex films, self-reflexivity’s effects of “distancing and estranging” are duplicated inside 
the story worlds, where, as if our avatars, the protagonists also experience the effect of an 
agency that manipulates their experience—in the same way that the narration manipulates our 
own as viewers. Thus reflexivity creates self-similar fractal architectures through which the 
story world constitutes itself by reproducing the self-reflexive character of the viewer’s own 
experience of the film. Thus, every self-reflexive turn of the plot at once refers to the inside 
and the outside of the screen, and connects them in a loop of mutual constitution, which, in the 
last analysis, is diegetic, even though “anti-narrative”.  
 
Reflexivity as the textual form of self-reference  
 The paradox of the anti-narrative nature of complex films also lies in their ability to 
achieve coherency, both as textual and as cognitive ‘wholes’, despite the multiple disruptions 
of discourse. Self-reflexivity plays an important, constructive role, in the constitution of these 
wholes. As I would argue, using structuralist vocabulary, even though self-reflexivity has 
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mainly been approached through a film’s enunciation (the context of the narrative act, 
including the speaker, the listener and their relation), in contemporary complex films it is also 
a feature of the utterance, which, in this case, is the syuzhet/plot, or indeed, the narrative 
(récit).  
 The function of self-reflexivity in the textual organization has been missing from both 
its metanarrational and metafictional theorizations, but as I felt through the analysis of The 
Final Cut, it plays an important role. This function has to do with (self-)reflexivity’s serving 
what Williams calls (in the context of literature) an internal “self-circulating tropological 
economy”, which exists “for its own sake and its own reproduction” (Williams 145). But here 
I do not speak about first-degree self-reference anymore (the first level of self-reflexivity that I 
indicated in the beginning of this chapter), but about reflexivity as an operation that internally 
shapes the text’s form, when itself seems to be constituted, like The Final Cut, through loops, 
resonances and folds that create connections between different segments of the film, units 
through which the film’s organization is recomposed. Generating the textual form, these loops 
make also possible the feedback between film and viewer, by means of “a ‘lowering’ of self-
consciousness and a different form of recursiveness”, as Elsaesser describes in the context of 
complex, “mind-game” films (2009c: 24). It is textual reflexivity that makes this different 
form of recursiveness possible.  
 As already broached, a conception of self-reflexivity compatible with a film’s ‘closing’ 
onto itself has been faced with suspicion by a certain critical tradition in film theory, and 
considered as an expression of elitist formalism. It is more in poetry and its spatial textual 
organization, and not in literary texts, that such a conception of reflexivity can be traced. In 
the 1940s the literary theorist Joseph Frank drew the attention to the “spatial form” of literary 
narration, referring to the novels and poetry of modernism (Frank 1945; 1978). Referring to 
modern poetry and its spatial form Frank stressed its “principle of reflexive reference”: “The 
primary reference of any word-group [in a modernist poem], is to something inside the poem 
itself” (1945: 229). Drawing on Saussure’s theory of language, which maintains that the text is 
constituted by “a system of self-reflexive signs”, Frank refers to reflexive reference as formal 
organization rather than signification: “[external] referentiality is relegated to a secondary 
position, or disregarded entirely, and the internal relations of words to each other play a 
predominant role” (1978: 280). Objecting the traditional distinction—drawn by Lessing in 
Laocoon—between spatial and temporal arts (painting and poetry), Frank argues that 
modernist poetry as well as literature (especially through works such as Joyce’s Ulysses and 
Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu, but also to Djuna Barnes’ Nightwood and Robbe-
Grillet’s novels) are primarily spatial, because of their reflexive self-reference.51 
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 Reflexive self-reference in films also points at their spatial attributes. Frank refers to the 
early 20th century Russian formalists as pioneers in the study of the spatial aspects of 
literature, which are to some extent inherent in every literary text. The Russian formalists 
emphasized the (often non-sequential) form of the syuzhet (plot) as opposed to that of the 
fabula (story). This emphasis upon the syuzhet and its spatial form returns in the discussions of 
complex films. A model of reflexivity such as that of the text’s “spatial form” is suggestive of 
how complex plots achieve a level of organization and coherence despite being fractured and 
disordered.  
 In my view, the model of reflexivity that Frank suggested before the Second World 
War is a systemic model. In the next chapter I will develop a systemic framework for the 
spatial workings of reflexivity in contemporary complex films, drawing on systems theory, 
which flourished in the years after the World War II. According to this framework, reflexivity, 
although internally operating, makes possible the viewer’s engagement into the self-referential 
movement of the textual form, and thus points at an emergent constitution of the diegesis.  
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3. Reflexivity and organization in systems and in complex films  
 
In this chapter I will pursue a revision of the concept of reflexivity through the systems 
theoretical framework, which illuminates reflexivity’s particular ‘complex’ function. Thinking 
complex films as systems will allow me to revise the previous accounts of self-reflexivity in 
narratives and films and place the term in a context that departs from objectivist epistemology, 
which determines the ‘anti-narrative’ as ‘anti-illusionistic’. The argument I make through this 
chapter is that (self-)reflexivity leads beyond narrative, not only because it is anti-mimetic, but 
mainly because it suggests a nonlinear and continuously renewed form of textual organization. 
The shift of analytic framework to systems theory will also provide me with a useful 
distinction between the different levels of self-reference and reflexivity. A systemic approach 
to complex films allows for further insight to be gained in both their “mind-game” aspect, 
which I associate with systemic self-reference, and their nonlinear temporal structure, which I 
associate with systemic reflexivity. The way these two aspects are interwoven is what makes 
the films under question functioning as complex systems. 
 
The systemic genealogy of reflexivity  
 The genealogy of the concept of reflexivity extends beyond the discourse of art and 
film theory. Before proceeding to the theorization of reflexivity in the theory of Niklas 
Luhmann, I will first sketch the background of the concept in systems theory, and particularly 
in its cybernetic strand.52 This framework will make it easier to understand how Luhmann 
conceived reflexivity as an agent of self-organization and complexity. 
 Cybernetics, one of the most important strands of systems theory, developed as a 
research field in the years after World War II. Cybernetics is the science of regulatory 
systems, that can be organic (living) or not. This discipline’s objects are profoundly reflexive, 
as psychologist and epistemologist Steven Bartlett notes; they are “self-correcting systems, 
self-regulating systems, systems capable of self-initiated learning, self-organizing systems, 
self-reproducing systems” (Bartlett 1987: 24).53 But also according to the definition of Louis 
Kauffman, mathematician and president of the American Society for Cybernetics between 
2005 and 2008, “cybernetics is the study of systems and processes that interact with 
themselves and produce themselves from themselves” (Kauffman, as cited in Andrew 2008).  
 Cybernetics considers humans, animals and machines as information processing 
systems; therefore, in this context, reflexivity is not associated with self-reference in the sense 
of self-awareness—the latter implies a human consciousness. According to Bartlett, the 
‘recruitment’ of reflexivity in cybernetic models of control was anticipated by earlier 
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developments in different fields. Semantic theory, argumentation, and theory of knowledge 
used reflexivity to build a “metatheory” in order to elaborate on the previous intuitive and not 
fully self-conscious reflexive results of mathematics (the “semantical and set-theoretical 
paradoxes” and the “intellectual misgivings and confusion” that followed their discovery—
Bartlett 1992: 17).54 In analytical philosophy and argumentation, self-reference has been used 
as a method that controls and prevents inconsistency and helps the construction of ‘strong’ 
arguments, by taking into account and ‘calculating’ the influence of the observer’s, thinker’s 
or speaker’s subjectivity upon the observation, thought or utterance s/he makes. Thus, 
reflexivity gradually turned, from a power corrosive to the foundations of reason—as in the 
case of logical, mathematical, or later, post-structuralist paradoxes—into one that may bring 
positive results for epistemology. It was combined with the human ability for successful 
problem solving, adaptability to the environment, and control of logical inconsistency (Bartlett 
1987: 6). As cybernetics has primarily been the study of control systems, reflexivity in this 
field has been integrated into the workings of all cybernetic and self-controlling organisms. 
Cybernetic systems are self-referential; they calculate information about their status in relation 
to their environment at every ‘step’ they take, and thus regulate, plan and anticipate the future 
outcomes of their actions.  
 Through the notion of “feedback” between organism and environment, cybernetics 
attempted to systematize the workings of reflexivity (Bartlett 1992: 17), which is now 
conceived more in terms of “circularity” and mutual causality between system and 
environment, rather than in terms of first-degree self-reference (Suber 1987: 259). Because of 
the inseparability of system and environment and the mutual causality between them, every 
action an organism performs is already determined by previous feedback from the 
environment and further continues the feedback chain.  In cybernetics reflexivity presupposes 
that every action or observation is not done in a vacuum; at the moment it takes place it also 
constitutes a ‘self’ (as system) vis à vis an environment.  
 In her account of the history of cybernetics through the minutes of the Macy 
Conferences (1946-1953),55 Katherine Hayles highlights reflexivity as a turning point for 
cybernetic (and systems) theory, and names the phase in which cybernetics entered in the 
1960s as “the phase of reflexivity”. Hayles mentions that the Austrian physicist Heinz von 
Foerster suggested the application of the self-reflexive principles to cybernetics as a scientific 
field. Presenting his essay collection Observing Systems at the Macy conferences in the 
beginning of the 1950s, von Foerster expressed the need, as Hayles notes, to take the scientist-
observer into account, as well as the context (or “environment”—in this case the field of 
cybernetics in which they are positioned) in which s/he operates. Thus, von Foerster attempted 
to “extend the cybernetic principles to the cyberneticians themselves” (Hayles 1994: 442), 
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opening the “black box” of the observer and triggering discussion on whether the scientists as 
observers determine the cybernetic systems they observe. Indeed, von Foerster argued for a 
“second-order” cybernetics—a “cybernetics of cybernetics” (von Foerster 2003: 289)—which 
would follow the same recursive principles that guide the conduct of cybernetic organisms. 
Operating through recursive self-reference, a cybernetic organism “refers each incoming 
signal to its own self […] to establish self-reference with respect to the outside world” (von 
Foerster 2003: 110). Thus, von Foerster’s account of self-reflexivity associated the concept 
with contextual meta-information.56 
 Hayles sees this call for a second-order cybernetics that von Foerster made losing 
ground with the subsequent development of the theory of autopoiesis by the Chilean biologist 
Humberto Maturana and his student at the time Francisco Varela. Autopoiesis, which 
penetrated the field of cybernetics after 1969, when von Foerster invited Maturana to 
contribute to the Macy Conferences, transported reflexivity to a different level, from the 
interplay between a system and its environment to that “between a system and its components” 
(Hayles 1994: 462). Thus, the epistemology of autopoiesis “displaced the focus of attention 
from the boundary between a system and the environment, to the feedback loops within the 
organism” (463).57 This idea of the boundary between an organism and the environment being 
reproduced within the organism itself, is fundamental in the social systems theory of 
Luhmann, which is based on the theory of autopoiesis.58 I will parallel this ‘internalization’ of 
reflexivity in cybernetics and systems theory with the textual form of self-reflexivity such as 
the one suggested by Frank—as broached at the end of the previous chapter. The systemic 
framework allows me to think of the two levels of filmic self-reflexivity, the one of self-
reference in relation to the viewer (metanarration) and the other of ‘internal’ reflexivity (as 
loops and resonances within the film), as continuous, the one being generated from the other.  
 Luhmann’s theory of social systems—which he developed in the 1970s—has been 
influenced by Maturana’s (and Varela’s) theory of autopoiesis. However, the degree to which 
the circular process of reflexivity is dependent upon the existence of an observer differentiates 
the use of the concept between Maturana and Luhmann. While autopoiesis still retained a 
place for an external observer,59 Luhmann took a step further, maintaining that the observer is 
the system.60 In contrast to Maturana’s autopoiesis, Luhmann’s social systems theory does not 
require “an observer as another system in order to produce system/environment relations” 
(Luhmann 1995a: 37). The environment is part of the system and produced by its inner 
processes of self-reference. However, the system is only operationally and not structurally 
closed; its self-reference produces an organization that becomes more complex by trying to 
render its environment meaningful, and to select from it the necessary resources (in 
information or energy) that will allow it to survive and evolve. As Luhmann notes: 
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The concept of the self-referentially closed system does not contradict the 
system’s openness to the environment. Instead, in the self-referential mode of 
operation, closure is a form of broadening possible environmental contacts; 
closure increases, by constituting elements more capable of being determined, the 
complexity of the environment that is possible for the system. (Luhmann 1995a: 
37)  
 After briefly sketching the theoretical and scientific background in which Luhmann’s 
contribution to systems theory entered, in the rest of this chapter I will argue for the 
applicability of Luhmann’s theory, and especially his description of systemic self-referential 
processes, to films of the complex narrative tendency. As already discussed in the previous 
chapter, self-reference plays an important role in these films and their modes of narration. In 
general, self-reference in films is expressive of an agency that belongs to the act of narration 
and manifests itself through various expressive modes, as discussed in Chapter 2. This act 
does not necessarily point at an (anthropomorphic) subject of narration, that is, the ‘author’ or 
‘director’, but at a ‘unity’ that the text gradually forms. Narrative theory presupposes that this 
unity is a causal-logical one, pertaining to universal schemata of understanding. My 
suggestion is instead that this unity is one of emergent complex organization, which creates its 
coherency from the bottom-up (being internally reflexive and self-referential) and not based 
on some kind of external ‘common sense’. The presupposition of a causal-logical system 
implies a whole that pre-exists its elements, and determines the way that the disparate or out-
of-order parts will finally fall into place. However, moving before the constitution of such 
whole, and looking at the process through which a film organizes from its elements, puts the 
validity of this presupposition into question. 
 Films and narratives are not social systems in the same way that law, economy, politics 
or religion are, but they could be considered as products of the social system of art, as 
Luhmann considered narrative, and also of that of mass media—in which cinema as an 
institution can be classified.61 At the same time, cinema, despite its structural similarities with 
other mass media, is also very different from them, and the specifics of its systemic function 
are yet to be clarified by research. In the same vein, individual films cannot be reduced to their 
narrative or ‘artwork’ aspects. Only when this distinction between cinema and other systems is 
effectuated it becomes possible to study how films contribute to the constitution of the system 
cinema—which currently, as I pointed out in the Introduction, works as a complex system. 
The specifics of the workings of films, and, by extension, of cinema, as complex systems, is 
what I attempt with this dissertation to begin clarifying.  
 With the analogy that I draw in this chapter between social systems theory and 
contemporary complex narrative films, I do not aspire to address or evaluate Luhmann’s vast, 
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multifaceted and controversial work in its entirety. Rather, I derive from it his description of 
the internal processes that constitute a system’s self-reference, which I find illuminating when 
it comes to how (self-)reflexivity, a key-feature of contemporary complex films,  as already 
discussed, functions as an organizing process.  
 In the following part of this chapter, I will first explain what is self-reference in 
Luhmann’s systems theory, and then single out the systemic process of “reflexivity”. I will 
proceed by explaining what particular function reflexivity has in the context of systemic self-
reference, and how it is related to the temporal organization of systems.  
 
Self-reference: From complex systems to complex films 
 Luhmann distinguishes three kinds of systems: biological, “psychic” and social 
systems. Self-reference is for him the defining characteristic of all systems. It is an 
“operational closure” that constitutes the system by drawing a boundary between its internal 
organization and the environment, and by permitting self-observation (and self-reference) 
from this boundary. But the boundary is produced by the system’s own operation; by 
observing itself as a distinct entity the system also constitutes its own environment. Thus, the 
closure that the boundary suggests is operational (serving the system’s operation of self-
organization) rather than ‘real’, suggesting a disconnection of the inside from the outside.  
 Systemic self-reference produces complexity in a seemingly paradoxical way, by 
reducing the complexity of the environment. The reduction of external complexity produces, 
at the level of the system, further complexity. This is effectuated by what Maturana called 
“structural coupling”. Every “distinction”, or self-observation, is a selection of information 
from the environment. The system, according to Luhmann, selects only what is useful and 
relevant to its own internal organization; what produces “meaning”.62 He distinguishes 
between organized and unorganized complexity: the environment is characterized by 
unorganized complexity, but the system, through the self-referential distinctions or 
“selections” it makes, organizes complexity. The reduction of external (unorganized) 
complexity increases the system’s internal, organized complexity, and makes it capable to 
evolve (Luhmann 1995a: xxxv).63 Every selection constitutes a system vis-à-vis an 
environment but also it establishes a relation between elements within the system, vis-à-vis the 
sum of the possible relations—the “surplus of possibilities”—that the system contains (39).  
 Internal complexity is produced when, with every self-observation and distinction from 
an environment, the system achieves higher internal differentiation, and, by extension, more 
ways to “couple” further with the environment. This is because every time the system has to 
select from its environment what is relevant to its own organization, it makes this organization 
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more complex in order to accommodate further complexity with each new distinction. But it is 
not the environment that determines the system’s structure. What happens, according to 
autopoietic systems theory, is the reverse. Structural coupling implies that the system, through 
its own organization, shapes its environment: “environments do not determine internal 
changes of the system. The environment merely selects states from among those determined 
by the internal structure” (Bailey 1994: 304). This is the way communication is established 
between system and environment. Every self-referential distinction is an act of 
communication, increasing the ways a system can couple with the environment, and making 
them more refined. In Luhmann’s words: “closure increases, by constituting elements more 
capable of being determined, the complexity of the environment that is possible for the 
system” (1995a: 37). The structure of a system at any instant of time is a prerequisite for 
communication, as it gives leeway for coupling with its environment to be achieved.  
 In this context, complex films can be seen as products of the internal differentiation of 
cinema vis-à-vis its environment of audiences as well as of other media and social agents. 
Cinema self-organizes by increasing its internal complexity, which can be observed in 
(popular) films and filmmaking practices that become more complex. If we think of film 
viewing in complex systemic terms, then the “psychic system” of the viewer (according to 
Luhmann’s triad of social, biological and psychic systems) and his or her cognitive 
organization would be placed in the ‘environment’ of individual films. The structural coupling 
of these two systems (the viewer and the film, the one being the environment of the other) is 
their communication, which is different from the communication created by narrative. The 
latter, as long as it attempts to construct a causal-logical sequence, seems to be standing closer 
to the common sense of meaning and communication, and not the systemic one.  
 A first point of contact between self-reference in systems theory and the self-referential 
processes involved in complex films can be made through Luhmann’s discussion of self-
referential modes in art (2000a: 142). He suggests that through self-reference, artworks, 
among which he classifies novels, create “doublings of reality copied in the imaginary reality 
of the world of art”.  Thus artworks re-introduce into their own form the basic distinction upon 
which art operates, namely a distinction of perception between the ordinary and the imaginary, 
or even, reality and illusion. Such doublings created within the artworks can be those between 
“reality and dream […], reality and play, reality and illusion, even reality and art” (ibid, 143). 
But, as all distinctions, they only point at the unity of the difference they introduce, namely, in 
the case of art, the absence of a dichotomy between reality and imagination. It is the system of 
art itself (here considered in its function in society and not through qualitative criteria) that 
represents this unity: in the realm of art, reality and illusion can coexist, since artworks are real 
objects that construct imaginary worlds.   
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 Self-reference in narratives has recently been approached from the aspect of systems 
theory, by scholars Joseph Tabbi and Bruce Clarke. More specifically, Tabbi (2002) refers to 
self-reference as an act of narration. Especially when self-reference is placed at the end of a 
“complex” novel, it demonstrates the ability of narrative to overcome the chaotic forces of 
high complexity. Tabbi especially refers to novels such as Thomas Pynchon’s The Cry of Lot 
49, Richard Powers’s Galatea 2.2, Paul Auster’s City of Glass and Kate Marksons’s 
Wittgenstein’s Mistress. In these novels, when a high level of complexity is achieved, the 
author’s self-reference (expressed through phrases that can be characterized as metanarrational 
comments) enables an exit from narrative’s paradoxical self-closure and its transfer to a meta-
level, where it can observe itself. Therefore self-reference re-enters the distinction between 
system and environment (story and a ‘non-story’ of random information) inside the stories, 
producing an observer—the narrator—who now intervenes in the story in order to observe it 
from a different meta-position: “the moment a narrator recognizes the possibility of ‘keeping a 
journal of the journal’, or of turning one’s isolated inconsequential notations into an 
‘absolutely autobiographical novel’, the narrator re-enters the system at another level (and at a 
later time), and thus keeps things going” (2002: xxii). These self-referential instances are for 
Tabbi instances in which “the system becomes conscious of itself”, and then uses this self-
consciousness as information, re-entering the distinction between itself and its environment 
into the system, and thus being able to develop (65).   
 In Posthuman Metamorphosis: Narratives and Systems (2008), Bruce Clarke, 
attempting a convergence of Mieke Bal’s rereading of Genette and Luhmann’s systems 
theory,64 argues that the systemic framework is applicable to the narratological study of 
cultural texts involving “posthuman transformations”. Such texts vary from Stanislaw Lem’s 
The Cyberiad (1965) to Octavia Butler’s Xenogenesis trilogy (1987-1989), and from H. G. 
Wells’ The Island of Doctor Moreau (1896) to David Cronenberg’s The Fly (1986). Clarke 
analyses the self-reflexive structures of these texts such as paradoxes, embedded frames, 
“stories within stories and plays within plays” (9), and their multiple diegetic levels, and he 
comments on the way the observations of transformation that these novels diegetically 
perform can be seen as shifts from first to second order observation (not just observing 
something, but observing oneself observing something). Such second-order observations are, 
according to Clarke, characteristic not only of stories about metamorphosis but of narrative 
itself, as they are at the core of narrative’s function as “a form of communication through 
processes of observation” (78).65 
 Despite these few but significant attempts in literary theory to use systems theory and 
especially Luhmann’s model and the notion of self-reference to analyze narratives as systems, 
my own approach of complex films as complex systems differs from them in some substantial 
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points. Firstly, these attempts do not particularly address the self-referentiality of film, with its 
own particular modes of expression, let alone the expressions and transformations of 
cinematic self-reflexivity in contemporary complex films. On the one hand, Tabbi’s approach 
refers to cases of literary self-reference, expressed by the intervention of the narrator’s self-
reflection (in the form of metanarrational comments), that are fundamentally different from 
the filmic self-referential (and metanarrational) devices. On the other hand, although Clarke 
makes extensive reference to a film (Cronenberg’s The Fly), he does not discuss the devices of 
cinematic self-referential discourse as instances of systemic observation, when metamorphosis 
as such is not thematized by the plot, as it happens in the stories of the novels he analyzes. 
Secondly, as already implied, these attempts insist on seeing the systemic function of texts as 
“narrative”, without addressing the paradox of the anti-narrative elements—and here 
particularly self-reference—that these texts show in the first place. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
according to Genette self-reference (through discours) introduces an inner tension with 
narrative (particularly with récit), but this tension has not sufficiently been addressed by 
scholars in texts that show high degrees of self-reference, not so much thematically, such as 
the stories of metamorphosis Clarke discusses, but also structurally, as in contemporary 
complex films. Are these texts narratives of a second-degree or, by showing more 
commonalities with systems than with stories, do they suggest a departure from narrative?  
 Through the various ‘twists’ that many of them contain, complex films seem to be 
inviting the viewer to observe their narrative worlds, in a process similar to the one Clarke 
describes, and to make distinctions between reality and illusion, producing through these 
distinctions a unity that is the system of narrative, as Luhmann would have it. This level of 
self-reference would address the metafictional aspect of complex films, which has to do more 
with the way they undermine the truthfulness of their own narratives. However, as pointed out 
in the previous chapter, complex films also display a strong metanarrational reflexivity. The 
play between reality and illusion that can be observed in them is combined with a self-
conscious narration that directly invites the viewer to participate in the construction of the 
diegesis, independently of the unreal impression that their story worlds create.  
 The moments when the viewer, in the process of watching the film and not a 
posteriori, ‘realizes’ that the narration deceives them—as it often happens in complex films 
(especially those characterized as “puzzle” films)—can be seen as instances that increase the 
communication between film-system and viewer-system and make the cognitive organization 
of the latter, as an effect of the structural coupling with the film, more complex. Along with 
the twist or “mind-game” moments that happen within the diegesis of complex films, we also 
have the self-reflexive practices that guide their plots’ structuring, such as the openly 
restrictive narration or the time-juggling. These practices have been considered anti-narrative, 
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as already discussed, because they point at the film itself (and not just the narrative) being in 
some sense the construction of an agency, and therefore having a somewhat factitious or 
‘illusory’ status. The function of these self-reflexive devices can be reinterpreted when seen as 
levers of systemic self-organization. Thus, instead of alienating the viewers, or making them 
‘reflect’ upon the film (by means of a subject-object relationship and positivist epistemology), 
self-reflexive techniques engage them in an increasingly complex communication. Thus, 
contrary to what has been characterized as a “low level of communicativeness” in puzzle films 
(based on Meir Sternberg’s taxonomy—see Panek 2006, Bordwell 1985), their unwillingness 
to “tell everything” that they know and their “openly restrictive narration” that flauntingly 
omits information from the spectator (at least until a twist moment comes), might suggest a 
different form of communication, which engages the spectator more deeply and in 
fundamentally different ways; not those of cognitive reflection but of systemic self-reference. 
The “id” of the narration, which “flaunts its uncommunicativeness” (Panek 2006: 85), might 
then be exactly the film’s call for a different, systemic communication.  
 The “operational reflexivity” of which critics like Mittell talk about in relation to 
contemporary complex narratives, creates care for the story world instead of critical distance. I 
would add that self-reference in contemporary complex films achieves not only ‘care’ for the 
characters and the story, but also for the film as such, the particularity of its experience and its 
way of constructing a diegesis (in the expanded sense used in Chapter 2). In systems 
theoretical terms this may be explained as follows: every time there is a self-referential 
distinction in complex films, this distinction does not have as a consequence the detachment of 
the film from its environment-viewer, neither a cognitive distancing of the latter, but the 
further development of internal complexity, which ultimately engages the viewer in more 
complex ways as well, because of the new possibilities for coupling that emerge (since every 
system by increasing its internal complexity lends itself to further coupling with its 
environment). Thus self-referentiality becomes a communicating principle in complex films, 
as long as it enables the emergence of meaning in each system, the one of the viewer and the 
other of the film.  
 
Reflexivity and temporality: A separate plane of self-reference   
 Apart from systemic self-reference, what I believe becomes of particular relevance 
when it comes to complex films is the inner process of self-reference that Luhmann calls 
“reflexivity”, which needs to be given separate attention. It is thus of interest to the purpose of 
this study to somehow isolate the workings of reflexivity from that of systemic self-reference, 
and see how the latter is produced through the former.  
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 In Luhmann’s systems theory, reflexivity has been linked to the complexity of systems. 
According to my hypothesis that complex films can be approached as complex systems, I will 
suggest that Luhmann’s theory provides insight into the role of reflexivity in them. In his 
systems theory, reflexivity is the temporal organization of a system through self-reference, and 
can therefore serve as a useful theoretical tool for the analysis of the complex interplay of self-
reference and the (out of sequence) time in complex films. Using Luhmann’s conception of 
reflexivity and self-reference, I will argue that the textual and cognitive organization of 
complex films is produced primarily through self-reference. Time is also a product of this self-
referential organization.  
 Luhmann distinguishes between different processes of systemic self-reference, which 
takes place on multiple levels, such as that of the system as a whole vis-à-vis its environment, 
and that of the ‘elemental’ (at the level of elements) constitution of the system. “Reflexivity” 
and “reflection” are two types of the self-reference that produces the system’s organization—
the third is “basal self-reference”. All three kinds of self-reference, namely reflection, 
reflexivity and basal self-reference,66 and all types of relations corresponding to them, namely 
“system-environment”, “before-after”, “element-relation”, constitute a system’s self-
organization. Observation is itself dispersed in this systemic nexus; it happens at many 
levels—and across the different levels of self-reference—and constitutes the system’s 
complexity. The type of self-reference that specifically operates at the level of the system-
environment distinction is “reflection”. While reflection refers more directly to the system as a 
whole, and controls its relation to the environment, reflexivity refers to the relations between 
the elements of the system, and thus the “interplay between a system and its components”. In 
particular, reflexivity operates at the intra-systemic level of the temporal organization of the 
system’s elements.67 According to Luhmann, every system that can display self-reference 
(such as a social, conscious or biological entity), is composed by the triad: elements (events 
and actions) – processes – systems (1995a: 10, 447). Reflexivity is the type of self-reference 
that refers to the “process” part of this triad.  
 Reflexivity is a mode of self-reference, but it does not refer to an ‘outside’ of the 
system (its relationship with an environment and the borders that define it), neither to the 
system itself from an external perspective, but to the process that constitutes the system 
through the arrangement of its elements.68 Reflexivity is the way an element of a system 
“refers” to other elements of the same kind, and not directly to the system they constitute (see 
Luhmann 1995: 39). I find the function of reflexivity particularly relevant in the context of the 
systemic organization of contemporary complex films and the “modular” temporality that they 
display. Thus, I am going to argue that, by “re-entering” events/distinctions into the temporal 
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sequence of these films, reflexivity at once spatializes and produces time, making the films’ 
structure more complex.  
 Luhmann describes reflexivity as a process that observes the temporal constitution of a 
system through its selections-events (the elements that compose it). Through reflexivity, a 
system makes selections from its environment (thus produces new events for itself) based on 
earlier and later events (previous selections and future expectations). Thus, reflexivity is the 
process that makes events (elements, singular occurrences) “re-enter” into the process 
acquiring “predictive value” and forwarding the events that are about to come.69 Through this 
procedure, “the unity of the process acquires causal significance for itself”, and also “guides 
and controls” itself (Luhmann 1995: 450-451). Reflexivity thus becomes a basic process of 
self-organization; selecting events and composing the system in time, it generates the system’s 
causality and makes its communication with other systems (such as the one of the viewer, in 
the case of films) possible: “Therefore an observer can detect movements, follow melodies, 
and figure out what is going to be said” (Luhmann 1995: 451). 
 This means that a self-referential observation affects the structure of the system’s 
elements, selecting also at the level of elements certain relations and not others. Meaning 
emerges in temporalized systems that are able, through reflexivity, to indicate something as 
having preceded and something else as about to follow. In the particular case of the art system, 
Luhmann notes: 
Temporal positions in art […] are determined by their own vanishing, and the 
artwork must define what remains significant and what can follow—a 
momentarily fixated and vanishing where and whence. It is always the difference, 
the boundary, that makes a difference and is turned into information by the work 
of art. (2000a: 115) 
It is this difference between before and after that reflexivity observes in systems and thus 
retains and, more precisely, remakes, the system’s unity in time. Turning it into information, it 
organizes itself and also, at another level, differentiates itself from the environment.  
 Since self-reflexive observations continue over time and new selections take place, 
these selections are treated by the system as events, that is, as singular moments in time; they 
are thus being “temporalized”. This ‘elemenal constitution’ makes structure (as the 
constitution of links between elements) and organization possible. Yet these structures need to 
be flexible and constantly reformulated, because each new event creates new relations between 
the system’s elements, new ‘befores’ and ‘afters’. Structures have to “glue back” events in the 
right place and “treat them as if they were expected” (Luhmann 1995: 287). As Luhmann 
contends, “events present the irreversibility of time within systems. In order to achieve 
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reversibility, one must form structures” (ibid: 449). By self-organizing, systems not only cope 
with the complexity of their environment, but also with the irreversibility of time. Their 
organization exists in time and is irreversible, but their structure enables them to temporarily 
withhold selectivity, to ‘fake’ a momentary ‘freeze’ of time, so that they can select from its 
flow those elements that serve their internal organization. Thus, as Michael Schlitz notes, time 
in Luhmann’s systems theory appears in the shape of a “torus” rather than in that of an arrow 
(2007).  
 
Looking back – going forward  
 Through the example of The Final Cut (Chapter 1) but also through the overview of 
filmic self-reflexivity and its particular function in complex films (Chapter 2), two conclusions 
can be drawn: self-reference is an important (though traditionally ‘anti-narrative’ or in tension 
with narrative) feature of contemporary complex films. A way through which self-reference is 
expressed is the one of non-sequential temporal structure (or ‘time-juggling’), which, is a 
fundamental form of narrative discourse and at the same time “data of voice”, according to 
Genette, that is, a narrational marker. Far from a random ordering of events in time, the non-
sequentiality of contemporary complex films often consists in revisiting and ‘replaying’ past 
events through a different perspective, for instance through that of a digital inscriptive device 
(the zoe-implant) in The Final Cut. Less in The Final Cut and more in other films like The 
Jacket (John Maybury 2005), it is also flash-forwards that are inserted into the present to—
again—offer a different perspective, albeit with not always known subject or source, and that 
introduce doubt to the now lived experience—of the character, but also of the viewer. The 
changes of perspective that these analeptic and proleptic moments suggest, and the different 
glances upon self-experience through another that they introduce (another moment in time but 
also another agency), seem to me more relevant to self-reference than to time itself. This 
proliferation of self-reference ‘copes’ with time as a pre-existing force, and re-introduces it as 
a side-effect of the system’s gradual organization. It also manages to capture the viewer into 
the text’s own complex organization.  
 This coupling of self-reference with time in contemporary complex films offers an 
important connection with complex systems. The organization of complex systems, like the 
one of complex films, takes place in time as all organizing processes do. But internally, 
systems create time in the form of relations (based on the before-after difference) between 
events-selections out of the complexity of their environment. Thus systems refer to (and 
observe) their own process of self-organization. Reflexivity goes hand in hand with a 
reproduction of the system’s structure: through it, every event “re-enters” the system’s 
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existing organization, constituting an observation upon what has preceded (before) and what 
will follow (after). As Luhmann explains, 
Systems based on events need a more complex pattern of time. For them, time 
cannot be given as an irreversibility alone. Events [the systems’ composite 
elements] are happenings which make a difference between a “before” and a 
“thereafter”. They can be identified and observed, anticipated and remembered, 
only as such a difference. Their presence is a co-presence of the before and the 
thereafter. They have, therefore, to present time within time and to reconstruct 
temporality in terms of a shifting presence which has its quality as presence only 
owing to the double horizons of past and future which accompany the presence on 
its way into the future.  On this basis conscious time-binding can develop. 
(Luhmann 1986: 181-182)  
 Time in complex systems emerges as a construction created by the event of a 
difference, which ‘generates’ a before and an after (through links to prior and expected 
events).  The system accommodates this difference by assimilating it into its structure, and 
acting ‘as if this difference was expected’. The notion of “re-entry”, fundamental in 
Luhmann’s systems theory, here becomes particularly relevant.70 Luhmann ‘borrowed’ this 
notion from the mathematician George Spencer Brown (who in his work Laws of Form 
developed a calculus of first distinctions) and adopted it to his social systems theory, in order 
to explain the way self-referential systems introduce (or “replicate”) in themselves the 
difference between system and environment. The paradox or contradiction that re-entry 
suggests in logics, was solved by Spencer-Brown through the insertion of time: two 
contradictory states of a form are not incompatible as long as they refer to different moments 
of the same form in time (Schlitz 2007:17). Reflexivity in Luhmann’s theory, differentiating 
between before and after, creates time in the same way, as a solution to the paradox of self-
reference. Reflexivity guides this process of re-entry, as singular events constitute instances of 
differentiation between past and future, and thus “force” distinctions at the level of the 
system’s elements. These distinctions are “internal boundaries” of self-reference.  
 Re-entry makes a system capable of evolving by inserting its output (system-
environment difference) back into the system as input (reproduction of the system-
environment difference inside the system itself). Luhmann describes this feedback process: 
“the system nevertheless has to start every operation from a historical state that is its own 
product (the input of its own output) and needs a memory function to distinguish forgetting 
from remembering, and it has to face its future as a succession of marked and unmarked states 
or self-referential and hetero-referential indications” (1995b: 42; emphasis mine). Through 
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reflexivity, systems create a history for themselves by observing the relation between their 
input and their internal structure, and they proceed with continuous distinctions between 
forgetting and remembering, as certain ‘past’ elements are linked to the present event, and 
some others are ‘forgotten’. A system’s self-observation always implies time as difference: it 
is only retrospectively that a system is capable of making the cut—the prerequisite for any 
kind of observation.71 As long as reflexivity operates at the before-after distinction of every 
system, regulating its autopoiesis, then I would argue that reflexivity in Luhmann’s systems 
theory becomes a sort of systemic memory; it is the mnemonic function that the system needs 
in order to organize itself. Moreover, this memory is implanted, as long as it is an inserted 
self-observation (inserted because it always comes from something different than the 
system—when the systems observes itself it is always from a later point in time). And the 
system constitutes itself through a series of such implants. The creation of the system thus 
becomes a spatial construction, unfolding in continuous loops. 
 On the one hand, (self-)reflexivity spatializes time—by giving it the shape of a torus—
the space that folds upon itself—but also by juxtaposing past, present and future at the 
moment of re-entry. On the other hand, reflexivity also produces time. This ‘juggling’ is the 
way time and meaning are gradually constituted in a complex self-referential process:  
The duality of horizons doubles as soon as we think of a future present or a past 
present, both of which have their own future and their own past. The temporal 
structure of time repeats itself within itself, and only this reflexivity makes it 
possible to renounce a stable and enduring presence. (Luhmann 1986, 182)72  
 The process of reflexivity seems to be the missing link in the function of complex 
films as complex systems. The way re-entry works in them, at the moments when the past is 
observed from the present (flashback), or the future is observed from the present and vice 
versa (flash-forward), is reflexive. On the one hand unexpected and twisting, coming from 
‘outside’, on the other hand demanding an internal modification of the system and creating 
links between its elements, such reflexivity is textual in a way reminiscent of Frank’s 
“reflexive reference”, the way that textual elements relate to other elements in a text, giving it 
a spatialized form.73 At the same time, through the re-structuring effectuated by time-juggling, 
whole segments of complex films, such as scenes, also become temporalized. The present 
becomes a temporal chunk, a moment or “event” (a point in “a spatiotemporal model”, 
according to Floyd Allport—as cited by Luhmann 1995: 287), and this is necessary in order 
for it to be linked to other prior or later events, and be assimilated into the structure of the 
story. 
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 Here it seems that we have two contradicting tendencies; one that juggles time and one 
that structures it, one that could be characterized as ‘anti-narrative’ and one as narrative. 
Luhmann’s systems theory has a counter-intuitive force, in that it shows how time-juggling is 
the ‘norm’ and not the exceptional state of a system. A system spatializes time and then 
temporalizes space, so that it can keep its own structure and remain open to the contingency of 
its environment. Films of the contemporary complex narrative tendency show exactly how this 
is possible. By withholding temporalization, i.e. the succession of events from other events, 
they at once demonstrate that contingency always comes before narrative (see Simons 2008), 
and display the endurance of their organization, which is able to self-reflexively cope with the 
massive complexity of their environment.  
 Film theorist Edward Branigan has referred to the process of reordering events that 
narrative films sometimes demand as one of “presentation of time”. He notes that in cases of 
complicated temporal ordering of shots, “the shots require the spectator to refigure the 
temporal scheme” or “to reorder story events” (1992: 42), letting, through this association of 
data, an “experience of time” to emerge: “an experience of time emerges as data is processed 
and associated, that is, as the spectator reorders fragments on the screen, creating such story 
relationships as temporal continuity, ellipsis, overlap, etc.” (1992: 116, 169). In the systemic 
model, it is reflexivity that makes time possible. Time as a sequence of past, present and future 
does not exist but through self-reference. So it is not a presentation of time, as an overarching 
principle that lies beyond the grasp of representation, that systems theory suggests, but a 
creation of time (here, a time meaningful to the system and not the cosmological time), 
through a principally spatial distinction. 
 Luhmann saw modern narratives and artworks as systems that secure temporal and 
spatial continuity in order to achieve variety through redundancy (2000a: 115). Here Luhmann 
does not refer to a continuity that is presupposed but one that emerges in order to achieve 
functional closure, self-organization and evolution of inner complexity. The spatial and 
temporal continuity of narratives that Luhmann refers to, if conceived as a kind of 
organization, remains a tentative and dynamic configuration. Only after adopting this systemic 
framework and placing it before the constitution of narrative, narrative could be re-interpreted 
as a reciprocal and complex constitution of two systems, the one of the text and the other of 
the cognitive response of the viewer. But at the very moment that it achieves operational 
closure, narrative transforms into something other than itself. This is because everything that 
is observed, and closes on itself, is observed by an observer, therefore, there is never an ‘end’ 
in the beginning-middle-end schema. 
 Self-reference produces recursive, circular closure, but closure does not serve as 
an end in itself, not even as the sole mechanism of preservation or as a principle of 
	  
 
71 
security. Instead, it is the condition of possibility for openness. All openness is 
based on closure, and this is possible because self-referential operations do not 
absorb the full meaning, do not totalize but merely accompany; because they do 
not conclude, do not lead to an end, do not fulfil a telos, but rather open out. 
(Luhmann 1995a: 447) 
 In complex systems this loop-like process is never-ending, while narratives are 
traditionally defined in narratology with regard to a beginning-middle-end schema, which 
always evokes a sense of closure. In the systems theoretical framework I develop here, this 
schema becomes itself a moment in time, and being observed it helps the constitution of a 
larger organization that goes on in and with time. And contemporary complex narratives in my 
view, more than the endurance of narrative, express the need to open up to what lies beyond it. 
In contemporary complex films uncertainty becomes their principal communicative condition, 
like it has been in The Final Cut, and films often end with the introduction of one more 
uncertainty, thus negating closure. I find that Luhmann’s description of processual reflexivity 
in systems, on the one hand adequately addresses the self-referential processes involved in 
complex films, and on the other hand points beyond narrative.  
 The temporal reflexivity of systems also has a social-communicative dimension. 
Reflexivity has been described as an “expectational structure” that “implies a mode of self-
observation which uses contingent events only as an occasion or stimulus to move from one 
operation to the next” (Pottage 1998: 13). This expectational self-reproduction makes possible, 
Alain Pottage notes, a system’s “relating to others” (ibid), since, in each and every decision, a 
system engulfs an anticipation (expectation) of the environment’s (or other systems’) 
response. This expectation is fulfilled, in the case of complex films, by the response of the 
psychic (cognitive) system of the viewer, who is engaged more actively, through 
metanarrational self-reflexivity, as already stated, in the filmic process, and becomes part of its 
complex organization.  
 
 Luhmann’s theory is a complex systems theory because it shows how complexity is 
created through singular events-units—since every event causes a restructuring of the system. 
However, every event and every input is determined by the pre-existing structure, and the re-
structuring it causes is to some extent predictable. Luhmann’s theory introduces an interplay 
between contingency and structure, which however seems to be partially enabled and 
controlled by structure. This is something that changes in more recent developments in 
complex systems theory. Although Luhmann stressed the complexity of systems, he insisted 
on the organization of this complexity in a top-down direction: 
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 Whether the unity of an element should be explained as emergence “from below” 
or as constitution “from above” seems to be a matter of theoretical dispute. We opt 
decisively for the latter. Elements are elements only for the system that employs 
them as units, and they are such only through this system. (1995a: 22) 
In the perpetual re-organization of systems through difference, through the unexpected and 
contingent, as Luhmann himself described them,74 I see the seeds of the opposite movement: 
one that has systems being configured and emerging in a nonlinear way through the 
constellations of elements. It is this direction I will pursue in the following part of this thesis. 
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PART 2: EMERGENCE 
 
The second part of this dissertation, like Part 1, will begin with a plot-oriented analysis of an 
individual film, Burn After Reading (Joel and Ethan Coen, 2008, US/UK/France). Although 
individual characters and their trajectories will be separately introduced, what will gradually 
become apparent is that three levels of agency—the individuals, their aggregates and relations 
(the ‘network’ that their interactions create), and the film narration itself—are in this film 
constituted through a mutual causal mechanism, characteristic of complex systems. In Chapter 
5, I will discuss the characteristics of the diegetic causality of complex films that contain 
multiple characters, like Burn After Reading, and show how it deviates from the causality of 
classical narrative films. Chapter 6 will suggest that, when films of the complex narrative 
tendency are analyzed as complex systems, their loose diegetic causality can be considered at 
the same time an effect and a prerequisite for their emergent self-organization.  
 
4. Are networks narratable? The case of Burn After Reading*3 
 
Joel and Ethan Coen mention in an interview that Burn After Reading brings together two 
worlds, the one of the State employees in Washington DC and the other of a fitness center 
situated in the same city.75 In the beginning of the film, along with the opening credits, we see 
the US state of Virginia from a satellite camera, which gradually zooms in to ‘land’ on the 
headquarters of the CIA. There, an analyst responsible for the Balkan desk, Osborne Cox 
(John Malkovich), is called to the office of his senior, who will announce to Cox that he is 
being demoted. The reason for his demotion is his “drinking problem”, which seems to be 
known among his colleagues, although Osborne furiously denies it, blaming instead political 
reasons and calling the demotion “a crucifixion”. Disappointed and insulted, he decides to quit 
his job altogether and goes home to make himself (another) drink. This is the first in a series 
of many small ironic twists that Burn After Reading contains. In a game of continuous 
deception that the film prepares for the viewer, the latter learns to anticipate twists and turns, 
infiltrated both by paranoia and by the farcical and black comedic elements characteristic of 
Coens’ work.  
  
Paranoia and farce  
                                                
3 Some parts of this chapter were later used in the article ‘Network films and complex causality’ 
published in Screen, 55(3), 2014, pp. 379-395, doi: 10.1093/screen/hju020 
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 Burn After Reading is a mix of paranoia and farce that gradually feels more and more 
‘real’. Towards the ending, the film accelerates its tempo and culminates into a crescendo of 
brutal physical violence. While in the first half of the film we are continuously reminded, 
often in a comic way, that “appearances can be deceptive”, as one of the characters says, and 
we get prepared for surprises and twists, in the second half we are nonetheless caught by 
surprise as we watch the farce leading to a real “storm of consequences”. 
 Ozzie Cox seems to live a delusion regarding his work status, his self-conception and 
his personal life. He appears unaware of what all his colleagues seem to know (his drinking 
problem), and on top of that, he does not seem to realize that he is “no biggie” in the CIA, 
according to a senior agent’s expression. Indicative of his arrogance is his belief that writing a 
“pretty explosive memoir” about his experiences in the intelligence service can be a possible 
way to make his living after quitting his job. Ozzie’s marriage is not excluded from his 
delusions. His wife, Katie (Tilda Swinton), who has been cheating on him with a US Marshal 
officer, Harry Pfarrer (George Clooney), secretly prepares to take divorce action. When she 
hears from Ozzie that he quit his post, she decides to move faster, as the last thing she wants is 
to become the sponsor of her husband’s nascent career as an unsuccessful writer, as she rushes 
to predict. But, as her lawyer advises her, she should not forewarn Ozzie about her intention to 
divorce him, since he is a man professionally trained in deceit. Instead, she “can be a spy too” 
and steal from him information about his finances, in order to leave him the least possible 
space for maneuvering.  
 After the scene of Katie at the office of the divorce lawyer, a cut makes the transfer to 
the Coxes’ house, where a high-angle shot shows Ozzie lying on the couch with his eyes wide 
open and an empty expression on his face. But, contrary to what we might assume, Ozzie is 
not dead. He is actually in the process of recording his memoir, but he falls short in 
inspiration. He tries out many phrases about the “glorious past” of the service, all of which 
sound ridiculous, until he jumps up and runs down the stairs when he hears the phone at the 
basement ringing. It is a phone call for Dr. Cox, his wife. The phone call perhaps raises 
Ozzie’s suspicions that his wife might have a lover. This hypothesis that the viewer might 
make is enforced in the next scene, where Ozzie watches a game show on TV, hearing the 
audience cheering “she’s married!; has a boyfriend!; she’s pregnant!”, and later on, when 
Ozzie, after apparently waiting for Katie for hours, leaves her a note which appears 
threatening—mostly because of the bombastic music score that accompanies the shot.76 The 
note that Ozzie leaves to Katie is encircled by slices of lemon from the drinks he has 
consumed. In it, Ozzie mentions that he will be at Princeton’s reunion dinner, but the film 
postpones giving us a chance to verify his statement, as we only see him at this dinner later on. 
So, in the meantime the viewer might infer that Ozzie is the one surveilling his wife and her 
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lover, whom we see out together and probably being watched by a mysterious gaze, whose 
POV we share. In the course of the film, not only the husband of Mrs. Cox but also her lover, 
Harry, appears secretive, occupied with some mysterious construction at the basement of the 
house where he lives with his wife Sandy. His secretiveness is accompanied by a paranoid 
feeling that he is being followed and that a mysterious car tails him everywhere he goes. Burn 
After Reading plays with the viewer using many “surface POVs”, through which the viewer 
can only speculate by external indications what the characters might be thinking.77 At the 
same time, the viewer often shares POVs that are not focalized (their source remains 
unknown, although they seem to be subjective) and have an ambiguous status, as I will further 
discuss later in this chapter.  
 The second world that Burn After Reading encloses and is left to ‘clash’ with the one 
of the state officials such as Ozzie and Harry, is the one of a fitness center called Hardbodies. 
Intelligence, if not exactly the strong point of intelligence agents such as Osborne Cox, is 
certainly the weakest link in Hardbodies. However, a piece of “raw intelligence” is found 
“lying on the floor” of the gym. It is the CD that Katie managed to ‘burn’ from the hard drive 
of Ozzie’s computer, stealing his files, which included not only his finances, but also, without 
her knowing, the memoir that he had been writing. Chad (Brad Pitt), a personal trainer 
working at Hardbodies, is the first and perhaps the only person who appreciates Ozzie’s 
memoir, not because of its content but due to its author’s affiliation to the CIA. Chad actually 
has no idea what the “numbers and dates and numbers and shit” that the CD contains stand for, 
but with his obviously limited cognitive capacities he assumes that they must be very 
important. His colleague Linda (Frances McDormand) seems distrustful at first, but when 
Chad refers to the reward that they might get by delivering the CD to its owner, she 
immediately gets hooked in. From that point on, her mind does not cease plotting and 
arranging the strategic details that will help them make profit out of this “once in a lifetime” 
coincidence. But also Linda is not clever enough to be evil. Her actions are guided by her 
desire to “reinvent herself” by correcting her bodily flaws with the help of cosmetic surgery, 
and the strategy she follows seems to be derived from the spy movies she had probably 
watched as a kid. 
 However, Chad’s and Linda’s ambitions are not so easily fulfilled. A midnight call by 
Chad to Ozzie from Linda’s house does not bring the desired outcome (the reward that they 
hope to get as “good Samaritans”) because Ozzie perceives the call as blackmail and gets 
furious. Of course, the mere idea of blackmailing someone for an unprotected CD sounds 
groundless, since copies of the original can so easily be made, but this does not seem to have 
crossed the minds of Chad and Linda. They arrange a meeting with Ozzie to exchange his 
memoir for money, and when he does not give anything to them, Linda decides to proceed to 
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“plan B”. Thus she and Chad end up at the Russian embassy, where they attempt to sell the 
‘classified’ information that fell into their hands to the surprised diplomatic officials, who 
nonetheless, perhaps due to lingering Cold War-reflexes, agree to have a look at the memoir 
before asserting that, if that is all, then it is worthless. But Linda is determined to find the 
money for her surgeries at any cost, so she continues playing the spook, this time sending 
Chad to break into the Coxes’ house to try and get more information.  
 
Productive surveillance  
 Burn After Reading, just like its music score, proliferates in bombastic deception and 
paranoia. Some critics attribute this paranoia to the genre conventions of the spy film. Thus, in 
this “goofy spy comedy” (Doom 2009: 174), or “absurdist spy spoof” (Rowell 2009: 74), as 
critics have characterized Burn After Reading, the Coens intentionally use elements of the spy 
genre in a plot that nonetheless does not include “actual espionage”, as Ryan Doom observes 
(2009: 164). Many of the spy movie conventions are certainly present in Burn After Reading: 
film critic Erica Rowell points at the suspense-building soundtrack and the tailing of Harry’s 
moves by the mysterious car, and also at the choice of Linda to go to the Russians, which is 
“what characters in Cold War spy movies do”. However, even if the Coens set up to do a 
contemporary spy film, or to ‘revisit’ the spy genre, the outcome, as they themselves realize, is 
something more than this: “I guess we sort of wanted to do a spy movie.  It didn’t exactly turn 
out that way. I don’t really think it is a spy movie. That’s how the original idea was 
structured” (J. Coen 2008).  
 Doom sees deception as an intrinsic part of the Coens’ oeuvre. In the chapter devoted 
to Burn After Reading (entitled “Burning Paranoia”) in his book The Brothers Coen, he draws 
attention to Chad’s line “appearances can be deceptive” to make a link between Burn After 
Reading and other Coen films: “Throughout Joel and Ethan Coen’s twelve feature films, the 
brothers continually toy with deceiving audiences by altering stereotypes, clichéd plots, stock 
characters, and genres.” From the point of view of their characters, as it happens in Burn After 
Reading, paranoia is “a reaction to the unknown, to the fear of possibility” (2009: 163). This 
paranoid feeling is also transmitted to the viewer, who, throughout the movie, is left to 
oscillate between many lingering possibilities of what is real and what only appears to be so, 
before some of these possibilities are finally picked up. As already discussed, we are 
forewarned very early about the play of deception that Burn After Reading sets up, so we tend 
to make inferences that are not always verified; for example, when we expect that Ozzie might 
be following the whereabouts of his wife while this proves to be wrong. Moreover, traditional 
film-noir techniques of building suspense proliferate: strange camera angles, looks that seem 
to come from hidden corners, “discovered” POVs (shots of objects before being matched to a 
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specific character’s POV, according to Branigan), etc. For example, we see shots of the rear-
view mirrors of cars before knowing who is looking: in one occasion, it is Ozzie waiting for 
Chad, in another it is Harry realizing that he is being followed. A zoom on the smashed trunk 
of Ozzie’s car takes us by surprise before realizing that it comes from the point of view of 
Mrs. Cox, who now finds out about the damage that her husband caused.  
 In another characteristic scene, Ozzie talks to his father on his yacht as they sail 
somewhere not far from the city (as Washington DC is built on the bank of Potomac River). 
We see their profiles in a medium close up placed in parallel to each other, both staring at the 
water in front of them. The elder man listens to Ozzie with a straight face, as the latter 
discloses his inner thoughts about his forced resignation from his job at the CIA. From Ozzie’s 
words we learn that his father served the State too, in the Cold War period. But now the work 
at the intelligence service is “all bureaucracy and no mission”, as Ozzie says full of 
disappointment. His father remains silent and expressionless during Ozzie’s monologue, and 
the irony of the scene becomes apparent in the following scene, after the two have returned to 
the dock. There we see (sharing the POV of someone spying on the two men) Ozzie’s father 
being pushed in a wheelchair by his son, having the same empty expression as before. This 
makes us think that the father’s expressionless face may be the symptom of a deteriorated 
mental condition, which probably prevented him from hearing or understanding anything from 
what Ozzie had been earlier confessing. In this respect, the previous scene on the boat was 
again farcical and deceptive, as it did not reveal the father’s health condition.  
 In Burn After Reading, the viewer gets the impression—as well as shares the 
impressions—of a ubiquitous eye watching the action, although there are no transcendental 
nuances in such ubiquity. This eye is always a camera that can penetrate every level, from the 
macro level of the planetary village implied in the opening and closing sequences, to the micro 
level of the characters’ lives unfolding in different corners of Washington. All of the 
characters seem to be surveilled by a camera lens that hides everywhere: it watches Ozzie 
pushing the wheelchair of his disabled father, zooms in on Harry as he jogs being tailed by a 
car, but also observes the characters spying on each other.  
 A surveillance camera also seems to be following Mrs. Cox and her lover. Outside the 
yacht of the Coxes, which Mrs. Cox visits with Harry, a surveilling gaze waits for her, placed 
at the same spot of the dock from which it was earlier spying on Ozzie and his father. 
However, this and other similar shots in Burn After Reading do not ever allow us to be sure 
about whether the shot comes from a diegetic surveillance camera, as we do not see the 
camera or the person behind it. The shots themselves are dubious. In some of them the 
presence of diegetic surveillance becomes clear, for example, when as Harry jogs across a 
bridge by the highway, he stops when he suspects that he is being tailed by a car. In this scene, 
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the car passes by and takes a right turn. This shot is succeeded by another one from the 
opposite side of the bridge, which explicitly offers a view through a (diegetic) camera, as we 
see and hear the zoom of its lens focusing on Harry. However, this shot cannot be coming 
from the car that was tailing him, because it has just disappeared in the opposite direction.  
 Burn After Reading invites its viewer to a game of surveillance defined by the 
continuous interplay of different narratological levels, between which the transition is almost 
seamless. The movement of the—perhaps CIA—camera that follows Harry as he runs across a 
bridge smoothly dissolves into the movement of the film’s camera now approaching from 
behind Mrs. Cox as she sneaks into the computer files of her husband. A camera eye also 
hides behind some shelves in Harry’s basement, ‘spying’ on him at the time he is absorbed in 
the manufacturing of his mysterious machine. We are never sure who is spying on whom and 
who is each time the subject of surveillance. Later, when Harry kisses goodbye his wife 
Sandy, who leaves on a tour across the States advertising her latest children’s book, he notices 
again the car that has been tailing him outside their house. The next shot shows us the figure 
of Harry (who’s turning us his back) from a longer distance and from a direction opposite to 
the one of the car. Then Harry turns to look behind his shoulders, as if he sensed a (or our) 
gaze on him. The threat is not only the visible car but an invisible and seemingly 
‘omnipresent’ eye that we are not sure if it is a product of Harry’s imagination or not. 
Therefore we imply that the diegetic surveillance is at least double, and when combined with 
the surveillant style of the shooting, triple. A ‘paranoid feeling’ is thus transmitted to the 
viewer too, who can never be sure whether the gaze that holds the image is part of the story, or 
part of its telling; if it is part of the narrative or the discourse. This way Burn After Reading 
creates an atmosphere of omnipresent surveillance, which becomes the way to approach the 
characters both from the extra-diegetic/narrational point of view and the intra-
diegetic/narrative one.  
 According to Elsaesser, paranoia is “the appropriate—or even ‘productive’— 
pathology of our contemporary network society”, and he points at its proliferation in the 
movies that he calls “mind-game” (2009c: 26). Burn After Reading is a network film that 
stands closer to the communicative conditions of mind-game films than to the transcendental 
connectivity promoted by the “network narratives” of Bordwell’s theorization. And it 
ultimately proceeds towards the demystification (and perhaps rationalization) of the paranoid 
atmosphere created, placing its own (extra-diegetic) camera in a network of global 
surveillance.  
 In the course of Burn After Reading, it gradually becomes clear that the intelligence 
service has been following the movements of the majority of the characters, and this allows 
the viewers to hypothesize that some dubious shots that they previously witnessed belonged to 
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CIA secret agents spying on the characters. But, as the camera’s—and the viewer’s—gaze get 
mingled with that of the CIA camera, due to the lack of specification of the narrative or 
narrational surveillance, eventually we find ourselves not much less baffled than the CIA 
agents of the story—and at times, equally ridiculed. We realize, for instance, that the object of 
Harry’s secretive construction work proves to be just a sex chair he proudly presents to Linda, 
when he takes her to his house after randomly meeting her through the Internet. And the 
mysterious car that has been tailing him proves to be driven by a lawyer working for a law 
firm that Sandy (his wife) hired in order to mobilize the divorce action against him. One of the 
few persons that have remained ‘innocent’ in the course of the plot, Sandy is in the end also 
found a cheater (we see her meeting her lover in Seattle during her book tour) and a ‘spy’.78 In 
the context of a shift, observed by Elsaesser, from “detectives looking for clues” to “insurance 
agents assessing risk on behalf of their corporate employers in the neo-noir films of the 1990s” 
(2009c: 29), Burn After Reading’s ‘spying back’ aims, in most cases, at ‘insuring’ its agents 
against a social network that they perceive as threatening and unreliable, because it ‘spies’ on 
them in the same way they spy on each other. Identifying both with the characters and the 
camera gaze, we as viewers experience a feedback of surveillance coming from every node of 
the network that the film creates, and connecting its different diegetic levels.  
 In what follows, I will focus on the inner workings of Burn After Reading’s network of 
surveillance and paranoia, and the degrees of agency it allows to the characters—as well as to 
the viewer. Human and unhuman ways of looking and acting are not only found in tension in 
Burn After Reading, but also in a process of dynamic interplay. This interplay cannot be 
approached through a notion of surveillance that separates the observer from the observed, 
because in the systemic approach that I adopt, the observer is found inside the system. In 
Luhmann’s version of systems theory, as already discussed, observation does not come from 
the outside but it is generated by the system itself, which, by observing its own workings, 
achieves internal differentiation and self-organization. In this respect, distributed surveillance 
(and the accompanying paranoia), expressed not only through the content but also through the 
form of contemporary complex films (their narrative structure, the style of shooting and the 
way they address the viewer), can indeed be considered a productive pathology.  
 
Networked complexity in Burn After Reading  
 But let us see how the diegetic paranoia of Burn After Reading develops across 
different levels. This will reveal how, apart from a parody of the spy movie genre, Burn After 
Reading can be considered as a complex film. But how is Burn After Reading’s complexity 
enabled and enhanced by the complicatedness of its plot, which, according to Rowell (2009: 
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74), “depicts a chaotic world through a seemingly chaotic narrative”? As a comment in the 
user reviews of IMDb says, Burn After Reading is “intricately-plotted”.79 Burn After Reading 
is certainly “complicated” and “fuzzy”, as the CIA agents who try to follow the actions of the 
various characters in the film assert. The two scenes involving a CIA official (Palmer) 
reporting to his senior about the events are hilarious because of his apparent inability to put 
into words and describe in a coherent way what is happening. The officials almost perform the 
role of the dance in ancient Greek tragedies, reflecting on what takes place but without being 
able to influence the action. These scenes, placed after the two most violent incidents of the 
film, are reminiscent of the stasima of ancient choruses, although here they have a satirizing 
effect with regard to narrative meaning making. The emotional distance that they offer from 
the atrocities taking place, as well as the summary of the action that has already developed, is 
supposed to be offering a grip on the complexity of the characters’ interactions and to direct 
the recipient’s attention to questions that are not yet answered. However, these scenes only 
have the opposite result, as the CIA ‘chorus’ can only leave us more baffled than we were by 
just following the action without trying to make a coherent narrative.  
 Of course, narrative hypotheses as the ones I made in this chapter when introducing the 
film and the characters are always plausible and in fact invited by the pseudo-mystery plot of 
Burn after Reading. At the same time, however, the film seems to be setting up a farce to this 
kind of causal-logical cognitive approach, not by just failing our hypotheses and surprising us, 
but by making us reflect on their overall futility. Burn After Reading complicates any attempt 
to cognitively approach it in a linear way; it is complex, on the one hand at the diegetic level, 
which interweaves narrative and discourse in a way similar with other complex films, as 
discussed in Part 1, and on the other hand at the textual level and its structure. Its plot develops 
by accelerating and augmenting the codependency of its separate elements—the characters and 
worlds that it brings together. As the same reviewer from IMDb puts it: “once the Coens start 
firing on all cylinders they never stop”. It is precisely the dynamic and ‘uncontrollable’ 
features of Burn After Reading that I will call ‘network’.  
 Burn After Reading can be read as a film about how networks of information are also 
networks of people. But it is also a network narrative, not in the strict sense of Bordwell’s 
classification (2006, 2009)—though it also partly meets his criteria, as far as the chance 
encounters between previously unconnected characters play a central role in the film—but in 
terms of the network that its mutual causal mechanisms create. These mechanisms make the 
film a complex system, the parts of which are not only forming an intricate maze but are also 
causally connected in a nonlinear, and arguably ‘network’, way.  
 As it happens in many complex films, and also the ones that Bordwell has 
characterized as network narratives, contingency plays a crucial role in Burn After Reading. 
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To begin with, the CD with Ozzie’s memoir falls from the bag of the secretary of Mrs. Cox’s 
lawyer, while she is at the gym. We never witness this incident but we are asked to infer it 
later, while we have already been wondering about the missing link: how did the CD that Mrs. 
Cox burned end up “lying on the floor” of Hardbodies? Our first inference has been that it was 
Mrs. Cox who must have lost it, as we are given the clue that it was found at the ladies’ 
lockers. But her surprise when she hears the phone call that Chad makes to Ozzie shows us 
that she is not aware of the loss. The irony here lies in the striking difference in the way that 
the incident of the lost and found CD is valued by the different parties involved. The reaction 
of the old secretary absolutely contrasts the one of Chad when he found the CD: she duly 
reports its loss to her boss and begins to ‘burn’ another copy out of the hard drive of her 
computer.  
 The difference in the way the “two worlds” of Burn After Reading (the one of state 
officials and the other of Hardbodies) respond to the same incident becomes even more ironic 
in retrospect, when one considers the final results that a contingent—and totally unimportant 
for some—incident brought about: a CD falls in the wrong hands and this has among its 
consequences two persons getting killed (Chad and Ted, the manager of Hardbodies), another 
ending up at the hospital with no brain function (Ozzie) and a fourth escaping the country in a 
state of paranoia (Harry).  
 If we consider the separate characters as the basic elements or ‘nodes’ of the textual 
network of Burn After Reading, this network develops nonlinearly both in space and in time, 
through the interactions between the elements. On the one hand, in space, a “small-world 
effect”, as it is called in network theory, is in the making. In network science, a small number 
of random links added to a regular network “can generate a very large effect”, turning it into a 
“small-world network”. This happens because the “average path length” (which is defined as 
the number of links between two nodes in a regular network) is reduced to half with the first 
five random rewirings (connections) (Mitchell 2009: 238). Therefore, once a long-distance 
link between two people is achieved, then more of their mutual connections/acquaintances 
also get connected to each other. In simple terms, the fact that most people are “more likely to 
be friends with the friends of [their] friends than with other, random, people” (ibid), is a result 
of the small-world network property. In Burn After Reading, as soon as one random (long-
distance) link connects the two worlds, as the CD of one State official gets found in 
Hardbodies, then the connections become more, they develop faster, and ultimately they have 
disproportional effects as the system develops in time. In the course of the film, Harry comes 
across Chad, and Ozzie meets not only Chad and Linda but also Ted—in the last case with 
lethal consequences. Also, at another, global small-world level, while Linda and Harry are 
unknown to each other in the beginning of the film, they eventually get to meet through 
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Internet dating. In all cases, the encounter of the two worlds, the one of the government 
officials and the other of Hardbodies, is directly or indirectly mediated by information—
contained in a CD or in a dating site.  
 Every action of one element—narrative ‘actor’ or agent—of any of the two worlds of 
Burn After Reading, has in most cases a disproportional impact on the other elements, no 
matter which of the two worlds they inhabit. For example, we will see that, in the long run, the 
demotion of Osborne Cox has as an indirect consequence the payment of Linda’s cosmetic 
surgeries by the CIA. The initial actant (the CIA) gets affected—though indirectly and 
nonlinearly—by the consequences of its decisions. The feedback it ultimately receives might 
be negative (as the senior official concludes in the end “I guess we learn not to do it again”) 
but it has passed through a chain of both positive and negative feedback among the various 
elements, a chain similar to the one most complex systems involve, as the pioneer in the study 
of feedback Magoroh Maruyama showed (1963). In mutual causal systems, that is, feedback 
systems, the activity of each element of the system has an impact upon the other elements and, 
in turn, upon themselves. Feedback can be negative (a communication that helps a system to 
maintain a stable state called homeostasis) or positive (a communication that leads the system 
to a continuous and cumulative deviation from its initial state, thus to a certain 
disorganization).80 Self-organizing systems usually take the form of feedback networks, which 
combine both negative and positive feedback. And this type of feedback increases the 
complexity of systems, through co-dependency of the parts, mutual causality and 
amplification of deviation. An illustration of such positive feedback in Burn After Reading 
would be the paranoia that ultimately overwhelms Harry near the film’s closing.    
 A retrospective view of Burn After Reading could include the film in the group that 
film theorist Wendy Everett identifies as “fractal films”, which are influenced by chaotics. 
From the perspective of systems theory, accidents (even like the one created when a CD falls 
in the wrong hands) can be considered as (external) bifurcations that may cause positive 
feedback in a system. As Maruyama notes: “all processes of mutual causal relationships that 
amplify an insignificant or accidental kick, build up deviation and diverge from the initial 
conditions” (1963:164). Even though Burn After Reading is certainly not thematically 
influenced by chaos theory like some other recent films (the 2004 film The Butterfly Effect 
would be an obvious example), it seems nonetheless occupied with the specific nonlinear 
workings of causality in complex networks, where a small event leads to disproportional 
outcomes. 
 Contingency is a key-factor in complex networks, but also an element that fascinates 
filmmakers. The Coen brothers’ interest in the contingent and unexpected is reflected on their 
preference for idiotic characters. As Ethan Coen comments in an interview, “a lot of our 
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movies are about dolts. […] Maybe it’s just because it seems to go somewhere in terms of the 
story. If everybody knows what they are doing in the movie, if they are capable, and everyone 
is on top of things then what is going to happen that is interesting or fun, or surprising?” (J. 
Coel 2008). To this ‘agency of coincidence’ comes to be added the agency of relations: the 
‘accident’ of the loss of the CD containing Ozzie’s memoir would not have extreme 
consequences if the relations between the various characters did not start increasing in number 
and complexity. Contingency is here coupled with structure, as complex systems develop by 
contingency (random links) but also organize themselves through it.  
 Together with the complication of the relations and encounters, the editing of Burn 
After Reading also becomes more intricate. In the beginning of the film the tempo is slower, 
the scenes succeed each other allowing us enough time to get to know the individual 
characters and to construct various narrative hypotheses about their relations and motives. 
Towards the end, the rhythm accelerates and the scenes develop in quick crosscutting. Thus, 
Linda’s drive in the city, during which she gradually gets encircled by cars and even a 
helicopter of the CIA, develops shot by shot in parallel with the scene where Ozzie goes down 
the stairs to the basement of his house to find Ted sneaking into his archives—after the latter 
has been persuaded to do so by Linda. The “firing” that will bring the narrative to its ending 
also alters the temporal experience of the viewer, to engage him or her into its frenetic, out-of-
control rhythm. Although the acceleration of the film’s pace towards its ending is a common 
suspense-building practice, especially in the scene where Harry encounters Chad or in the one 
where Ozzie approaches Ted, what is underlined is that this acceleration, while somehow 
connected to the characters’ actions, transgresses them at the same time. It is as if a collective 
causality operates upon the characters, transmitting its agency from one to the other, and 
ending up to the lethal clash between the two ‘worlds’.  
 
Micro and macro-causality merged  
 Apart from a probably unintentional illustration of the workings of complex networks, 
Burn After Reading also offers the chance to study causality in complex films through the 
complex network framework. The exploration of agency and causality in Burn After Reading 
would demand from us to question how from an initial state (no relations or just beginning of 
relations between characters), and through the intensification of these relations, the film as a 
complex system develops. How does causality work in a complex structure? Is it attributable 
to the initial state and the isolated elements or not?  
 We can distinguish two interwoven levels of causality present in the plot of Burn After 
Reading. The first is the micro-causality of the characters deriving from their individual 
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motives. The second level is the macro-causality of the network that their interrelationships 
make. If the two levels were kept separated, then the first would appear individualistic, 
anthropomorphic and perhaps cynical, while the second transcendental and omnipresent, 
surpassing the individualism of the characters and connecting them in unexpected and 
catastrophic ways. In other words, the first would be the level of farce while the second, the 
level of paranoia. In what follows, however, I will argue that just like paranoia and farce, the 
micro and macro-causality form an inseparable mix in Burn After Reading.  
 At the level of micro-causality, the ‘internal organization’ of each character, his or her 
expectations and motives, will certainly influence but not—as it ultimately becomes 
obvious—decisively determine the output of their interactions. In the course of the film we get 
to infer these motives: Chad is just fascinated with the “raw intelligence” he discovered and 
seems to be simply enjoying the probability that—perhaps for once in his life—he and 
intelligence can meet. Linda desperately wants to reinvent herself and her body as well as to 
find a boyfriend with a sense of humor. Ted is secretly in love with Linda and gets convinced 
to help her in her groundless plot. Harry is a hedonistic character who enjoys casual sex, 
remaining nevertheless dependent on his wife, immature and incapable as he is of undertaking 
any kind of responsibility. Sandy wants to get a divorce and get rid of her untrustworthy 
husband. Ozzie is full of rage and bitterness against the “morons” that seem to be chasing him 
his whole life, unable to acknowledge his mental superiority. Katie wants to maintain her 
finances intact and stay in control, away from her ‘loser’ husband.  
 In all cases, women in Burn After Reading seem to be plotting and maintaining some 
kind of control of the circumstances, while men appear to be victims, first and foremost of 
their own idiocy or lack of self-awareness. Women gather information: financial data (Katie), 
evidence about daily movements (Sandy), ‘highly classified’ computer files or just 
information about the marital status of their lovers (Linda), while men seem trapped in their 
web, killing each other without even knowing why (Harry ends up killing Chad, and Ozzie 
killing Ted, while they have never met before and they lack any direct motive). Their 
unreasonable violence appears to be an expression of the complications that the narration—
exploiting the influence of its female actors—created. It is worth noting that paranoia, a 
defining characteristic of Burn After Reading, as already mentioned, was a sui generis male 
pathology for Freud, as Patrick O’Donnell notes: “The universe of the Freudian paranoid is an 
all-encompassing mirror for the narcissistic ego, whose imperialism is only matched by the 
repressed anxiety that it has been invaded by the woman, the other; but this alterity is, in fact, 
merely a displacement of the self same identity who both dreads and desires this invasion” 
(2000: 78).  
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 Linda’s character is the one most extensively developed and in her ‘thread’ of the story 
the two different levels of micro and macro causality seem to be in complicity. In two scenes 
of Burn After Reading, we see Linda making a phone call to her insurance company, in order 
to ask if it covers the expenses of the four distinct cosmetic surgeries she wishes to make. The 
answering machine works with automatic voice recognition and asks her to pronounce the 
word “agent”, in case she wishes to speak with one of the company’s agents. Linda has to 
spell out the word many times because the machine does not understand her. Except for the 
failure of every communication of her with many different kinds of interfaces—from that of 
the “BewithmeDC.com” (the dating site she surfs hoping to find the man of her life) to that of 
the CD with Ozzie’s files which she distortedly ‘reads’—the way she repeatedly and 
impatiently shouts “agent” underlines in a comic way her stubborn mission to exert her agency 
against all the ‘intelligence agents’ who surround her.   
 Linda thus tries to be an ‘agent’—even a ‘secret’ one—and to use the power of 
information to achieve her own goals (manipulating Chad too), but she soon realizes that it is 
not her agency that guides the events, as the latter seem to develop beyond her control. 
However, she manages to get ‘on top’ of the mesh created. The consequences temporarily 
challenge her belief in the power of “positive thinking”, but in the end, Linda triumphs. She 
manages to convince the CIA to pay for her cosmetic surgeries, in order to “play ball”, and 
give to those intelligence agents the information they are missing. As she earlier says to Ted, 
who does not seem to share her insights, “…information is power, Ted. Hello?” But it is not 
the information that she had been trying to steal—the one contained in Ozzie’s memoir—that 
is more valuable, but the one created out of the poor probability of the characters’ actions, 
which the CIA cannot foresee. According to the mathematical definition of information, the 
lower the possibility of a selection indicated, the higher the number of informational bits 
contained in a message (see Crosson and Sayre 1967: 5). Burn After Reading’s plot is in my 
view high in informational value because of its proceeding through improbable selections and 
the—seemingly—nonsensical actions of the characters it involves. And Linda, as the 
prototype of improbable reason, which is emotional (guided by the power of positive thinking) 
rather than analytical, is the one who manages to handle this information in the best possible 
way. 
 The individual behavior of Burn After Reading’s plotting women, that somehow makes 
an interesting match between them, or similarly the conspiracy paranoia that drives the way of 
thinking of many of its male characters (Harry, Ozzie) creates patterns of motives and 
individual reasons that contribute to the causality of the film’s network. However, this pattern-
like form of causality cannot be attributed and reduced (once the matching has already been 
made) to any single agency in particular. Even though it is the motivation of the singular 
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characters that seems to be triggering some of the ‘acting outs’ taking place in the film, no 
single character, not even the most intelligent or manipulative of them, is in a position to 
predict the range of the consequences of their actions’ co-resonance.  
 Recent dynamical (and not graph-theoretical) approaches of networks as complex 
systems suggest that emergence of unpredictable properties in them happens at moments of 
“phase transition” (Barrat, Barthelemy and Vespigniani 2008: 97-98), which takes place when 
different systems and different components of their own resonate together (Marion 2006: 247). 
In a similar fashion, the action in Burn After Reading seems to be passing through thresholds 
of co-resonance, having augmented effects on the individuals composing its network. Such 
instances of co-resonance are found when the two worlds apart, and their different conception 
and handling of information, meet and interact, but also when from the level of individual 
characters and their isolated actions we pass to the collective patterns that their linked 
behavior creates. The human—interpersonal—agency of the characters is met in Burn After 
Reading with the one of informational networks that move in a different—accelerated—speed, 
and on a higher—global—level. The augmented consequences of their actions, which turn 
back upon the characters, seem to be a result of their attempt to accommodate to the flow of 
information.   
 Although the individual heroes seem still driven by a Cold War order that is supposed 
to have ended, as well as by the spy-genre conventions that this order reproduced, the 
spectator realizes, perhaps together with the Coens, that this order collapsed partly because the 
monopoly of the intelligence services on high-security information was no longer 
sustainable.81 Information in Burn After Reading escapes in a CD, and this escape immediately 
marks a scattering of the pre-existing hierarchy. “Burn after reading” refers to the order given 
to spooks to destroy confidential documents before they fall into the hands of a third party. In 
the 2000s, ‘burn’ does not anymore mean to destroy; it also means ‘to create a copy’. It is not 
the origin of information but its transmission that adds to its power; and the model of causality 
and agency that the transmission implies involves in-between nodes that support and maintain 
the network of distribution.  
 Information becomes power through the network it creates in and through Burn After 
Reading. His wife might be laughing at Ozzie because of his memoir, wondering “why in 
God’s name would anyone think that’s worth anything”, but the latter becomes significant—at 
least in the world of Hardbodies—after being burnt to a CD and turned into ‘information’. Not 
only Katie but also both the representatives of the historically rivaling power centers, the US 
intelligence service and the Russian embassy, find this information useless “dribble”. 
However, an advantage is given to the ‘small’ agents that decide to “play ball” and use the 
information without understanding or even trying to understand its content. In the end, the 
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whole picture of the action triggered by the protagonists—so frequently characterized as 
“morons” in the film—elapses from the CIA. The intelligence service is obliged to restrict 
itself to the position of a passive, remote observer, unable to make sense of what is happening. 
The heroes of Burn After Reading may be unable to understand too, as they cannot get the 
whole picture of the network of their interactions. But neither the external spectators of the 
CIA can make any sense, because they miss the micro-details of the relationships between the 
heroes as well as information about their psychological needs. “Spare me”, the senior agent 
interrupts Palmer who starts going into detail about how the characters (and especially Harry, 
Linda, and the Coxes, whom they seem to have under surveillance) “all seem to be sleeping 
with each other”. The CIA’s surveillance follows the network created by the characters but 
cannot really foresee and control action before it is finished; thus the CIA ends up dumping 
the bodies that the murders leave behind, but not solving the mystery behind them. Of course, 
for the CIA there is no mystery to be solved: the service wants to do away with what happened 
and erase the traces of a series of absurd incidents in which its former analyst seems to be 
involved. Thus the senior agent sounds more than relieved when he hears that Ozzie ended up 
in hospital in a comatose state. Reducing the network to its nodes and tracking them, or 
following a “building block” strategy—one that complex systems also use, according to some 
strands of complex systems theory—is the most successful way to control complexity (see Ed. 
Smith 2006: 75-78).  
 However, the complex interactions between the characters make the work of tracking 
harder. The way information is ‘passed on’ and acted out, rather than being cognitively 
processed, makes the characters looking more like informational vessels than psychologically 
fulfilled entities. As Evan Smith observes using the example of Pulp Fiction, “psychological 
transitions might be the greatest weakness” of “thread structure” films (2000: 90). Each 
character in Burn After Reading is given some sort of ‘internal’ motive but the events that 
follow cannot be seen as linear and logical consequences of any of the particular motives, or, 
even less, traced back to any one of them. The prevalence of nonlinear causality in Burn After 
Reading makes it a dynamic system, a system found in a “transient process”: 
strictly speaking, all real systems are dynamic systems. However, when the 
duration of the transient process is negligibly small compared to the duration of 
the investigated phenomenon, and where the nature of the transient process does 
not have an important influence on the behaviour of a system, it is not necessary to 
take into consideration the dynamic properties of the system under consideration; 
it can be assumed that the changes in state follow instantaneously the causes which 
produce them. (Lerner 1972: 39) 
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In Burn After Reading though, the interactions between characters and the network they create 
do have an important influence upon the way their individual trajectories develop. But this 
influence is nonlinear and not easily attributed to any of the separate actors. Thus, if the film is 
seen as a diegetic network/system, the dynamics of this system make a cause-effect matching 
implausible. Thus it is important to “take into consideration the dynamic properties of the 
system”, and see what transformations they bring about.  
 Even though the individual motives of actors in Burn After Reading are recognizable 
and anthropomorphic, the co-resonance of a number of agencies in the network of the diegesis 
is not foreseeable. The network’s  ‘macro-agency’ is the contribution of every single micro-
agent to the network that connects it to all other agents, making their ensemble evolve in 
nonlinear and unpredictable ways. Through the emergent movement from the micro and 
singular to the macro and global, and, from the units of agency to aggregates, the 
anthropomorphism of Burn After Reading’s narrative meets the “elemental”—as Galloway 
and Thacker characterize it (2007: 155-157)—nature of complex networks and their dynamics, 
suggesting a shift from human to nonhuman (or systemic) ways of conceiving agency and 
causality in complex films. 
 In Burn After Reading, the system created by the agents’ interactions may not be 
driven back to its initial conditions in the end of the film, but its change is not radical or 
subversive. Through surveillance—which becomes tighter the more the characters link to each 
other and interact—the CIA manages, perhaps not to understand, but certainly to conceal the 
links that connect the characters’ action to the intelligence service. The CIA stays unaffected 
by their “messy” behavior. Thus, when it comes to the ‘politics’ of the film’s network, this 
appears to be ambivalent at best, and certainly preventing the viewer from being excessively 
optimistic. After all, the network ends up serving the vain (and all-too-human) goal of Linda, 
to get the money for her cosmetic surgeries. Networks might have their own unpredictable 
dynamics, but their individual nodes, either big, like the State officials, or small, like the 
employees of Hardbodies, resemble a lot, as they use the same tactics as their ‘opponents’. 
They spy as much as they are being spied, and are distinguished only by their ‘positionality’, 
while the networked system they all serve continues its smooth function.  
 An anthropomorphic reading of Burn After Reading’s causality, based on the motives 
of the individual characters and their resulting action, would miss out the dynamics of its 
network form, but this does not mean that a move away from such reading, and the adoption 
of a systemic model, would dismantle the attempts of tracing and surveilling the network’s 
individual nodes—even though they would not be considered anthropomorphic anymore. This 
is a mode of surveillance towards which contemporary state powers, and not only in the 
fictional world of Burn After Reading, are oriented. As Dimitris Papadopoulos writes, 
	  
 
90 
referring especially to neoliberal state models, “the neoliberal state needs, more than self-
regulating individuals, networked actors who actively forge the structures necessary for the 
transformation from centralized state powers to disseminated modes of neoliberal regulation” 
(2008: 153). Such disseminated modes of regulation are still possible in non-anthropomorhic 
and complex networks.  
 A shift from the narrative to the complex systemic approach would make it easier to 
‘track’ the network of Burn After Reading. The film, although hard to be described in a linear 
sequence, especially from the point when its multiple causal threads converge, would in my 
view be more easily described as a multi-agent system, adopting an adequate methodological 
approach. Agent-based models are used in computation in order to simulate the various actors 
in a system and make it easier to understand how a complex system develops from the micro 
to the macro level (see Bonabeau 2002). Hence, an adequate approach to this multi-character 
film would not be anthropomorphic and even less characterological, but agent-based.  
 
 Burn After Reading opens and closes with a moving satellite view resembling the ones 
we can get using the Google Earth software. The initial zoom-in places us at the micro level of 
the particular area of the world where the narrative will set off, while the concluding zoom-out 
adds a macroscopic distance to the events that just took place.82 During the end credits, the 
camera takes off from the same point where it first landed in the beginning of the film, at the 
heart of the CIA’s headquarters, and the dynamic network that so far has been shaped by the 
diegetic interactions, gradually gives its place to a global view. 
 Panning or bird’s-eye-view shots have been used to close a great number of classical 
Hollywood narratives, offering a safety distance to the viewer in order to reflect upon the 
events that have just taken place. One could argue that the same effect is achieved by the 
concluding zoom-out of Burn After Reading. Metaphorically, this safety distance is also what 
narrative meaning making, at the point of ‘equilibrium’, is supposed to achieve. However, one 
wonders if perceiving narrative cinema in the context of such meaning making from a ‘safety 
distance’ (kept and reproduced by the supposed closure of meaning when the story is 
completed) does not itself belong to a pre-network, Cold War era, that film theorists, just like 
Ozzie, hesitate to abandon. A closer look into narrative’s complex dynamics could make us 
see the benefits of “operating off the map”, according to Linda’s spook-inspired expression. 
 In the closing of Burn After Reading, the view from above is not more comprehensive 
than the partial view from below, nor does it offer a feeling of safety distance. It rather creates 
a sense of vertigo as the viewer finds him or herself inside this global paranoia. The final fast 
and dizzying zoom-out extends Washington’s irrationality from the local to the global level, 
suggesting that making perfect sense is a helpless endeavor, even when distance is taken; 
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contemporary forms of world order are impossible to understand following logical and 
sequential reasoning, and contemporary films cannot do else but demand new skills from their 
audience in order for it to achieve some level of understanding—which has to retreat from 
constituting a coherent and logical sequence of action. Burn After Reading’s network of 
human and unhuman agencies develops as a system through ‘infinitesimal perturbations’, 
which make the story’s progression nonlinear—impossible to go back to its initial state due to 
the constant increase of complexity—and also impossible to infer with precise logical steps, or 
deduce from one single perspective.  
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5. Agents and patterns of causality in traditional and network narratives 
  
In chapter 4 I highlighted the complex workings of causality and agency in Burn After 
Reading. Here I will embed this analysis in a broader discussion of the role of causality in 
complex films. First, I will briefly present the way that causality has been conceived in 
narratological models, which have also influenced film narratology. I will then ask to what 
extent complex films differ from these accounts of narrative causality, requiring a shift in our 
theoretical approach beyond the prevailing models. As a point of reference I will use the case 
of “network narratives” (David Bordwell), which, from a broader angle, have also been 
characterized as “multi-character” or “ensemble” films. The multiplicity of 
characters/narrative actors that these films usually involve and their “loose” cause and effect 
chains will be explored as possible factors of their deviation from other films. However, the 
question of what constitutes loose causality still remains. I will argue that the answer to this 
question cannot be provided through the traditional Aristotelian or structuralist approaches of 
narrative causality. An approach of complex films as complex systems suggests that causality 
in them is an emergent attribute of the interactions among their basic components. 
 
Narrative and the principle of causality 
 Causality, the way that recipients interpret narrative events as relating to each other in 
sequences of causes and effects (Kafalenos 2006: viii), is the driving force of narrative. As 
Branigan characteristically declares: “If I were forced to use a single word to characterize a 
narrative organization of data, that word would be ‘causality’. Creating time and place in a 
narrative is not as important as constructing a possible logic for the events that occur” (1992: 
216). The definition of narrative that he suggests is “a way of organizing spatial and temporal 
data into a cause-effect chain of events with a beginning, middle, and end that embodies a 
judgement about the nature of the events as well as demonstrates how it is possible to know, 
and hence to narrate, the events” (ibid: 3).  
 Causality is not only a matter of interpretation of narrative events; texts themselves 
prompt recipients to formulate various causal interpretations. The function of narrative 
causality presupposes diegetic and character-based action, and the changes brought by it. 
Literary theorist Didier Coste points out the association of narrative with “‘action’ or 
‘making’, if not with causality” (1989: 42). Causality in narratives operates through agents—
actors or ‘actants’—and the “functions” they perform. According to Mieke Bal, as long as 
stories are constructions made by humans, involving human characters and addressed to 
humans, they are based on “the presupposition that human thinking and action is directed 
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towards an aim” (1985: 26). Causal action is carried by agents and is most of the times 
oriented towards a goal. The association of causality with meaningful action is so widespread 
that many narratologists distinguish between narrative and other forms of texts in which causal 
connections through actions are not prevailing, for example descriptive passages.83 Narrative 
is a teleological construction, demanding a subject and its “will to execute his or her program” 
(Bal 1985: 33). Such ‘will’ provides the story with the necessary energy in order for it to 
unfold in time. As long as we think of agency in narratives as a goal-directed activity, it is 
difficult to detach it from cause and effect chains at the micro-diegetic level, that of 
characters’ actions.  
 Although characters are always causal agents, the actions that drive a narrative’s 
causality are not always character-driven. Bal distinguishes between actors and classes of 
actors (actants) and distinctive characters in narrative texts. The former two might also be 
inanimate and their role is structural (always related to the overall teleology of the fabula), 
while the latter correspond to human beings, and from the semiological point of view, they 
consist in semantic units (Bal 1985: 79). The actantial model was introduced in narrative 
theory by the Lithouanian-French semiotician Algirdas-Julien Greimas, who in turn borrowed 
the term ‘actant’ from the linguist Lucien Tesnière. Actants may be defined as “names of 
roles” (see Coste 1989: 135). The notion of actant, also becoming influential in social theory 
through “actor-network theory”, suggests a step beyond the micro-diegetic level, by adopting a 
transindividual perspective. It is also helpful in order to conceive of larger patterns of causality 
involved in narratives, although even this notion of actant does not escape some degree of 
anthropomorphism. For instance, among the examples of actants that Bal provides are “The 
old people”, “The Marxists”, etc. (see Bal 1985: 27).  
 What I would describe as two different kinds of causal analysis in narratives, namely 
the approach focusing on the micro-diegetic level of causality (actors) or the macro-diegetic 
level (actants) correspond to different models of narrative analysis. Particularly in film, these 
different models are summarized by Elsaesser in Studying Contemporary American Film. On 
the one hand “the Aristotelian model [by comparison to the structuralist model] seems to stress 
overall unity (of time, place, and action), rather than segmentation. It also centres on 
characters as initiating agents rather than on interpersonal transactions (functions) as the core 
elements of narrative” (1992: 30; emphasis mine). On the other hand, the structuralist and 
poststructuralist model of characters and causality is “functionalist and relations-based, 
essentially a-causal and instead more complexly ‘logical’ and ‘semantic’” (37). In this chapter, 
my goal is to introduce into the study of causality in narratives the complex systemic 
approach, which attempts to capture the emergent dynamics of form that stay outside the 
Aristotelian and the structuralist model of narrative analysis. These dynamics can be pictured 
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as emerging from the micro-level of characterological action and linking it to the macro-level 
of narrative structure. 
 
Causality and transformation  
 One classical narratological model that perhaps could be considered as proto-complex 
systemic (because of its emphasis upon dynamics, as I will discuss in more detail in chapter 
6), is the one of narrative equilibrium, suggested—in 1960s France—by the Franco-Bulgarian 
philosopher Tzvetan Todorov, who also coined the term “narratology”. Todorov considered 
narrative causality a dynamic process tending towards equilibrium. For him, equilibrium 
seems to be a fundamental structuring principle of narrative:  
The minimal complete plot consists in the passage from one equilibrium to 
another. An “ideal” narrative begins with a stable situation which is disturbed by 
some power or force. There results a state of disequilibrium; by the action of a 
force directed in the opposite direction, the equilibrium is re-established; the 
second equilibrium is similar to the first, but the two are never identical. (Todorov 
1977: 111)  
 Thus, according to Todorov’s model, narrative is “a causal ‘transformation’ of a 
situation through five stages” (Branigan 1992: 4), or five fundamental “actions”: initial 
equilibrium, disruption of this equilibrium, recognition of disruption, repair of disruption, 
reinstatement of the initial equilibrium.84 Todorov here on the one hand follows a logic 
derived from Aristotelean poetics, and his division of drama in a number of specific 
acts/stages. On the other hand, Todorov’s contribution focuses on the structure of the form, 
thus it is more structuralist than Aristotle’s model in this respect.  I would add that, due to 
Todorov’s addition of an element of dynamics in the study of narrative, his model stands 
closer not only to linguistic but also to physical systems.  
 The complete five-stage equilibrium model is an ideal case, as Todorov himself 
stresses, and he recognizes the existence of cases where the narrative does not do full circle 
but describes “only the passage from an equilibrium to a disequilibrium, and conversely” 
(1977: 118). Although the first two, or sometimes the last two stages might be omitted, 
suspending a ‘happy end’ or a satisfactory resolution, all narratives can be thought of as parts 
of the full five-stage circle (ibid: 39). In this respect, narrative teleological causality can be 
imagined as a trajectory towards equilibrium, even in cases when the latter is not finally 
achieved. The phase of equilibrium is considered by Todorov as static (and corresponds, at the 
grammatical level of predicates, to the role of adjectives), while disequilibrium is the dynamic 
phase, corresponding to verbs (ibid: 111, 120).85 However, if the above described “full circle” 
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constitutes the basis of the narrative model, then narrative dynamics is overarched by a 
symmetrical construction—defined by the initial and the concluding equilibrium. Indeed, as 
Branigan notes, both Todorov’s as well as Vladimir Propp’s classical narrative analyses are 
oriented towards the “large scale symmetries” of narratives (1992: 9), and, in this respect, 
deviate from the characterological focus of Aristotelian drama. These large-scale symmetries 
are not causal in the strict sense of the word, which implies a more or less direct relation 
between an effect and its cause (see Branigan 1992: 27). Moreover, their function is not to 
drive the action forward. They rather pertain to what Todorov calls transformations, referring 
to larger patterns of change that do not follow strict cause and effect sequences.  
 Todorov’s model has been associated with equilibrium, because of its emphasis upon 
symmetry. However, it seems that what really defines narrative for Todorov is change and 
disequilibrium. The latter is the necessary (and perhaps sufficient) condition for narrative to 
exist. I quote a characteristic passage from his article in Diacritics, where he analyzes 
Boccaccio’s Decameron III:  
But what is it that makes this narrative? Let us return to the beginning of the story. 
Boccaccio first describes Naples, the setting of the action; then he presents the 
three protagonists; after which he tells us about Ricciardo’s love for Catella. Is this 
a narrative? Once again I think we can readily agree that it is not. The length of the 
text is not a deciding factor—only two paragraphs in Boccaccio’s tale—but we 
sense that, even if it were five times this length, things would not have changed. 
On the other hand, when Boccaccio says, “this was his state of mind when …” 
(and at least in French there is a tense change here from the imperfect to the 
aorist), the narrative is underway. The explanation seems simple: at the beginning 
we witness the description of a state; yet this is not sufficient for narrative, which 
requires the development of an action, i.e., change, difference. (Todorov 1971: 38)  
 
What is not permitted to narrative, it seems, is the stasis of non-action. Change defines 
narrative, either at the micro-level of characterological action, or at the macro-level of 
“transformation”.  
 Narrative transformations might be ‘a-causal’ but they still evoke causality, although 
not in the sense of cause and effect sequence. Because of the emphasis upon change, I would 
argue that, even at the level of transformations, causality is still in place, but it is a sort of 
causality acquired through transformation. No matter where the transformative agency lies, in 
anthropomorphic actors (with their desires, goals and internal motives) or in actants (classes of 
actors), the overall patterns of change make a narrative causal, as long as they reveal its status 
as an organization that develops in time. Focusing on the specific case of multiple-character 
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“network” films, I will show how the multiplicity of actors is an important starting point in 
order to shift to a different model of causality, which combines but also transgresses the ones 
mentioned above.  
 
Causality in complex film narratives  
 The group of complex films that I will discuss in more detail in the following part of 
the chapter are the films that have been characterized as “network narratives”. It is through 
this group of films, with which Burn After Reading shares many characteristics, that the issue 
of causality in the films of the complex narrative tendency has been raised. At the micro-level, 
causality in many complex films is distributed across an intricate network of characters. 
Beyond the level of individual actors though, the role of transcendental factors, such as chance 
and contingency, takes a central place in many of these films, making the overall causal 
patterns less anthropomorphic.  
 The feature that stands out and arguably defines the type of causality in complex 
network films is the increased—in relation to traditional Hollywood narratives—number of 
characters. Films with multiple characters and multiple stories have often been labeled 
“ensemble films”. In his taxonomy of the “Tarantino phenomenon”, as he calls the complex 
film tendency of the last two decades (since the mid-1990s), Charles-Ramìrez Berg classifies 
recent films with multiple characters in the category of “polyphonic or ensemble plot”. 
According to him, “the majority of the alternative narrative films fall into this category, a 
variety of the multiple protagonist film” (2006: 15). From the perspective of my research, 
ensemble films form a significantly large sub-group of complex narrative films. Berg includes 
in the ensemble plot category films such as Pulp Fiction (Quentin Tarantino, 1994), Magnolia 
(Paul Thomas Anderson, 1999), Code Inconnu (Michael Haneke, 2000), 13 Conversations 
about One Τhing (Jill Sprecher, 2001), Crash (Paul Haggis, 2005), and others.86 Not all 
multiple-protagonist plots are ensemble plots, as Berg stresses, but only those in which there is 
no one single goal that unites the characters. Berg considers the polyphonic/ensemble plot as 
ideal “for portraying social cross-section” (2006: 18). Despite the absence of a “single goal”, 
in many of these stories the characters’ fates get entangled in “a single location”, which can be 
a hotel, apartment block, city etc.  
 Another plot category that Berg distinguishes, apart from that of ensemble plot, is of 
particular interest here. It is the category of the “hub and spoke” plot, which, although again 
involving multiple protagonists, Berg classifies under the broader group of “nonlinear plots”, 
shifting the focus from the number of protagonists to the issue of time and causality. In this 
category Berg includes, among others, the films by González Iñárritu Amores Perros and 21 
Grams, which have been used as examples of the complex narrative tendency by many 
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theorists. In “hub and spoke” plots, as Berg notes, “multiple characters’ story lines intersect 
decisively at one time and space” (2006: 39). Cross-sections of characters in time and space 
are also key-features of ensemble plots, but what makes “hub and spoke” plots distinctive is 
their emphasis on chance events and contingency. According to Berg, these plots 
thematically […] demonstrate the frailty of agency by presenting a world where 
happenstance prevails and best-laid plans come to naught. At a formal level, they 
question whether causality and characters’ choices, the bedrocks of Hollywood's 
classical narration and narration in general, are valid as narrative mainstreams 
particularly in contemporary dramas and romances. And because causality is 
foundational not just for movies but for life, particularly American life, the 
ideological implications of such challenges are seriously subversive. (2006: 40-41) 
 “Hub and spoke” plots problematize causality and experiment with non-causal 
connections between events. Both ensemble and “hub and spoke” plots have many similarities 
with Bordwell’s category of “network narratives”, which combines the multiplicity of 
characters with the role of chance that creates connections between them.  
 The category of network narratives has been suggested by Bordwell in order to 
describe the contemporary revival of multiple protagonist films. According to him, the format 
of network films “crystallized in the 1980s [with directors such as Robert Altman, Jean-Luc 
Godard and Otar Iosseliani being among the first who experimented with it] and was 
revivified in the 1990s” (Bordwell 2007: 245). Bordwell points out that network films contain 
an aggregation of characters that makes the plot more “complex” (2006: 96), as the 
intersections between them are not obvious from the beginning nor easily established through 
preexisting relations, and thus need to be built gradually, making use of various plot 
inventions.87 Because of the intersection of strangers involved in these films, Bordwell 
considers them expressions of the lay interpretation of network theory (as “six degrees of 
separation”) and products of the exchanges between network and chaos science and popular 
imagination. To explain his use of the term “network” in his description of contemporary 
“criss-crossers”, as the Variety magazine has labeled multi-character films, Bordwell refers to 
the sociological model of networks that was developed after the 1950s “small world” 
experiments of the social psychologist Stanley Milgram. According to this model, networks 
are composed by links between individuals, and, as Bordwell notes, “most network theorists 
define a link as a personal acquaintance” (2007: 198). Apart from this increasing awareness of 
social networks, other cultural factors, such as the rising internet literacy, contributed, 
according to Bordwell (2007: 197), to the wave that revived network narratives in the mid-
1990s—with films such as Short Cuts (Robert Altman, 1993), 71 Fragments of a Chronology 
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of Chance (Michael Haneke, 1994), Chunking Express (Wong Kar-wai, 1994), and Pulp 
Fiction (Quentin Tarantino, 1994).  
 The network is composed “when strangers intersect”, and chance is what drives their 
intersections, no matter how goal-oriented their individual trajectories may be. In network 
narratives, Bordwell notes, “The plot structure […] must find ways to isolate or combine 
characters in compelling patterns that will replace the usual arc of goal-oriented activity. The 
principal source of these patterns […] is chance” (2007: 199). Coincidence that makes people 
meet (or even, kill each other, as in Burn After Reading), contingent events and encounters, 
circulating objects, accidents and internet friendships:88 does causality play any role in 
network narratives? And if yes, what forms does it take?  
 Bordwell uses the term “loose causality” in order to account for the lack of tight cause 
and effect sequences in network narratives, which seems to be, according to him, the 
distinctive characteristic of these films (he discusses in detail the films Nashville, Magnolia, 
Favoris de la Lune and Les Passagers). In network films, the characters’ lives, which are 
rather autonomous, eventually meet and separate not as a result of the characters’ purposeful 
actions but as an outcome of pure chance. A “car accident” is the typical plot invention used to 
bring characters together in network films, and Paul Haggis’ Crash (2004) drew this 
convention to the limit. This loose type of causality in network narratives does not preclude 
the expression of more traditional characterological causality in them, and Bordwell’s 
theorization allows for different degrees of causality to be at play in these films. All characters 
might have their own goals (for example in Crash, to which Bordwell refers, or in Burn After 
Reading discussed here), however this does not stop contingency from changing their lives in 
unpredictable ways. 
 Bordwell’s observation of ‘loose causality’ in contemporary complex films is valid, in 
the sense that many events in network narratives “just happen” and are not attributable to an 
“overarching causal project” (2007: 193). However, Bordwell does not elaborate on the 
characteristics of this loose causality, which is mostly negatively defined. Calling the causality 
of (a group of) complex films “loose” implies a pre-definition of causality as being tight. This 
form of ‘tight’ causality has been considered as characteristic of classical narrative cinema: 
Events in the story are typically organized in a relationship of cause and effect, so 
that there is a logic whereby each event of the narrative is linked to the next. The 
classic narrative proceeds step-by-step in a more-or-less linear fashion, towards an 
apparently inevitable resolution. (Cook and Bernink 1999: 40)  
This cause and effect logic in classical narrative cinema needs to be supported, on the one 
hand by temporal and spatial coherence (see Burch 1981), and on the other hand, by agents—
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most of the times one central hero—presented as “fully rounded individuals” with well-
developed personality and corresponding motivation. It is against this backdrop of tight 
characterological causality that the ‘loose causality’ of network films is defined. Bordwell’s 
evaluation of causality in network films is made using classical narrative and anthropomorphic 
standards—the latter in the sense of events caused by human actors and bringing forth other 
events as consequences of the previous actions. This is a definition of causality based on the 
Aristotelian model of drama—which is not to be confused, however, with Aristotle’s 
categories for natural causality.89  
 Characterizing the causality of network narratives as loose, Bordwell also comments 
upon the “tension between fate and chance” in them, and the slip of many into a “secular 
theology” (2007: 213, 214) or a “design that governs coincidences” (ibid: 232), through an 
apparent ‘worship’ of chance. Here Bordwell hints at a second (macro) level of causality in 
network films, the causal power of which, however, does not fit into the characterological 
conceptions of causality. Thus, network films problematize this type of causality with which 
narrative in classical cinema has been associated. However, the adjective ‘loose’ only applies 
to the case of characterological causality. Causality still remains tight on a different level, 
since fate and chance in many ‘network narratives’ become important sources of causality, 
which might be tighter, in terms of determinism, than the character-driven causality—even 
though less linear.   
 A form of causality based on the workings of destiny, even though not as 
anthropocentric as the tight actor-based causality, is in a sense ‘classical’ as well, as it has 
always been playing a significant role in the structure of drama. In his discussion of chance in 
network narratives as “God’s way of seeming anonymous” (2007: 214), Bordwell tends to 
substitute the determinism of events at the characterological micro-level, for the one at the 
macro-level of transcendental powers, and ultimately of (extra-diegetic) narration and plot 
construction. Warren Buckland’s discussion of the two plot lines involved in classic complex 
plots is instructive in this respect. As long as in network narratives chance tends to dissolve 
into fate, network films would not really differ from the ‘traditional’ sense of a plot’s 
complexity that dates back in Aristotelian Poetics. According to Buckland (2009: 2-3), the 
classical tragedy of Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, is an example of the plots that Aristotle 
considered as complex (peplegmena). In complex plots two different lines of causality are at 
play, the (micro-)causality of the characters’ actions, and the plot’s (macro-)causality, which 
enters through “reversal” (of “good fortunes”) and “recognition”, by the character and the 
viewer, of this reversal. This second plot line becomes influential both intra-diegetically 
(determining the character’s fate) and narrationally, making the plot more “complex”. 
Towards the final catharsis though, as Buckland stresses, the two plot lines tend to converge: 
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the complication (expressed through reversal and recognition) and its outcome gets finally 
integrated into the path predestined to the protagonist, diegetically through the power of fate 
and narrationally through the closure and wholeness that narrative construction demands. 
Thus, ‘everything happens for a reason’, even though this causal-logical sequence can only 
retrospectively be observed and established by the viewer/recipient.  
 Something similar seems to be happening both in the films that Bordwell discusses as 
forking path narratives (as Buckland points out), and in those he calls network narratives. For 
instance, in Happenstance that Bordwell discusses in his—explicitly Aristotelian—Poetics of 
Cinema, an impressive number of chance events such as a “discarded cookie”, a stolen 
coffeemaker and “a pebble thrown out of the window”, seem to be happening only to bring 
together two characters that were either way destined to be together. Here, too, the complexity 
of the plot ultimately boils down to the classic love-story resolution of traditional Hollywood 
films.  
 The discussion of this film in Poetics of Cinema is indicative of the way Bordwell 
appropriates and adopts network theory to (classical) film theory. Although up to a point he 
emphasizes the divergence of network narratives from classical narratives, especially through 
“loose causality” and the prevalence of chance, he tends to emphasize the “return to the 
customary path” of classic narration (2007: 242). In this respect, Bordwell’s discussion of 
complex films, either as “forking-path” or “network” narratives, stands closer to the 
Aristotelian definition of plot complexity, where the divergence from the main causal line gets 
finally integrated back to it, leading to the fulfillment of the hero’s destiny and to closure. 
Similarly, Bordwell’s application of network forms of complexity in film narrative theory 
tends to de-emphasize emergent dynamics and stress predestination.  
 In Bordwell’s theorization of network narratives, chance and contingency, key-notions 
in complex systems theories, appear succumbed to predestination. The chance events that 
proliferate in these films are interpreted as ultimately serving the overarching causal line of the 
plot, which intra-diegetically takes the form of destiny. That is why Bordwell and other 
commentators see a transcendental element in the prevalence of happenstance in complex 
films. The interference of chance as a transcendental factor makes the connections between 
characters appear almost “metaphysical”, tending towards a kind of totality (Silvey 2009).  
 Chance is a system of causation in its own right, considered as such especially since 
the end of Enlightenment, and works of contemporary narratology acknowledge its causal 
power (see Richardson 1997: 15, 20, 62). In literary works as old as Aphra Behn’s The Lucky 
Chance (1686), which literary theorist Brian Richardson refers to, but also in the ‘network 
narratives’ of contemporary complex films, chance is a cause, but at the same time it disrupts 
causality in the sense of one-to-one relationships between events as causes and effects. A 
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chance event might start a chain of causality but itself cannot be explained as the result of a 
pre-existing cause. It thus becomes hard to establish any chain of causality when there is, not 
just one, but a proliferation of chance events within a text. The central role that network films 
ascribe to contingency can now be highlighted in its tension with the type of causality that 
defines narrative.  
 Many complex films develop around the effects of chance events. However, here the 
effects do not correspond to their causes by logical necessity, neither are they exclusive. The 
same contingent event may have entirely different outcomes, and this is something that 
network films stress. The multiplicity of characters in these films is particularly functional in 
illustrating the complex effects of chance. For instance, in the film Code Inconnu, the same 
contingent event, a pastry bag discarded by one character, affects the lives of all other 
characters, but has very dissimilar outcomes depending on which character it affects. Chance 
has an organizing power that interacts with the pre-existing organization of the world upon 
which it exerts its influence. But this is different from claiming that coincidence is governed 
by a design, and that it ultimately succumbs to this design.  
 But to what extent is causality in complex films non-traditional, one may ask, since 
traditional narratives have also been sparing a place for loose causality? Seymour Chatman 
differentiated between causality and its looser form, which he called contingency, borrowing 
the term from philosopher Jean Pouillon:  
In traditional narratives, the internal or story logic entails the additional principle 
of causality (event a causes b, b causes c, and so on) or, more weakly, what might 
be called “contingency” (a does not directly cause b, nor does b cause c, but they 
all work together to evoke a certain situation of state of affairs x). (Chatman 1990: 
9)  
 Contingency blurs the initial causes of events, thus, even though to some extent 
contained in traditional narratives, becomes much more pervasive in the non-traditional ones, 
such as Robbe-Grillet’s—paradigmatically non-linear for literary theory—texts. Thus, as 
Chatman notes: “The idea of contingency is attractively broad, for it can accommodate new 
organizing principles” (1990: 47). These new organizing principles become in contemporary 
complex films, as I argue in this dissertation, much more pervasive than before, questioning 
the primacy of the traditional organizing principles of narrative. 
 
From heaps to systems  
 Network narratives, as I already pointed out, include a multiplicity of characters, who 
are given almost equal merit of the narrative time and agency. By focusing only on the number 
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of characters, however, the adjective “network” does not offer us more information than the 
older label of “ensemble” or “multi-character” narrative, a common trope in other media 
products as well, such as TV soap operas. A network is not a sum of individuals; it is a system 
as long as links connecting the individual nodes organize them into one collective 
organization. It is the entanglement of the units that makes a network—and a network film—
complex.  
 Bordwell refers to network narratives in cinema as “catalogues” (2007: 212), because 
the separate stories they contain (through the different characters) stay for the most part of 
these films discrete, and actually function, in the mind of the viewer, as ‘alternatives’ 
according to some common criterion. I will address this aspect in the last part of this thesis, 
but for now I would like to expand on the function of the catalogue. Emphasizing the 
catalogue-like form of complex films Bordwell seems to bringing them closer, in my view, to 
the “categorical form” of films, which in his book with Kristin Thompson Film Art (first 
edition 1979) he described as “nonnarrative”.90 However, in his theorization of network 
narratives Bordwell soon demonstrates how even though resembling catalogues, network films 
easily succumb to the principles of narrative organization. It is a fact that complex films create 
story worlds, and thus they are not so radically ‘anti-narrative’ like the documentaries that use 
the categorical form, to which Bordwell and Thompson refer. However, my contention is that 
complex films use this non-narrative form, which Bordwell and Thompson compare with a 
catalogue, in order to organize into systems that do not necessarily become narrative.  
 A catalogue is not a system but a list of elements; a system needs relations between the 
elements in order to form itself. I would argue that one of the ways through which network 
films become meaningful—and communicate with the viewer—is the experience of the 
process through which a catalogue or a heap91 (a “summative complex”, according to systems 
philosopher Ervin Laszlo) becomes a system (a “constitutive complex”). The absolute 
disentanglement of elements that a heap suggests would abolish a film’s communicative 
potential. As Laszlo points out: “If subsystem communication is reduced to zero, the whole 
system has zero level of organization; i.e. we are dealing with a limiting case in which the 
whole system ceases to be a system and becomes a heap of independent components” (Laszlo 
1972: 250). Thus, in systems theory, it is the communication between elements, or system 
components, that makes a system (a constitutive complex) distinct from a heap (a summative 
complex): “the more two or more components communicate, the more information they pass 
to one another, and thus the more they determine each other” (ibid). In network films, the flow 
of information and communication increases gradually, as the separate agents and story 
components are linked to each other and begin to create a collective organization. In the 
previous chapter, I stressed the way in which the characters of Burn After Reading function as 
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informational vessels, passing on the information they receive (the CD being a diegetic 
metaphor for information), without cognitively processing and understanding it. But through 
the connections and interactions between characters/agents—who are at the same time basic 
diegetic components—that such handling of information entails, the diegetic information 
gradually transforms into systemic information at the extra-diegetic, ‘formal’ level of the film. 
Thus the film becomes a constitutive complex.92 The complex systemic framework allows us 
to see the diegetic interactions as primarily informational and secondarily 
anthropomorphic/characterological. Moreover, it shows how the structure that these 
interactions create at the formal level of the film is not closed and symmetrical but open and 
nonlinear. Thus, instead of concluding that network films ultimately become classical 
narratives, as Bordwell would have them, I would argue that they lead to organizations that are 
different from narrative.  
 The degree of components’ codependency in network films increases because of the 
greater spatial disparity of information across different agents and plot threads, as none of 
these individual pieces composing the narrative is omniscient. The relative lack of information 
makes the connectivity and communication between units necessary, and through the increase 
of connectivity the units may form a system.93 At the textual level of complex films, the co-
dependency of both characterological and structural (agents/actions) elements increases 
through interconnections, and creates the causality of the filmic text in a different way than the 
one implied by the classical conception of narrative and its particular type of causality. 
Complex causality may be better conceived as a cumulative, nonlinear and emergent effect, 
rather than as an event-sequence of causes and effects (or ‘focused causal chains’).  
 Complex network films display a multi-directional and multi-level causality that can 
be seen as the product of a feedback circuit that connects in the same network the agencies of 
different actors/actants across the different diegetic levels. At the intra-diegetic level, a 
complex film brings together and ‘interlocks’—through parallelism or crosscutting—separate 
agents/actors, and along with them, separate parts of the film’s text that correspond to each 
character’s perspective upon the diegetic world and function within it. It is not just the number 
of characters but the connections between them—and how they are effectuated—that become 
prevalent. What brings the actors together (intra-diegetically) might be chance, but the result 
of their interactions cannot be attributed to chance alone; rather, it is the emergent product of 
their relations. Moreover, chance itself is caused by relations, as contingency seems to be 
triggering further contingency. The proliferation of chance events in a film is incompatible 
with narrative causality, because chance cannot be easily attributed to a cause; but it can be 
attributed to the synergy of many causes and causal agents, which may bring unexpected 
consequences. Causality is similarly acquired at the structural, extra-diegetic level of 
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‘ensemble’ complex films, as their multiple actors autonomously participate in the generation 
of the dynamics that drive the plot forward in a nonlinear way.  
 Network films derive their dynamics from the connections, on the one hand between a 
multiplicity of autonomous agents, and on the other hand, between different diegetic levels 
that these relations produce. Thus, from the micro-level of actors we move to the meso-level 
of their complex constellations, and the macro-level of system dynamics (the level of 
transformation in Todorov’s model). An “agent-based” approach to film narrative analysis, 
following the logic of agent-based methodologies used in simulations of complex systems,94 
would allow for a unidirectional feedback circuit to be established between the different 
narrational levels. The micro-diegetic level of characters and actions gives way, through 
complication of relations and nonlinear causality, to aggregates of agency at the meso-level. 
Mutual causal processes take place across levels. On the one hand, higher-level “medium-
agents”, who are the result of (or, in simulations, who are introduced as models of) the 
aggregates of individual units/micro-agents, feed back upon the micro-agents; this can be seen 
in network films such as Burn After Reading, where, from a point on, all actors are affected by 
the connections created between them, which influence both their individual trajectories as 
characters and the plot’s structure. The meso-level of interconnections introduces constraints 
to the micro-level, but at the same time contributes to the overall transformation, taking place 
at the extra-diegetic macro-level, of the text into an organization that acquires a causality of its 
own. Narration, however, may not introduce the medium agents, as simulation does. These 
agents emerge from the aggregate agency of micro-actors. Narration takes place through the 
interplay of macro and micro-level, but does not directly address the meso-level of aggregate 
micro-agency. Causality in complex films takes place across all three levels and is 
differentiated, by means of its emergent properties, both from the character-based 
‘behavioristic’ causality and from the one of totalizing and deterministic structures, either intra 
or extra-diegetic.  
 
Towards an emergent conception of causality in network films 
 Recent approaches to networks as complex systems are more interested in their 
dynamic properties (see Barrat, Barthélemy and Vespigniani 2008). It is not only the shape 
and spatial distribution of connectivity, but also the actual workings of it and the way a 
network self-organizes and develops as a dynamic system that attracts the attention of network 
scientists. Causality cannot be bracketed out from accounts on how a network system comes to 
being and evolves out of the separate elements/nodes that compose it. A network is not caused 
by the individual actions of the elements that compose it neither by a single transcendental and 
overarching cause; it rather emerges as an organization of a multiplicity of agencies and their 
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complex relations. This organization acquires a causality that is not anthropomorphic but 
systemic, and which, through a feedback process, in turn influences the units that now 
participate in the collective organization. Thus, I would argue that in complex films such as 
those containing networks of characters, it is not just that “contingency replaces causality” 
(Bordwell 2007: 204), but rather, a different form of network causality is created, which 
couples with contingency rather than excludes it. Every complex system evolves in a constant 
exchange with contingency, and achieves its organization through the interplay between 
contingency and structure.  
 Moving towards an understanding of the complex causal workings in network films, an 
updated conception of networks as complex systems would be required. Everett seems to be 
pointing at the framework of complex systems theory and particularly chaos and network 
theory as more adequate in the theoretical approach of films such as Free Radicals (Albert, 
2003), Run Lola Run (Tykwer, 1999), Code Unknown (Haneke, 2000), Amélie (Jeunet, 2001), 
and Intermission (Crowley, 2003)—films that she prefers to call fractal. As Everett notes:  
What is new about today’s understanding of networks, and what makes it 
impossible to approach them with simple linear graphs (in mathematics or physics) 
or with straightforward linear narratives (in films or novels), is the recognition of 
their essential complexity. Complexity is characterized by variety, heterogeneity, 
and the fact that the various elements in a compound behave in random and 
different ways. Networks are complex systems because they exist by interacting; 
and they are dynamic because they evolve and change in time, driven by the 
random activities or decisions of their very components […]. (Everett 2005: 162)  
In agreement with Everett, I do not find that the complexity of ensemble/network films, based 
on the interactions and relations between their components, as well as on their evolvement in 
time, has been addressed, let alone sufficiently explored. Thus the question that I attempt to 
answer in Part 2, taking into consideration the theorization of network films summarized in 
this chapter, is how the complexity of these filmic texts and the dynamic flow of information 
in them generates causality. I think that a shift of theoretical and methodological framework, 
from narratology to complex systems theory, is necessary in order to gain insight into the 
issues of causality involved in multi-agent, network films. Causality works differently in 
complex networks. It does not suggest just a complication of linear cause and effect arrows; 
rather, it is an emergent procedure. The systems theory of complex networks offers useful 
tools in order to think of how the organizing principle of causality, the cornerstone of 
narrative, is succumbed to a ‘new organizing principle’, which in complex systems theory is 
emergence. Networks are dynamic complex systems that acquire causality as they emerge out 
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of the links between units. In the following chapter I will focus on the workings of causality 
through emergence. 
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6. Causality and emergence through complex systems and narratives  
  
In complex systems, causality is entangled with internal complexity and self-organization. As 
we saw in Part 1, Luhmann described how systems acquire their causality through self-
organization. This is an emergent approach to causality, as it describes a system that becomes 
causal as soon as it constitutes itself. In the latest years, a nonlinear conception of causality 
also gains ground, complementing—and not contradicting—the emergent causality of the 
system. This nonlinear causality is involved in the constitution of the system by its units. 
Rejecting proportional cause and effect sequences, this conception accounts for the ability of 
units and their complex interactions to make way for the system’s emergence. It acknowledges 
the agency and causal power of elements, which work in synergetic networks rather than 
linear sequences. Causality in complex systems offers a model for thinking causality in 
complex films as having a similar nonlinear constitution and self-organizing function. 
Especially network films attract the attention to the nonlinear workings of causality in the 
process of their textual and cognitive organization. 
 
Emergent causality 
 Emergence is a concept that in the last years has been taken up by the study of 
complex systems, and refers to the self-organization achieved through complexity. The two 
terms—emergence and complexity—are often used interchangeably in the relevant literature, 
although complexity is a more ‘technical’ term compared to the philosophical background of 
emergence. Even though the study of emergence in complex systems still remains in many 
respects an obscure process that has not yet been explained is a systematic way (see Sengupta 
2006: 324 and 350), the common assumption of those who study complexity is that emergence 
is opposed to fixed structures that determine their components, but also to the simple reduction 
of a system to the number of its constituents.  
 In order to explain my claim that causality in complex films can be thought in terms of 
emergence, it is necessary to introduce in more detail the concept of emergence, as it has been 
developed first in philosophy in the beginning of the last century, and later in (complex) 
systems theory. The philosophical sense of emergence dates back to 1875, when George 
Henry Lewes used it in his work Problems of Life and Mind. In the late 19th and early 20th 
century, emergence was a central concern for the cycle of British Emergentists, who 
participated in the debate between mechanists and vitalists about the genealogy of sciences. 
Emergentists occupied a moderate position, resisting the reduction of biology, and secondarily 
of chemistry, to physics. Life, according to them, is not just an outcome of mechanical laws, 
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neither is it a substance itself; some of its qualities continue to be irreducible to mere 
mechanical processes. Among the most important figures of British Emergentism have been 
John Stuart Mill and Charlie Dunbar Broad. While Mill retained the attribute of causality in 
emergence, Broad initiated (in The Mind and its Place in Nature, 1925) a “synchronic, 
noncausal, covariational account of the relationship of emergent features to the conditions that 
gave rise to them” (O’Connor and Wong 2009); his account has certain affinities with the 
contemporary revived interest in emergence. The ‘noncausal’ character that British 
Emergentists ascribed to emergence is due to the fact that emergent laws are “trans-ordinal”, 
as Broad called them, that is, they refer to the connection of one order (or level) with another, 
and do not apply in the case of elements situated within the same order. Trans-ordinal laws 
can only be found a posteriori and at the higher level, and cannot be predicted by any existent 
law about the composition of lower-level elements: “[…] we must wait till we meet with an 
actual instance of an object of the higher order before we can discover such a law; and […] we 
cannot possibly deduce it beforehand from any combination of laws which we have 
discovered by observing aggregates of a lower order” (Broad 1925: 79, as cited by O’Connor 
and Wong 2009). Trans-ordinal or emergent laws “describe a synchronic noncausal 
covariation of an emergent property and its lower-level emergent base” (O’Connor and Wong 
2009). “Noncausal” here means that no single law of the lower level can account for the 
property that emerges at the higher level, thus direct cause-and-effect chains between different 
levels cannot be established. According to Broad’s approach to emergence, “high-level causal 
patterns” are additional to those at the lower level, and they can exert influence upon the lower 
levels, in a manner that has more recently been characterized as “downward causation” (see 
Campbell 1974). 
 Other British Emergentists, and especially Samuel Alexander, have been more 
influential than Broad in contemporary science. Alexander’s view of causality is summarized 
by Philip Clayton as follows: 
evolution produces new structures and organizational patterns. We may speak of 
these structures as things in their own right; they may serve as irreducible 
components of our best explanations; and they may seem to function as causal 
agents. But the real or ultimate causal work is done at a lower level, presumably 
that of microphysics. Our inability to recognize in these emerging patterns new 
manifestations of the same fundamental processes is due primarily to our 
ignorance and should not be taken as a guide to ontology. (2006: 21) 
Alexander, contradicting Mill and Broad, dismissed autonomous higher-level causality, and 
even though he emphasized the novelty of emergent qualities, he thought of emergence as an 
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epistemological rather than an ontological category. According to the criticism, however, the 
“weak” emergence of Alexander cannot account for the causal properties of the whole 
constituted by the parts (Clayton 2006: 25-26); such properties are indispensible in order for 
the whole to be considered as an autonomous entity.  
 Although the degree of connection between different orders was a point of dispute for 
Emergentists, what is certainly defeated by all emergentist accounts is causal determinism. 
The unpredictability of a system is considered a central property of emergence: “Emergent 
properties are systemic features of complex systems which could not be predicted […] from 
the standpoint of a pre-emergent stage, despite a thorough knowledge of the features of, and 
laws governing, their parts” (O’Connor and Wong 2009; emphasis mine). Moreover, despite 
their differences, all theorists of the British movement shared a common view of nature as 
“layered”. The world for them is arranged in levels “of increasing organizational complexity 
of matter” (ibid). As organisms move to higher levels of complexity, reducibility to lower 
levels becomes impossible. Thus, emergence counteracts reductionism. Preoccupied with 
wholes that are not reducible to their parts, the concept of emergence found fertile ground in 
systems theory, which revived the interest in emergence (ibid). Since Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy’s General Systems Theory (GST), systems theory “was put forward as a counter to 
what was perceived as excessive reductionism dominating scientific discourse during much of 
the 20th century” (EMIL 2007).  
 Different degrees of emergence, from strong (absolute irreducibility and completely 
‘new’ properties) to weak (practical but not analytical irreducibility), have been identified in 
the philosophy of emergence, and causality plays a crucial role in the difference between the 
two—strong and weak—versions.95 Contemporary accounts of emergence in the context of 
complex systems study seem to favor a ‘weaker’, or “intermediate”, version of it.96 The weak 
emergent approach is materialistic, according to systems scholar Mark Bedau, as it steps on 
the existence of microdynamics between material components of the microlevel that result in 
the emergence of operationally autonomous macrophenomena (1997: 395). The recent 
complex systems theories favor these weaker versions of emergence, as the material substrate 
of autonomous units and their interrelations are considered to be involved in an active way in 
emergent self-organization.  
 Complex systems are nonlinear and irreducible, in the sense that “a single high level 
property may be realized by more than one set of micro-states which have no lawful 
relationship between them” (EMIL 2007). However, as a case of weak emergence, the 
irreducibility of a complex system does not preclude (nonlinear) deducibility from the initial 
conditions, although these conditions are impossible to be clearly defined in open (and not 
isolated) systems. Therefore the methods that are usually employed in the study of emergence 
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in complex systems are simulation or statistical modeling (see Byrne 1998: 62). Thus, the 
study of emergent causality demands a synthetic rather than an analytical approach, because 
synthetic approaches ‘follow’ the bottom-up constitution of systems. According to Bedau, “the 
macrostate’s behavior” could be derived “from the system’s microdynamic” only by means of 
simulation (1997: 378), or “modeling all the interactions of the realizing microstates leading 
up to it from its initial conditions” (O’Connor and Wong 2009).97 
 
Nonlinear causality and emergence from cybernetics to complex systems theory 
 Nonlinear causality has been associated with cybernetic feedback. In cybernetics, self-
organization was initially associated with negative feedback and homeostasis, but with the 
second wave of cybernetics (the one that Hayles calls phase of reflexivity, as mentioned in 
Chapter 3, and lasting from 1960 to 1980), a shift in the thinking of self-organization took 
place, and the “deviation-amplifying” positive feedback processes gradually gained ground. 
Philosopher Manuel de Landa credits Norman Wiener, the ‘father’ of cybernetics, with a 
nonlinear idea of causality, which broke with a tradition of “linear (nonreciprocal) causality” 
(De Landa 2009: 67). Magoroh Maruyama’s study of positive and negative feedback, as well 
as Maturana’s and Varela’s “autocatalytic loops”, further established a nonlinear conception of 
causality. This conception countered the dominant conception of causality in Western thought, 
according to which “similar conditions produce similar effects” (Maruyama 1963: 4).  
 The nonlinear approach to causality questions the value of negative feedback and 
stability, and highlights the role of non-equilibrium in self-organization. According to 
Bertuglia and Vaio, this shift to positive feedback and non-equilibrium also marked the 
‘overtaking’ of cybernetics by complexity theory:   
Cybernetics, in reality, can be considered a science that anticipated complexity in 
the investigation of dynamical systems, precisely because it was the first to make 
use of concepts such as isolated or closed systems that regulate themselves by 
means of internal feedback cycles. […] complexity has overtaken cybernetics 
because it makes use of new concepts such as, in particular, self-organization and 
emergence; in other words, because it considers systems that evolve towards new 
states that do not have negative feedback cycles. (2005: 264) 
 When causality is conceived in nonlinear systems, it becomes the emergent product of 
the aggregation and “synergy” of a system’s elements.98 Causal synergy and emergence is 
what differentiates nonlinear from linear systems.99 As complexity scientist Grégoire Nicolis 
explains, 
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In a linear system the ultimate effect of the combined action of two different 
causes is merely the superposition of the effects of each cause taken individually. 
But in a nonlinear system adding two elementary actions to one another can induce 
dramatic new effects reflecting the onset of cooperativity between the constituent 
elements. (1995: 1)  
The combination of different agents in a complex system has causal influence that again 
exceeds that of the sum of the combined causes taken individually. Nonlinearity in the 
mathematical sense of the word refers exactly to this disproportionality between starting 
conditions and results. ‘Weaker’ versions of emergence suggest that there is a connection 
between properties at the micro-level and those at the macro-level, but this connection is 
nonlinear. This, however, does not preclude some kind of causality to exist between the 
different levels. Later in this chapter, I will connect this synergetic and weak conception of 
causality with the one that operates between the different diegetic and narrational levels of 
complex films.  
 In complex systems accounts, emergence is not acausal. It rather pertains to a different, 
“pattern-based” as it has been called, form of causality. Jeffrey Goldstein (1996: 178), 
following Ben Goertzel’s mathematical model of “pattern dynamics”,100 rejects the view 
according to which complex chaotic processes are acausal—he refers specifically to the 
philosopher of science Stephen Kellert who expresses such as view in his book In the Wake of 
Chaos. Suggesting “a revision of causal explanation in the light of emergence” (163), instead 
of an abolishment of causality altogether, Goldstein distinguishes pattern-based causality 
(revolving around questions such as “how do the new patterns shown in emergent phenomena 
relate to previous patterns in the system?”) from the traditional, “substantialist” causality 
(implied by questions such as “what is it made of?” and “how much of it is there”) (165). 
Emergence is caused when already existing systemic patterns become more complex, creating 
“a plurality of folds” (169). Thus, either through “Boolean networks” (as Stuart Kauffman 
claims) or the “Baker transformation” (as does Ilya Prigogine), “emergent phenomena have 
[within the system] complex precursors” (170), and they do not just ‘pop up’ out of the initial 
simplicity of a system. By characterizing a property as emergent, one does not imply that there 
is no way to explain or understand its occurrence. Causation is still an issue in emergence, but 
it does not happen horizontally, following the model of bowling balls hitting each other, as a 
classical mechanical approach to causality would imply, but vertically, between different 
scales and levels. Emergent events are ‘wholes’, the causal effects of which “cannot be 
correctly represented in terms of the separate causal effects of [the] constituents” (O’Connor 
and Wong 2009).  
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 It is complexity itself that demands some notion of causality to be preserved for 
emergent phenomena. There is a causal link, Goldstein argues, between increased complexity 
and emergence (1996: 174).101 The insistence upon the coupling of emergence with causality 
is a stance that rejects both ‘hard’ scientific reductionism and the absolute detachment of the 
emergent phenomenon from its functional substrates (as a “strong emergence” thesis would 
have it). Rather, it is compatible with the combination of the “local” with the “global” level 
(175). As Prigogine, together with philosopher Isabelle Stengers, mention in their book The 
End of Certainty, there is “a narrow path between two conceptions that both lead to alienation: 
a world ruled by deterministic laws, which leaves no place for novelty, and a world ruled by a 
dice-playing God, where everything is absurd, acausal, and incomprehensible” (1997: 188; 
emphasis mine).  
 Emergence seems to require a bridge between the microlevel and the macrolevel, 
which allows a view over the patterns developed by aggregates of separate micro-elements. As 
O’Connor and Wong note: “Of central importance is to recognize that the relationship of 
micro-level structures and macro-level emergent properties is dynamic and causal, not static 
and formal (in a quasi-logical sense)” (2005).  
 
Emergent causality and narrative  
 Complex films, as many different theorists, from Bordwell to Cameron, have pointed 
out, stand somehow between determinism and contingency: on the one hand, they negate 
linear and deterministic causality; on the other hand, they demonstrate the causal effects of 
contingency. Before going on, certain clarifications need to be made: narrative causality is not 
the mechanical and ‘linear’ (in the strict sense) causality of Newtonian laws. It is not physical 
or mathematical but anthropomorphic, less precise and less tight than causality at the level of 
natural elements, to which complexity in sciences refers. In one sense, causality in most 
narratives and narrative films is already ‘loose’. According to organizational theorists 
Haridimos Tsoukas and Mary Jo Hatch, narrative can be a model for all modes of thinking in 
which causality does not operate through strict and reductive logical sequences, but “through 
associations that are not causal in the logico-scientific sense” (2001: 1006). As they point out, 
narrative causality operates through patterns of “co-occurrence, spatial proximity, formal 
similarity or metaphor” (ibid), features that “may help us to understand […] the non-linearity, 
indeterminacy, unpredictability, and emergence of complex systems” (1007).  
 However, this conception of narrative is already made from a post-narrative 
perspective, and particularly from one of complex systems theory that re-interprets narrative 
as a complex system. In film theory, narrative has been clearly differentiated from other non-
narrative formal systems that are possible in film, such as the rhetorical, categorical, 
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associational and abstract forms that Bordwell and Thompson distinguish (2008). Certain 
among these non-narrative forms, and especially the associational one, which creates patterns 
of images related according to motifs, have similar characteristics with those that Tsoukas and 
Hatch mention. But this form, prominent in “experimental” films, according to Bordwell and 
Thompson (2008: 356), is downplayed in narrative films. The definition of narrative in film 
theory but also in narratology, as shown in Chapter 5, sticks to the notion of causality as an 
organizing principle that arranges events in causal-logical sequences. This narrative 
organizing principle, no matter how less deterministic from the one presupposed by natural 
Newtonian laws, is still diegetically but also formally challenged by the “chance encounters” 
and the “intersections of strangers” proliferating in complex films. Causality in complex films 
is not just loose but nonlinear, and organizes the film in an emergent way. Nonlinearity does 
not only characterize the interactions of characters/actors at the representational level, and the 
way their actions lead to “storms of consequences”, as it happens in Burn After Reading, but 
also the ‘causal logic’ of the narration and the one involved in the cognitive construction of the 
diegesis by the viewer.  
 Narrative conceived as a cognitive system of interpretation retrospectively determines 
the sequence of events so that they can be placed in a causal-logical chain.102 But a complex 
systemic approach requires a careful examination of how any form of cognitive organization 
emerges from the level of the syuzhet, and how does the text and its construction complicate 
and even withhold this top-down establishment of causality towards which narrative tends. 
The complex systems framework favors approaches that take as their starting point the level of 
the syuzhet and put in a secondary position that of the fabula.  
 In the field of organizational studies, narrative causality has been contested as 
inadequate to capture the complexity of organization. From this perspective, David Boje 
contests causality (in the form of cause and effect chains) as anthropomorphic, and suggests a 
complex systems approach that he calls antenarrative. The Latin prefix ‘ante’ indicates his 
pointing at the stage before narrative. Drawing from Nietzsche’s disavowal of “universalized 
causality”, Boje suggest that the establishment of logical causal connections between events 
often underestimates the role of contingency upon human action and neglects “all kinds of 
affects” that are at play between two thoughts.103 Thus, Boje contends,  
The narrative acts of retrospective causality destroy the antenarrative experience of 
multi-causality and non-linear causality, and situations where the only cause is a 
fictive one. […] Physics is moving beyond mechanistic interpretation to more non-
linear models, and organization studies follows along. We in organization studies 
are giving more sensitivity to initial conditions, self-organization and emergent 
dynamics in chaos and complexity theory. In the postmodern world of storytelling 
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organizations linear causality is a convenient fiction, an over-simplified narrative 
of complex antenarrative dynamics in which non-linearity (and that too is a 
fiction) reigns. Organization studies are beginning to wrestle with an antenarrative 
understanding of causality. As Langley says, “Researchers are also increasingly 
recognizing that the presence of multilayered and changing contexts, 
multidirectional causalities, and feedback loops often disturb steady progression 
toward “equilibrium” (1999: 692). (Boje 2001: 93-94)104  
In film studies too, an antenarrative approach would be one focusing on and starting from the 
complexity of filmic texts, without presupposing the whole that narrative stands for, one 
that—even retrospectively and in an emergent way—imposes a causal-logical structure to the 
multiplicity of affects involved in the process of communication between a recipient and a 
film.  
 Since complex films can be conceived as complex systems, as I argue in this 
dissertation, they may still form organizations, communicate and produce meaning without 
putting their elements into any kind of steady linear arrangement. As long as meaning making 
processes in complex films are concerned, and provided that these are emergent processes, 
both textually and cognitively in the different systems of the film and the viewer, I would opt 
for a weak rather than a strong conception of their emergence. This implies that the textual 
form of the syuzhet matters in the emergence of meaning. Adopting a weak emergent approach 
to the causality involved in complex films would mean to direct our attention to the actual 
causal role that the multiple constitution and the non-linear ordering of the syuzhet and the 
relations between its elements have in the emergence of a whole. In the opposite case, a strong 
emergent approach that would consider this whole to be completely independent of its units, 
an ‘order’ or schema that emerges in all cases of reading and viewing being independent of the 
specific characteristics of each text, would tell us nothing, to paraphrase Jaegwon Kim (2006: 
200), about the processes through which the cognitive and filmic organization is constituted in 
complex films.  
 
Structure and emergence in networks, from social theory to narrative  
 In the previous chapter I argued that the number of characters in complex films, and 
mostly the number and entanglement of their interactions, disrupts the classical schemata of 
causality in narrative cinema. Here I will explain in more detail how the number of 
components of a system (which can also be a filmic system) and their relations plays a 
fundamental role in the system’s complexity.  
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 Complex systems scientist Stuart Kauffman has shown that complexity is built in 
multi-agent and densely interconnected systems (see 1993: 243). These two factors, the 
number of agents and the density of connections, are interdependent, as the big number of 
individual units increases the possible interactions and therefore, the complexity of the 
resulting system.105 As the anthropologist and neuroscientist Terrence Deacon notes,  
With every iterated interaction, relational properties are multiplied with respect to 
each other, so an increase in numbers of elements and chances for interactions 
increases the relative importance of interaction parameters and related contextual 
variables. (2006: 121-122)  
Films with network narratives follow this logic; by increasing the number of agents they also 
increase the relational range and the complexity of the network that these relations form.  
 In graph theory, networks are graphic representations used in order to depict relations 
between a number of units. It has become a common practice in many different disciplines to 
use network theory and graphs to analyze complex data, but the word ‘complex’ here equals to 
‘connected’—with a varying degree of entanglement, which sometimes makes network graphs 
incomprehensible. Network is the graphic form of interconnectivity, as it provides a means to 
elaborate systems with many interconnected parts. There are variations of complexity in 
networks, depending on the degree of their distribution, the clustering coefficient (the degree 
to which nodes cluster with each other) and other dimensions. 
 However, the network structure, pictured as the complicated connections between a 
multiplicity of nodes, is not a sufficient condition for complexity to develop, in the sense that 
complex systems theory gives to the term. Complexity theory does not stop at the 
representation of systems as networks but also seeks to explore how these networks are 
dynamic, and how they form themselves through reciprocal connections between the ‘nodes’ 
that compose them. Complexity theory, as Russ Marion points out, “envisions adaptive 
systems (species, animals, plants, viruses, etc.) as neural-like interactive networks of agents 
and seeks to understand the dynamics of network behaviors” (2006: 274). Emergence happens 
only through such dynamic interrelations.  As Marion notes, “events emerge from complex 
interactive dynamics involving neural-like networks of adaptive agents. That is, emergent 
events are products of unpredictable combinations and recombinations among interdependent 
agents” (259).106 The “networked, interdependent interactions” are characteristic of every 
complex system. Interactions between a large number of agents/elements create increasing 
complexity, but these interactions between the nodes need to be dynamical and reciprocal, in 
order for them to transform into an emergent organization. That is why network theory is not 
synonymous with systems theory, or, why not all networks can be characterized as complex 
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systems.107 Network theory has historically been a structure-oriented approach, but complex 
network theory as a strand of systems theory moves beyond structures, focusing on the 
emergent dynamics that the interrelations between units release. A similar complex approach 
to network films would also be differentiated from structuralist approaches, emphasizing the 
emergent dynamics at the ‘meso-level’ of unit interactions.  
 An example of the ‘structuralism’ inherent in network theory may be given through 
Emirbayer’s and Goodwin’s discussion of the particular use of network analysis in sociology. 
They distinguish between different versions of ‘structuralism’ (prioritization of structures) 
therein: the “structuralist deterministic” model prioritizes the potency of structures over that of 
the individual actors, while that of “structuralist instrumentalism” prioritizes actors. The 
former tends to work with “static ‘map configurations’ or relational ‘snapshots’ of network 
patterns” (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994: 1426), ending up in reifying relations and 
considering them overarching structures that determine the units; the latter takes the theory of 
“homo economicus” as its starting point, attributing to individual nodes a rationalistic and 
utility-maximizing logic, which, even in a bottom-up direction, still pre-determines the 
conduct of the network’s actors/nodes.108 Such a double ‘structuration’ became apparent 
through the analysis of causality in narrative in the previous chapter; the ‘characterological’ 
construction of causality based on—anthropomorphic—motives, such as those of the actors in 
Burn After Reading—reduces (and structures) the actors to instantiations of cultural and social 
ideals (the vein, obsessed with external appearance woman, the man who wants to feel 
important…), while a structuralist—in the narratological sense—analysis of causality again 
succumbs the dynamics of the plot’s form to overarching symmetries that preexist them. A 
change of theoretical context though would allow, as it did in sociology, for different 
properties of networks to come to the fore. Complex systems theory in sociology aims at 
revealing the dynamical nature of social networks and highlighting the complex links and 
interrelationships between the micro-level of individuals and the network macro-level. 
Between these two levels, a multiplicity of nested systems with their own interrelationships 
weaves the patterns of social complexity (Byrne 1998: 10).  
 In sociology too, as in cybernetics, systems theory initially adopted a very different 
approach from the one that the ‘new’, complex systems theory, takes. Even today, systems 
theory in sociology often refers back to the work of Talcott Parsons, who, influenced by 
cybernetics, developed a model of society—known as “functionalism”—as a hierarchy of 
nested systems always beginning from—and tending towards—equilibrium. This model can 
be seen as analogous to the equilibrium model of narrative in Todorov’s narratology, since 
Todorov defined equilibrium in a similar way, as “the existence of a stable but not static 
relation between the members of a society” (Kafalenos 2006: 4);109 and this conception of 
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equilibrium, similar to that of Parsons, influenced his adaptation of structural equilibrium into 
his narrative theory. However, as Kenneth Bailey argues, the emphasis that functionalism 
placed on equilibrium gradually became incompatible with the development of the (new) 
systems theory in sociology. The latter saw entropy (the amount of ‘redundant’ energy that 
increases during a thermodynamic process) as well as nonequilibrium, as the bases for both 
biological and social organization. Along with the development of complex systems theory, 
social systems theory differentiated from functionalism, departing from the “age of 
equilibrium” to enter the “age of entropy” (Bailey 1994: 5).110 A combination of autopoietic 
self-organization with complexity emphasizes evolutionary dynamics that can be observed 
from the macrolevel: “macro-level social order is a complex product of micro-level 
intentionality and the wider non-linear operation of the system” (ibid).111 The nonlinear 
process of self-organization is described by Peter Coveney as “the spontaneous emergence of 
non-equilibrium structural reorganizations on a macroscopic level, due to the collective 
interactions between a large number of (usually simple) microscopic objects” (2003: 1058).  
 As long as social theory kept oscillating between reduction and reification of social 
phenomena, the occurrence of macro phenomena as the ones of broader social changes and 
transitions could not be properly grasped. Particularly, not enough attention had been paid to 
the complex interactions that make such phenomena emerge; this is a gap that (complex) 
systems theory tries to fill. The recent rise of complex and emergent approaches to the study 
of social and other kinds of networks as complex systems provides new methods to bridge the 
micro-macro divide.  
 Narrative has been used as a counter-example of emergent organization in this respect. 
Patrick Doreian, in a similar line of thinking with that of Boje cited above, comments on how 
sociologists have tried to describe the formation of networks using narrative. However, the 
limitations of this approach, which emphasizes causality, soon became manifest, since 
networks cannot be represented in causal-temporal chains of events.  
A narrative as a straightforward description of a sequence of events has 
considerable appeal. Most network analysts who study empirical phenomena use 
narrative. In part, it is window dressing, but it has more than surface interest. The 
risk is that the narrative becomes yet another just-so story with events following 
each other in time under convenient stage management. Once it is recognized that 
the only real connection between the described events is merely temporal, the 
causal enterprise is shaken. If a different event could follow a given event—which 
happens—the coupling of the events in a narrative is loosened. And, if there could 
be other outcomes between two hitherto sequential events that appear in a set of 
narratives, the tight coupling between events is lost again. […] The most hard-
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nosed assessment is that truly establishing causality in network analysis is 
impossible—just as it is in the realm of statistical causality. […] There needs to be 
a very tight coupling of theory, mechanisms, and credible empirical information 
before we can delineate the actual operation of causes in the empirical world 
before we can tell causal stories. (Doreian 2001: 110-111) 
Here the term narrative refers to the particular type of presentation of research findings in the 
field of social networks, a description that the writer objects. Even though in a very different 
context from that of film and literary theory, the function of narrative here is reminiscent of 
the way narrative as a cognitive process is conceived by narrative theorists, namely as a mode 
of data organization that constructs a causal story—and ‘meaning’—even from the most 
baffled and ‘anti-narrative’ texts, in which causality is loosened or even broken. Our ability to 
construct causal stories, in the sense of tight coupling of events, is challenged by 
contemporary complex films, and together a need is created to account for the organizing 
potential lying in a different, pattern-based causality. The multiplicity of agents that complex 
network films involve is a means through which linear causality is undermined and other types 
of organization become prominent. Thus, complex films seem to call for an analogous 
development in film and narrative theory with the one in sociology or organizational theory. 
The use of emergent and bottom-up approaches to textual organization is needed when the 
lines of causality as traditionally conceived in narrative theory are broken, and when 
structuralist models of symmetry do not prove helpful. These approaches help us see how 
diegetic wholes emerge when narrative, along with both Aristotelian and structuralist 
conceptions of causality, is placed in the background.  
 
Dynamics of transformation and narrative  
 As already broached, an important aspect that differentiates the complex systemic 
approach from older cybernetic approaches to systems has to do with a passage from the “age 
of equilibrium” to that of entropy, according to Bailey’s expression. This passage also has to 
do with a shift to an “ensemble” perspective. Moreover, it is a factor that differentiates 
complex systemic approaches to causality from narrative approaches.  
 Nonequilibrium and change are the basic features of self-organizing systems, 
according to Prigogine, the founder of nonequilibrium thermodynamics, which is considered 
one of the strands of complex systems theory.112 Unlike Newtonian dynamics, nonequilibrium 
thermodynamics prioritizes evolution and entropy instead of time-reversibility or equilibrium. 
The behavior of systems cannot be described in terms of trajectories of individuals (in the case 
of thermodynamics, these ‘individuals’ are molecules) but in terms of populations or 
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“ensembles”,113 whose movement in time (or succession of states they are found in) is 
probabilistic and irreversible, leading to new, emerging properties.  
 In stable systems, there is no difference between the level of the individual trajectories 
and the one of ensembles; the ensemble can be easily understood as an additive collection of 
the individual trajectories. However, in unstable dynamical systems, as Prigogine and Stengers 
mention, “the equivalence between the individual point of view and the statistical point of 
view […] is broken” (1997: 83), and asymmetry is established between individuals and 
aggregates. What according to a Newtonian—and linear—trajectory description would appear 
as divergence, according to a statistical—“ensemble” and complex—description appears as 
“resonance”, “a coupling of events loosely analogous to the coupling of sounds by resonance” 
(ibid: 42).  
 It is of course not easy to draw an analogy between the behavior of particles in physics 
and that of agents in narratives. However, based on the principle of isomorphism that 
characterizes complex systems theory as a transdisciplinary field, we could argue for a similar 
‘ensemble approach’ in film analysis. If agents/actors in a narrative are conceived as 
individuals in single trajectories from one event to the next, then an ensemble approach 
introduces an asymmetry that changes this picture. The single trajectory perspective makes 
events appear as the causes and effects of other events, triggered most of the time by human 
(or anthropomorphic) action. Complex/network films, as already mentioned, are structured 
around events that are disconnected from their causes, contingent and divergent from the 
causal-logical sequence. Thus, the single trajectory perspective, or that of ‘lines of causality’ is 
not particularly helpful, as it tends to reduce the contemporary complex and ‘ensemble’ films 
to the classical Aristotelian definition of complex plot, as discussed in Chapter 5. The 
ensemble perspective, however, makes events appear as emergent products of resonance 
between multiple threads of action, initiated by different each time initial conditions. Single 
trajectories of actions and events can only make sense as long as they are placed in an 
ensemble, resonating with other parallel (actual in the case of multi-character films or virtual 
in the case of forking-path films) trajectories. Complex films can organize themselves by 
means of resonance, and produce complex textual organizations, and the viewer may follow 
them by similar cognitive resonances. Because of the multiplicity reflected in their plots, these 
films favor non-anthropomorphic—‘ensemble’, in the statistical sense—descriptions, that 
highlight the patterns of agency emerging from the micro-level of unit interactions.  
 Are these statistical ensemble descriptions narrative? One of the basic problems with 
narrative is that it holds onto the notion of the observer. This anthropomorphic observer 
always judges events as probable or improbable and establishes causality between them. From 
the perspective of complex systems, causality can be conceived as “the outcome of a 
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stochastic, probabilistic process” (Prigogine and Stengers 1997: 37; emphasis mine), the same 
process that drives self-organization. However, this statistical sense of probability is different 
from the one based on a human observer. Prigogine and Stengers explain how probabilities are 
now built into the fundamental laws of the universe, which behaves probabilistically 
independent of an observer (see 1997: 5, 54, 131). The complex interactions that take place 
before even narrative becomes possible, require, in the context of complex films, syuzhet-
focused approaches that do not take narrative as their starting or ending point, approaches that 
would thus focus before or beyond narrative. As I already argued, diegetic agent-based models 
may be one of the ways to take into account interacting agents that produce the diegetic world 
by means of ‘ensemble’ (here not only in the statistical sense but also according to the use of 
the word in film theory, as in ‘ensemble films’ that contain aggregation of agents) rather than 
of individual trajectories.  
 Irreversible processes create an order that is different from the one of systems in 
equilibrium. This ordering through nonequilibrium is produced by the self-organization of a 
system in a “state of increased complexity” (Prigogine and Stengers 1997: 64; emphasis in the 
original). Here what Todorov called narrative transformation becomes relevant. It is not 
causality in the traditional sense of the word, but transformation that generates the causality of 
a system. Transformation may be observed when the state of a system is compared in two 
different points in time, but the dynamics of transformation cannot be captured in retrospective 
observation. Narrative as a form of representation cannot address the process of 
transformation itself. It is the gradual development of the syuzhet that reveals the dynamics 
resulting in transformation. Transformation is an emergent process determined by contingency 
and impossible to attribute to a single cause or causal line.  
 In his article “Narrative and Emergent Behavior”, literary theorist Porter Abbott argues 
that emergent action does not follow anthropomorphic laws of causal continuity and direct 
consequences of actions, laws that are indispensible in narrative (237). Emergence happens in-
between the micro and the macro level, and narrative according to the same writer cannot 
approach this area (234). Thus, Abbott concludes that emergent behavior, with its nonlinear 
causality, is “by definition unnarratable” (233). The multiplicity of agents is for him one of the 
most characteristic obstacles that narrative faces when it comes to complex behavior: 
[…] the principal reason for the incompatibility of emergent behavior with 
narrative understanding is its massive distribution of causal agents—a complexity 
of causation so acute that it disallows any perceptible chain of causation that could 
serve as a narrative thread. Narrative can and does play a limited role in our 
understanding of emergent behavior but does so only at the micro level of 
individual agents […] and the macro level of the whole […]. (Abbott 2008: 227) 
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Even though the distribution of agents in the complex films of contemporary cinema is not 
massive, as it is, for example, at the level of particles in physics, or of biological organisms 
such as ants, it still confronts the narrative understanding with an alternative and less 
anthropomorphic way of understanding. As researchers or viewers we can see emergent 
processes retrospectively, and then narrate them, from a macro viewpoint. However, at the 
time when these processes take place, they are unnarratable, and the only way to follow them 
is to participate in the textual and cognitive resonances that transgress narrative reasoning. 
With an emancipation of the syuzhet from the fabula, narrative can give way to other forms of 
organization, which, according to my opinion, in the films of the complex narrative tendency 
withhold and ultimately overtake narrative.  
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PART 3: PATTERN 
 
In the last part of this dissertation I will focus more closely on the borderline cases of complex 
films, taking as an example the Italian film Gomorrah (Gomorra, Matteo Garrone, 2008). The 
issue of place, space and spatialization of the diegesis will be discussed in detail in the 
individual case of Gomorrah in Chapter 7 and further in the general context of complex films 
in Chapter 8. I will also suggest that modes of discourse other than narration, and particularly 
description, become pertinent in these films. The last chapter (Chapter 9), with an eye to the 
other parts of the dissertation, will question through the concept of ‘pattern’ whether complex 
films with their spatialized form of presentation involve emergent types of textual and 
cognitive organization.  
 
7. Systems in crisis:  Gomorrah as a case of complex cinema 
 
 If Gomorrah were a static picture, it would offer a tableau vivant of a world in crisis. It 
is the “System”114—as the locals call Camorra, the criminal organization controlling the area 
of Campania in Italy—that in the film seems to be employing all the means it has available for 
its homeostatic preservation. However, in this chapter I am not going to talk about this System 
in detail, because the film itself does not. Instead, it focuses on five different and partial 
perspectives upon a diegetic world that unfolds through them and declares itself, at the very 
end, as part of our real world—where Camorra is expanding. Thus Gomorrah creates its own 
‘system’ that emerges from the bottom-up through the separate trajectories of six characters, 
drawn in a fragmented and disorienting space.   
 
One world, five perspectives  
 Don Ciro (Gianfelice Imparato) is a ‘submarine’ in Camorra’s slang, that is, a bagman 
entitled to dole out a monthly financial benefit to the families of imprisoned members of 
Camorra. In his everyday trajectory from door to door, Don Ciro draws the invisible links of 
the clan’s network, crossing the ‘streets’ of the housing complex where both he and his 
‘clients’ live their lives—streets which are actually narrow passageways between the different 
compartments and levels of the building. Although Don Ciro does not seem perfectly 
comfortable in the role he has in this peculiar community, his identity and self-respect are 
dependent upon the acceptance of the group, which he—or the money he circulates—holds 
together. However, as the clan that prevails in the area—and for which Don Ciro works—loses 
its power, obviously facing economic problems, one by one the people he used to consider 
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“brothers” become enemies. At first, he successfully manages to negate the unrest that starts 
taking place around him, ignoring its inauspicious signs. A “bunch of morons warring against 
us” can do no harm: these are the words he uses to calm down the worrying woman (Maria) 
who confesses to him that her son joined the secessionists. However, as more and more people 
around him die, Don Ciro gets to realize that he has to consider his own role in this “war”. It 
becomes clear that he cannot continue to be a money-carrier for the leading clan; but neither 
can he do the same work for the opposite camp. The secessionists need the money for more 
drastic action; to “shoot and kill” in order to establish their power. So Don Ciro has no choice, 
if he wants to survive, other than to ‘buy’ his life, following the new power constellations, and 
to remain obedient and ‘invisible’.  
 Things are not better for those who now enter the established clan, as they watch the 
strings that used to hold it together breaking. Toto (Salvatore Abruzzese), a kid who lives in 
the same housing complex with Don Ciro, and who has just joined the drug trafficking that 
thrives in the area, is also forced to participate in the local civil war and betray his ‘brothers’. 
He has to play the ‘hook’ in order to help his superiors kill Maria, the mother of his close 
friend who became a secessionist.115 Toto cannot have his own say in this decision, and in his 
case, his age makes things worse; he is just a kid among older Camorristi and he has to obey 
their orders. His desire to grow up and become a ‘man’ made him eager to join the local clan, 
but the real experience of participating in its business has unglamorous aspects. In any case, it 
seems doubtful as to whether Toto would have been able to avoid his involvement in 
Camorra’s drug trafficking; he grew up being part of the System that reigns in his 
neighborhood, and his recruitment comes as a natural consequence of this inclusion.  
 Marco (Marco Macor) and Ciro (Ciro Petrone) are two other teenagers, who despise 
the ‘bosses’ of their area and have Tony Montana from De Palma’s Scarface as their idol. 
Armed with influences from gangster movies and a good deal of naiveté, they think that they 
can set up their own drug traffic business, and keep all the money and the thrill for themselves. 
Driven by their ambition, they turn down an offer to join the prevailing clan, or to ally with 
other secessionists. But with this they seem to commit against Camorra a ‘sin’ bigger than all 
others, for which they will have to pay a high price. 
 Roberto (Carmine Paternoster) has recently found a job in the waste disposal 
business—Camorra’s most profitable niche. Coming from a low-class family and lacking the 
necessary connections to find a decent job in Naples, he was sent to work for a noble 
businessman (Franco, played by Toni Servillo), next to whom he discovers that words such as 
“redevelopment” and “humanitarian aid” might have a dubious meaning. Roberto finds 
difficulties in adapting to the amoral way of conduct of his boss, and, in a burst of disgust, he 
quits his post, even though he knows that his future career prospects outside Camorra are thin.  
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 Finally, Pasquale (Salvatore Cantalupo) is a tailor who has been working his whole life 
for a local sewing industry, which is apparently also controlled by the System. The small local 
industries have to compete with each other and abuse their workers’ rights so as to achieve 
good deals with the ‘haute couture’ traders. After one of these unfavourable—in terms of 
unpaid overtime—deals, Pasquale is approached by a Chinese businessman, who tries to set 
up his own dressmaking industry. The man offers Pasquale money in order to teach his craft to 
the immigrant workers. Pasquale hesitates to accept the offer, but eventually he gets 
convinced, to see the Chinese apprentices treating him with a respect that he had never 
experienced next to his boss. However, when those who control the area find out that Pasquale 
dared to sell his craftsmanship to the rivals, he hardly manages to survive the clan’s 
vengeance. His longing for self-respect that motivated his steps outside the familiar network 
and his attempt for individuation are simply not permitted in Camorra, as he ends up realizing 
in the most humiliating way. The only ‘independent’ option left to him is to abandon his art 
and become a truck driver.  
 
 The above synopsis reveals that it is almost impossible to narrate what is happening in 
Gomorrah, and to construct one (or five) coherent stories out of it, without using the word 
‘Camorra’, which corresponds to this criminal (but also economical and social) organization 
that the film is ultimately ‘about’. It is this Neapolitan criminal organization that Roberto 
Saviano, the writer of the book Gomorrah, on which the film is based, decided to confront 
with his book. However, the film never uses the name Camorra (or ‘System’), and never helps 
us draw a larger picture to interpret the events we witness as viewers, except after its ending. 
This, one could argue, is the very process of narrative as a cognitive and also textual mode of 
organization. With narrative it is always at the end that we can construct the larger picture and 
put every piece in its place. However, in this chapter I will show how Gomorrah, through the 
complex space it weaves, subjects narrative to another organizing principle, which follows a 
different logic.  
 
Obscure space 
 The plot of Gomorrah does not follow the homonymous book but rather ‘improvises’ 
on some disconnected passages of it. Some characters, who are only mentioned in passing in 
the book, create the diegetic world of Gomorrah through the ensemble of their singular 
perspectives. Both literary and filmic versions of Gomorrah are narrated “from the inside” as 
Garrone explains: “I thought that Saviano wrote the book from ‘the inside,’ thereby changing 
how the Mafia was characterized in literature. I also tried to write from ‘the inside,’ choosing 
certain characters from the book without glamorizing them” (2009). Gomorrah shares the 
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realistic style of its literary source, although it develops a different way to express it. In the 
film, the first person narration of Saviano’s prose is entirely substituted by the partial 
viewpoints of the characters, whose individual trajectories are followed separately (with many 
bifurcations) from the beginning until the end, through the interwoven episodes. 
 As I broached in the beginning of this chapter, Camorra stays an obscure ‘world’ 
throughout the whole film. As Saviano points out in the book, “Camorra” is a term that only 
external observers use to describe the activity of many different clans in the broader area of 
Naples—a name the reference of which is often followed by ironic smiles from the locals. 
Placing us indeed in the position of an ‘insider’, the words “Camorra” or “System” are never 
heard during the film. In the book Gomorrah, however, the ‘naming’ is done already on the 
cover, with the help of the subtitle. The subtitle of the English version (Picador publisher, 
2008) is quite explicit: “A personal journey into the violent international empire of Naples’ 
organized crime system”. The original Italian subtitle is even more explicit: “Viaggio 
nell’impero economico e nel sogno di dominio della Camorra” (“a journey in the economic 
empire and the dream for prevalence of Camorra”). But it is not only the subtitle of the book 
that differentiates it from the film. Saviano’s book is to a large extent a journalistic exposition 
of the activities of the System, being very explicit in actual details and containing names of 
people and places. Saviano gives a special importance to ‘naming’, associating it with facing. 
Regarding the power of naming, he draws inspiration from Pasolini, and for that of ‘facing’, 
from the Biblical story of Gomorrah, according to which Lot’s wife, turning back to face the 
cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, turned into a pillar of salt.116 The film Gomorrah, however, 
suspends naming. During Gomorrah, as Radovic says, “the clues are everywhere but the big 
picture is a frayed patchwork of brutally rough sketches” (2009: 7). It seems as if the elements 
of Gomorrah resist, through their spatial disparity, their own integration into the System. 
However, the pattern that their stories weave connects them into a complex system before 
their final inclusion into ‘the’ System of Camorra.  
 Apart from avoiding the reference to Camorra, it is also extremely difficult to ‘speak’ 
about Gomorrah without referring to real-life places and events. Toto and Don Ciro represent 
different viewpoints on the same place at the same time: Scampia at the time of the ‘war’ 
(feud) of Camorra. This war actually took place in 2004 when the clan of Di Lauro, 
controlling the area in the North of Naples (especially the suburb of Scampia), was fought by 
secessionists who demanded their operational autonomy.117 However, Gomorrah does not 
make reference to the actual names of people and places involved in this war.  
 Apart from the stories of Don Ciro and Toto that take place in the same locale and 
obviously unfold in parallel, the viewer cannot be certain whether the stories of the other 
characters are chronologically contemporaneous or not, despite their parallel placement in 
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terms of editing. The temporal registers of Gomorrah’s stories remain undefined, and the same 
happens with their spatial coordinates. The diegetic space, as a cognitive composition of the 
‘places’ a film contains—according to André Gardies’ distinction between place and space in 
cinema (1993)—in Gomorrah becomes difficult for the viewer to construct.  
 The film was shot on locations where Camorra’s business actually takes place. The 
places of shooting vary depending on which one of the five ‘perspectives’ the film focuses on 
each time. The epicentre of all stories is the area North of Naples. Other scenes of the film 
(like those featuring Ciro and Marco) were shot in the area of Casal di Principe, a municipality 
situated 25 km northwest of Naples, which is the hometown of some notorious clans of 
Camorra (but also of the author of the book Gomorrah Saviano). The first scene featuring Ciro 
and Marco was shot inside the “villa di Walterino”—the nickname of the former local ‘boss’ 
Walter Schianoni—in Casal di Principe. This villa, as Saviano mentions in the book, was 
modelled on the villa of Tony Montana in Scarface. The countryside close to Marcianise in the 
province of Caserta seems to be the—diegetic—basis for Roberto and Franco’s business, as 
Franco names Marcianise as the place where the disposal cargo heads to. The (actual) housing 
project Le Vele (The Sails) in Scampia was the setting of the scenes featuring Toto and Don 
Ciro (Nadeau 2008). This is how the housing project is described by a journalist of The 
Washington Post: “One notorious set of apartment buildings featured pyramidal wings 
connected by ramps and staircases crisscrossing within a concrete canyon” (Williams 2005). 
Philosopher and film theorist Mario Pezzela characterizes Le Vele in Gomorrah as a 
“shapeless no-place” (2009: 249). Interestingly, the area’s mayor uses the same 
characterization for Le Vele in the documentary Napoli Napoli Napoli (Abel Ferrara 2009). 
 “No place” is a characterization that could also be used to refer to the diegetic space of 
Gomorrah. The term “non-place” has been coined by the anthropologist Marc Augé to 
describe the places where the subjects of supermodernity are found in transit, like, for 
instance, supermarkets or airports (1995). Such non-places do not retain any particular 
characteristics of the actual geographical place where they are situated. Moreover, crowds in 
them are subjected to the strictest surveillance. Although in the case of Le Vele, the term “no-
place” has not been used with the theoretical loading that Augé gives to non-places, but 
probably in the sense of a place that is unbearable to live in, and which will never turn into a 
real ‘home’ for its inhabitants, the comparison is nonetheless tempting, as it offers a chance to 
think further on the film’s connection to place and space, and the way that it adjusts, along 
with other ‘complex’ films, to spectators of supermodernity who are found in continuous 
transit. 
 Although Gomorrah was shot on location, it very rarely provides the names of places. 
On the contrary, the film makes its best to render the places obscure and even unrecognizable. 
	  
 
129 
This almost uncannily echoes with the biblical parable of Sodom and Gomorrah, about which 
Umberto Curi observes: 
Ever since antiquity, in the histories of Flavius Josephus and Strabo, and right 
down to the most recent archaeological research, no one has been able to locate 
precisely where the two cities were. This means that, yes, they certainly did exist, 
but it is not possible to say where in the known world they were actually located, 
before being turned to smoke. The uncertainty of their geographical location is of 
itself a significant fact. […] Perhaps, in an intermediate area somewhere near the 
Dead Sea. Perhaps, much closer to us than we suspect. Perhaps, without fully 
realizing it, we ourselves are inhabitants of those cities. (Curi 2009: 245-246)  
This spatial uncertainty that the contemporary Gomorrah, along with its Biblical counterpart, 
put emphatically forth, allows it to be at once local and universal, present and eternal, 
locatable and ‘ubiquitous’.118   
 Some local audiences have actually criticized the film for marking the few places 
mentioned in it with Camorra’s blueprint (Tricomi 2008). However, the place is never directly 
indicated in Gomorrah.119 Locations are named in passing when action obviously takes place 
elsewhere: Marcianise is mentioned in Venice, where Franco negotiates with a local 
entrepreneur, while Naples is mentioned in some airport where Roberto’s father thanks Franco 
for taking his son into his business. Finally, Ciro and Marco mention Casal di Principe, which 
is not a seaside place, while hanging out at some port. The place in Gomorrah remains 
indefinite while the space of the film is being composed and differentially experienced 
through the spatial shifts performed, in terms of cinematography, editing and narrative.  
 
Realism and disorientation  
 Gomorrah has been mainly discussed, both by film critics and scholars, with regard to 
realism. On the one hand, as an Italian film, it is considered to be continuing the tradition of 
Italian neorealism. On the other hand, it draws on the realism of modernist movements. 
Certainly Gomorrah combines some of the key characteristics of realism as a cinematic style 
that André Bazin praised, finding its exemplary manifestation in the movement of Italian 
neorealism (see Wagstaff 2007): it is shot on location, uses in part non-professional actors,120 
some of whom are indeed members of Camorra (as revealed in the press), makes use of deep 
space, and has an episodic structure. The work of the director of Gomorrah, Matteo 
Garrone,121 has been placed in this neorealist tradition (diCarmine 2010), and his method has 
been described as an active search for authenticity, a “studied spontaneity” (Radovic 2009: 9), 
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which he achieves by proceeding to an almost ethnographical field research on the places he 
shoots.  
 At the same time, Gomorrah contradicts neorealism’s avoidance of artifice in the 
camera work and editing as well as its refusal to let the camera be expressive in itself, features 
that Gianetti points out as characteristic of this cinematic movement (2005: 476).122 
Gomorrah’s cinematography and editing are strongly present and determine the structure of its 
plot. From this aspect, some influence from the realism of modernist avant-garde movements 
can be noted. In any case, it is not so much the realism of neorealism that is being challenged 
in Gomorrah, and perhaps even less the one of modernist cinema. What is rather being 
challenged is the representational realism associated with central perspective, which cinema 
inherited from Renaissance’s pictorial modes (Elsaesser 2009d: 6). In my view, Gomorrah’s 
connection to realism needs to be placed in the context of disorientation and ‘located 
unlocatedness’ that the film creates. In the following part of this chapter, I will first describe 
Gomorrah’s aesthetics of disorientation, which arguably demand a discontinuous and dynamic 
engagement of the viewer with the filmic environment. Then, I will show how this complex 
spatial experience is enhanced by the equally disorienting and disordered narration. Thus, I 
will not so much connect Gomorrah to the tradition of realist and modernist movements, but 
to the tendency of complex films.  
 In Gomorrah, a disorienting effect is achieved by the camerawork and editing of the 
film. Through shifts between different types of vision and motion, Gomorrah creates a 
discontinuous experience of the places depicted. I use the term ‘shift’ here in order to highlight 
the element of transfer, which implies at once a spatial relation and an abrupt (dis)connection. 
Gomorrah’s cinematography is characterized by shifts in terms of the camera’s placement and 
movement, the focus of the lens, the point of view and the lighting.  
 To enter the local microcosm formed by Camorra’s activities, Gomorrah employs 
handheld camera, which became, from Italian neorealism to the new waves and cinéma vérité, 
the landmark of a cinematographic style associated with realism. In Gomorrah the handheld 
camera becomes a tool of disorientation as it moves through the labyrinthine passageways that 
comprise the literally inescapable Neapolitan slum (including Le Vele and the buildings 
around it), where life is unthinkable beyond Camorra. However, at certain moments Gomorrah 
abruptly breaks with the handheld camera style, distancing its view and effectuating extreme 
shifts of scale. Thus, on the one hand, the handheld, amateur-like shooting adapts to the quick, 
spasmodic pace of Don Ciro or follows Marco’s and Ciro’s play with guns, capturing bodies 
in close-up. On the other hand, this style is often abandoned, and the shooting shifts to long-
distance or bird’s eye view shots, which are again to be contrasted with close-ups on faces. In 
a characteristic scene, a long shot tilts down following the edge of a tall quarry to end up on a 
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human figure barely distinguishable in front of the giant cliff. Then a cut suddenly transfers us 
to a close-up of Roberto’s face. The use of wide and bird’s eye view shots, also characteristic 
in more ‘professional’, Hollywood-style shooting, do not soothe the viewer’s overall feeling of 
spatial (sensorimotor) disorientation; on the contrary, they enhance it through their 
juxtaposition with their opposites, such as the handheld shooting and the extreme close ups. 
Spatial disorientation is also effectuated at moments when we cannot even distinguish the 
presence of the characters in the frame. This happens, for instance, at the scene where we first 
encounter Roberto and his boss during their quest for the ideal disposal location, when they 
test the capacity of an abandoned gas station. At first, we can only hear their voices as we 
watch a shot of a landscape that seems empty; only when we manage to adjust our focus (and 
without the camera helping us to do so by zooming) we can distinguish the presence of figures 
in the background.  
 The technique of deep focus praised by Bazin is not prevailing in Garrone’s film. 
Rather, “additional layers of tension” are created through the imposition of limitations on the 
depth of field, as Rajko Radovic observes. This way “the surroundings are reduced to an out of 
focus mix of stark light and threatening sounds” (Radovic 2009: 9). This blurring of the 
surroundings happens in many scenes of the film, especially those involving the dilemmas and 
frustration that the characters encounter (for example, in the scene where Pasquale is 
approached by the Chinese businessman, or the one in which Toto runs away from the scene 
of Maria’s murder). A critic finds in Gomorrah a “contrast between deep and shallow focus”, 
with the latter communicating “a sense of a constant, ungraspable, unknowable violence which 
envelops and blurs clear and distinctive perception” (Duckworth 2008). The shifts between 
deep and shallow focus in Gomorrah are as abrupt as those between small and large scale.  
 The “ungraspable violence” that can be felt in Gomorrah is created by a sense of 
omnipresent surveillance by the System, which is not an abstract controlling structure but the 
social network itself, the way people relate to each other at a local level. In the space that this 
network creates, every single person involved in Camorra, from the pathetic drug dealers to 
the powerful bosses, becomes a node in a web of surveillance. This web is not created by bags 
and wires (nor by high-tech GPS devices) but by interpersonal relations bound to the place, 
reproducing the global model of distributed control at a local level. The camera enters this web 
and becomes an eye that could belong to any node of this network. And the labyrinthine 
spatial arrangement of the housing project that functions as one of the film’s key-settings 
intensifies the feeling of entrapment.  
  In a scene of Gomorrah, Don Ciro, having just survived an assault by two 
secessionists, walks in a dark passageway of the housing complex and looks around him with 
a frightened expression. In what seems to be an eyeline match, the camera glances at the dark 
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corridors of the lower and the opposite level of the building. The shot seems subjective, 
infiltrated as it is with Don Ciro’s fear. Without cut, the glance of the camera, which, as we are 
lead to assume, represents the glance of the character, moves to capture Don Ciro himself, 
who has now walked past that spot and can be seen from the back. His gaze towards the other 
side of the building is thus included into the gaze of someone (or just the camera) following 
him. Such mise-en-abyme embedding of gazes is among the techniques employed in order to 
achieve the effect of ‘lookers being looked at’, as well as to create constant shifts in the reality 
registers of Gomorrah, undermining forms of identification and perception based on central 
and omniscient perspective.  
 Finally, contrasts between light and darkness across different episodes and locations 
(the scenes of Roberto mostly take place in open air, where the disposal quarries are bathed in 
plain sunlight, while in the scenes of Don Ciro, shadows are prevalent) as well as within 
episodes (for instance in the open and closed spaces of the housing complex) set up a game of 
visibility and invisibility, surveillance and hiding. Particularly interesting in terms of lighting 
is the opening scene before the credits, where the blue fluorescent light washing the bodies of 
the foppish Camorristi creates a surreal and disorienting effect (see Ratner 2009).  
 The multiplication of perspectives and the effect of disorientation that Gomorrah 
achieves make the viewing experience a struggle to oneself within the filmic environment. 
Gomorrah could thus be considered in the context of a “new” kind of realism that becomes 
manifest in films of contemporary world cinema, where paradoxical forms of perspective 
proliferate. In new realism, Elsaesser notes, “The world […] manifests itself as having special 
properties. Relations of size are different, distance and proximity take on equally dangerous 
features, temporal registers no longer line up, terrible or miraculous things can happen” 
(2009d: 9). In such disorienting conditions of cinematic reception, the world is not posited in a 
frame and offered in its entirety to an immobile spectator, but calls for a multiple and almost 
haptic way to relate with it. Radovic observes that in Gomorrah, the field of vision is limited 
to action itself (2009: 7). I would add that in this film, vision comes after action, as it is 
through a painstaking process of adjustment and orientation that we finally get to see (visually 
perceive) what happens.  
 
Complex narration in Gomorrah  
 Through its shifts in scale, focus and point of view, Gomorrah prompts the spectator to 
relate to the film through movement, displacement and re-orientation. But Gomorrah does not 
produce dislocation only through editing and cinematography, but also through the syuzhet, 
creating shifts from one story and character to the other. Thus, I would argue that Gomorrah 
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reproduces at the level of storytelling the spatial complexity of its visual composition. The 
latter can thus be placed not only in the context of the well-established (modernist, neorealist, 
and, in terms of theme, gangster film) cinematic traditions, but also in that of the 
contemporary ‘complex narrative’ tendency, which produces its own characteristic visual 
modes.  
 The script of Gomorrah, loosely based on the homonymous book of Saviano (first 
published in 2006 in Italy), is a product of collaboration between Garrone, Saviano and six 
more scriptwriters. To some extent reflecting the multiple processes followed in the writing of 
its script, Gomorrah has a multiple-thread plot structure, which the director has characterized 
as episodic,123 a term often used to indicate anthology-like or multi-plot films. Although 
Garrone refers to Roberto Rossellini’s Paisà (Paisan, 1946) as a source of inspiration (Garrone 
2008), the episodes of Gomorrah are extremely interwoven in comparison to Rossellini’s film. 
Thus, Gomorrah also stands close, in my view, to more recent ‘complex narrative’ films, such 
as Short Cuts and Pulp Fiction. As Radovic observes, “The narrative of Gomorrah, 
understandably, doesn’t follow a single or a straight line. It twists, turns and ducks for cover 
just like the gangsters do” (2009: 7).  
 If we separate the main plot threads of Gomorrah we get five different ‘stories’ or 
episodes. Providing each character with a number we have the following distribution: 1 for 
Don Ciro, 2 for Toto, 3 for Marco and Ciro (who act together), 4 for Roberto and 5 for 
Pasquale. The fragments of episodes appear in the film in the following order:  
1-2-1-2-3-4-5-2-1-2-4-3-5-1-2-4-1-3-2-1-5-2-1-4-5-3 
From this depiction one may see that the parallel stories of Don Ciro and Toto form something 
like the ‘axis’ of the film. The film (re)turns seven times to each of the episodes of Don Ciro 
and Toto and four times to each other episode. Most of the time, the scenes of Don Ciro and 
Toto are placed next to each other, because of the common place (of the housing complex) 
they share, although the two characters never meet. In terms of duration devoted to each 
character’s episode, the distribution is more even. The elliptical narration and the 
discontinuous editing effectuate an internal fragmentation of the episodes, so that the viewer 
has to get accustomed to an interrupted rhythm as s/he watches one and the same sequence of 
action. For instance, we see Don Ciro in his house putting on a bullet-proof jacket, then 
walking past Maria at the passageway in front of her house, trying to ignore her cries (because 
any interaction between them could prove dangerous for both, after the ‘betrayal’ of Maria’s 
son) and then at the parking lot on the lower level of the housing complex, hiding behind a 
cement column. With this by cuts interrupted ‘start-and-pause’ rhythm each episode or 
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episodic piece (i.e. sequence belonging to one of the separate plot-threads) is multiplied in its 
own space and duration.  
 With its multiplicity of stories, Gomorrah displays characteristics of the forms of 
narration that have been more broadly called “post-classical”: “A preliminary look into the 
narrative construction of these […] films shows a clear preference for multiple protagonists 
who participate in different stories that diverge and converge at different paces within the 
same film” (Thanouli 2008: 10). But how does Gomorrah ‘fit into’ the different typologies of 
‘narrative complexity’?  
 In the typology of modular narratives that Cameron suggests, he distinguishes a group 
of “episodic” narrative films, “organized as an abstract series or narrative anthology”. Here he 
classifies multiple-protagonist films such as Alejandro González Inárritu’s 21 Grams and 
Babel (Cameron 2008: 6, 13-15). Gomorrah, with its episodic structure, shares common 
elements with such modular narratives but would probably not be considered one by Cameron, 
who gives priority to the temporal dimension of modularity. For example, we do not find 
moments in Gomorrah when the temporal sequence that the spectator has so far been 
following is subverted.124 However, even though Gomorrah does not lead to such reordering 
of the temporal sequence, its episodes are far from following an uninterrupted temporal 
progression. They are fragmented into pieces that interpenetrate with those of other episodes. 
Moreover, they are composed by shots and scenes that are loosely—and often abruptly, due to 
the discontinuous editing—connected to each other. 
 Gomorrah’s narrative structure is also reminiscent of Bordwell’s network narratives, 
because of the different, autonomous characters and stories it contains. But it is not the 
interactions between characters that form Gomorrah’s network, because almost all encounters 
and interactions are suspended in this film. Thus, while the films that Bordwell discusses as 
network narratives contain stories that crisscross each other sooner or later, in Gomorrah such 
crisscrossing is, if not completely absent, then significantly downplayed. Don Ciro and Toto 
walk in the same streets but never meet. The link that indirectly connects them is primarily the 
setting—the housing complex where they both live—and the character of Maria, who is both a 
friend of Don Ciro and the mother of Toto’s best friend. Like Toto and Don Ciro, the other 
main characters of Gomorrah never interact with each other and the five stories stay 
autonomous throughout the film (despite being interwoven through editing), in a way that 
differentiates Gomorrah from ‘network narratives’ such as Short Cuts or Magnolia.  
 Every narrative is composed by separate elements, which are sooner or later connected 
in a causal-logical sequence. Narrative elements (such as characters) are not introduced to 
recipients unless they have a role to play in the succession of the story and its ultimate 
coherence towards the end. Thus, even in narratives that resist unification, such as ‘network 
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narratives’, the strangers will at some point intersect, if not through tight causality then 
through chance, and their contribution to the larger picture will become clear. However, in 
some exceptional cases, like Gomorrah, these intersections are suspended: the separate stories 
composing the narrative network do not ever come together; there is no final unification in 
Gomorrah, neither an overall dramatic culmination, as Michael Covino observes (2009: 75). 
Our (hypothetical) wish for a miraculous or chance-driven intervention that would unite the 
separate destinies of Gomorrah’s characters and produce a sense of humane affection (like it 
happens in Magnolia, Babel and Crash) is left unfulfilled. In this respect, Gomorrah 
resembles the films that Bordwell characterizes as “borderline cases” of network narratives. 
For example, referring to the film Slacker (R. Linklater, 1991) he observes: “The story action 
doesn’t bring the characters face-to-face, and the narration doesn’t bare unexpected 
connections among them” (Bordwell 2007: 215). This phrase could also be used to describe 
the diegetic interactions in Gomorrah. 
 Like the films that have been characterized as “forking-path” (Bordwell) or “possible 
world” (Perlmutter) films, it can be argued that Gomorrah also creates a (subtle) play between 
potentiality and actuality, highlighting the presence of the former in every choice taken. At the 
same time it suggests that perhaps it is not contingency but necessity that drives the 
characters’ choices. The potentials are not endless in the sense that all choices are pragmatic. 
They are driven by the instinct for survival and adaptation to changing and uncertain 
conditions. Thus, choices in Gomorrah depend on the specific ‘starting conditions’ given to 
each character: when Don Ciro realizes that the inhabitants of Scampia have never been 
‘brothers’, as he liked to fantasize, he is forced to take sides in order to keep himself safe from 
harm, even if this means to betray his former peers. Toto decides to join Giovanni’s clan but 
then he is forced to cooperate in the murder of Maria. Marco and Ciro decide to work as 
autonomous gangsters but they are also forced to stay out of the way. Pasquale has been 
exploited by his boss for his whole life, but when he decides to work autonomously, he is 
forced to either stay subordinated or lose his job. Roberto is placed in the waste disposal 
business out of financial necessity, but when he realizes that his ethics is not as ‘flexible’ as 
that of his boss, he is obliged to quit his job. 
 A series of events compose every episode, each of which culminates with the 
protagonist suffering the consequences of their choices. However, Gomorrah does not ever 
give up on demonstrating a type of agency that could be characterized as “performative” (see 
Elsaesser 2006: 216). There is a tension created between choices for integration into the 
System and choices for autonomy. But this tension does not suggest a binary opposition 
between the two: all stories are placed in a continuum between integration and autonomy, with 
each character occupying a different position in this continuum, and testing the degrees of 
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freedom left to him. Individual heroes with their different motives, either sense of community 
(Don Ciro), need for a job (Roberto), need for self-respect (Pasquale), ambition (Ciro and 
Marco), or just ‘feel for the game’ (Toto), they all try their chances to survive in or outside the 
System. This game between integration and autonomy can be distinguished in all of the stories 
developed—in terms of plot structure—in parallel, creating a pattern that connects the 
characters despite their physical and communicative disconnection.  
 As Saviano writes in the book Gomorrah, referring to the people who live in the 
broader area of Naples: “For the people who haven’t been born here, this place doesn’t mean 
anything. All guilty, all forgiven” (Saviano 2007; translation mine). It is the belonging to the 
place that makes them guilty, and this same belonging that gives them redemption, because 
they are unable to break free from it.125 But the film Gomorrah persists in exploring this 
(in)ability, catching the dynamism of the System in a perpetual present—spatially multiplied 
through the presents of a number of protagonists—where possibilities, however limited, are 
still up for grabs. The film thus emphasizes not only the kind of ‘resisting’ agency similar to 
the one that the character of Roberto shows (considered by various critics as the fictional 
counterpart of Saviano in the film), but perhaps, even more, the agency that is exerted through 
every choice and action taken inside the System.126   
 Thus, although the network of Camorra seems to extend far beyond the miserable 
suburbs of Naples and its dwellers, swallowing every possibility for change inside its muddy 
harbor and toxic land, Gomorrah insists in posing dilemmas and testing its characters, keeping 
them in a continuous movement; not only an external and physical but also an internal and 
psychological movement. At the same time, the viewers are placed in a similar position with 
the characters, continuously prompted to shift to different contemporaneous trajectories and to 
adapt to an ever-changing cinematic and diegetic environment, in which the separate stories of 
Gomorrah develop.  
 
Multiplicity and transmediality in Gomorrah  
 Storytelling as such is not rejected in Gomorrah, the way it is in fundamentally non-
narrative films (such as actuality films, experimental and art films, certain documentaries 
etc.—filmic categories in which, of course, none of the “complex films” discussed in this 
thesis can be included). But what we can see in Gomorrah and other films of the complex 
narrative tendency is how narrative itself becomes in them the object of a non-narrative 
composition, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Moreover, Gomorrah 
is not open-ended in the same way that other complex films are, such as the oft-cited Run Lola 
Run, Fight Club and Donnie Darko, or the previously discussed The Final Cut and Burn After 
Reading. All separate stories in Gomorrah are given some kind of closure, depending on how 
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each character finally negotiates his inclusion into the System. Although Gomorrah contains 
stories that have a certain beginning, middle and end, the film’s purpose is not, in my view, 
solely to narrate these stories but rather to describe a world in which all episodes unfold. Even 
though Gomorrah ‘closes’ narratively five times (as all five episodes have some kind of 
resolution), it still remains open-ended, as I am now going to explain.  
 Following Gomorrah, the viewer is called to compose its world by inhabiting it before 
knowing it. In the same way that action and movement precede vision, facing, naming, and 
ultimately knowing—in the sense of rational grasping of an object—are suspended. After the 
end of the film, though, right before the end credits, Gomorrah seems to be endorsing—along 
with the book—naming. Thus, it ‘names’ Camorra and gives us in titles information about its 
international action in the actual world, from the drug trafficking to the waste disposal; the 
concluding title refers to Camorra’s investment in the reconstruction of the Twin Towers, after 
the 9/11 attack. Especially in the case that the viewer lacks previous information, but also 
because of the film’s avoidance of sharing it—which affects all viewers no matter how 
informed they are—these ‘facts’ displayed at the very end have a shocking impact. It is of 
course a common practice in films ‘based on a true story’ to communicate to the viewers real 
facts before the end titles. However, I think that this kind of naming has a special importance 
in the case of Gomorrah, because of its contrast with the rest of the film.127 
 From one aspect, the information shared at the end allows us a somewhat more 
coherent grip on the stories retrospectively. It does not however allow us to construct a 
narrative that will include all the separate stories. We cannot reinterpret the film as the ‘story 
of Camorra’; actually, we still know nothing about Camorra. The information at the end 
creates a post-filmic link that connects the film’s storyworld to the world out there, or now-
here, in which we find ourselves equally disoriented, at the very moment that we think that we 
may finally achieve some orientation in the diegetic universe. Gomorrah gives us a clue to 
understand what has been going on in the plot so far; at the same time it points at what 
remains incomprehensible, that is, the workings of our actual world and the role of Camorra in 
it. The suffocating feeling created in the film is thus extended beyond the diegesis. Thus, what 
appears as ‘knowledge’ at the very end of Gomorrah, when the film’s network is given the 
name of Camorra, is rather the introduction of uncertainty at a higher level. Without naming 
the System it refers to, Gomorrah manages to posit the viewer inside its inescapable world; the 
ending of the film makes our actual world appear contained in the one of Camorra, instead of 
the other way around. The recipient is thus addressed by the film not only as spectator or 
narratee but also as a node in a larger network, that of global economy and the systems it 
supports and is supported by, such as the criminal system of Camorra.128  
	  
 
138 
 Through its multi-thread and multi-character plot structure, Gomorrah partakes in a 
larger group of world cinema and also big studio productions (such as those discussed in Part 
2) that share the “network narrative” format.129 Apart from partaking in this narrative 
tendency, however, the film of Gomorrah creates its own networks that supersede the film 
itself as an individual unit and expand into the broader media sphere. As already argued, with 
its closing the film on the one hand gives the viewer a clue to fill some gaps of understanding, 
on the other hand though, it leaves him/her baffled about the workings of Camorra. This 
reveals the ‘transmedia’ character of the film: it is by reading Saviano’s book and collecting 
information from other sources that a clearer picture of Camorra, as well as of what has been 
going on in the film, can be gained.  
 Transmediality has been pointed out as a feature of the literary movement into which 
the book of Gomorrah has been classified, according to Wu Ming 1 (2008).130 This 
movement, named New Italian Epic,131 has a manifest tendency to create “transmedial 
communities”, stimulated by the participatory spirit of the novels themselves as well as that of 
their writers. So there have been various “spin-offs” from New Italian Epics: films and TV 
series, video-games and board games, internet communities, theatrical plays, music etc. (Wu 
Ming 1 2008).132  
 Based on a ‘New Italian Epic’ (Saviano’s book), the film Gomorrah also shows a 
collective spirit, on the level both of screenwriting (by its six scriptwriters) and textual 
composition (with its multiple characters and episodes). It also shares with New Italian Epics 
the feature of transmediality, adding more nodes to the network that the preexisting book 
started. Henry Jenkins, one of the most oft-cited theorists of transmediality, considers this 
feature to be related to the multiplicity of characters within the diegesis, as well as to the open-
endedness of the latter.  As he points out,  
transmedia stories are based not on individual characters or specific plots but 
rather complex fictional worlds which can sustain multiple interrelated characters 
and their stories. This process of world-building encourages an encyclopedic 
impulse in both readers and writers. We are drawn to master what can be known 
about a world which always expands beyond our grasp. This is a very different 
pleasure than we associate with the closure found in most classically constructed 
narratives, where we expect to leave the theatre knowing everything that is 
required to make sense of a particular story. (Jenkins 2007; emphasis mine)  
Gomorrah is of course in many respects different from the film examples that Jenkins brings 
about.133 But it also has significant similarities with the complex transmedia objects he 
describes. The process of ‘world building’ is encouraged in Gomorrah both in the relationship 
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between spectator and screen—due to the obscure and disorienting style and editing—and also 
in the relationship between the spectator and the world beyond the film, a world which is no 
less obscure and complex.  
 The film Gomorrah—as well as my approach of it—ends with an ‘observation’ of its 
diegetic world in relation to our world,134 not to create a coherent narrative, but to produce 
further complexity, as it now embeds an environment of other systems, and creates more 
connections between them. Thus Gomorrah forms a complex system both internally and 
diegetically, and externally, being itself a node in economical, social and cultural networks of 
which the film partakes and creates. The complex diegetic space of the film reproduces in a 
fractal way the complex space of its environment, to which viewers and social subjects have to 
adapt by developing new skills of orientation. In the following chapter, I will argue that the 
mode of organization under which Gomorrah subsumes narrative can be compared with that 
of description in literary theory. This mode has implications upon the viewer’s construction of 
the diegetic space as an emergent world.  
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8. Complex space: Narrating and describing   
   
The ‘obscure’ space of Gomorrah and the disorienting effect that the film creates gives me the 
chance to have a closer look at the relationship between space and narrative in film, and to 
question whether the construction of space in contemporary ‘complex narrative’ films differs 
from that of classical narratives. In narratology space is conceived as a layered composition of 
the places where the story unfolds. However, I find that in contemporary complex narratives, 
space more generally adheres to a discontinuous arrangement of filmic elements (that are not 
always locales), which needs to be addressed in its heterogeneity. In these films we find 
different and often contradicting geographical and ontological levels that coexist in the filmic 
text (for example, in Run Lola Run), while the films themselves are visually and narrationally 
discontinuous (like Gomorrah). Taking this heterogeneity into account, I will suggest that 
description, in its particular relation to space, is an equally or even more appropriate term than 
narration when we approach the mode of discourse of complex films.135 Description places 
emphasis on the individuality of each unit out of which an image, a scene or a story is 
composed. It also allows for a discontinuous approach to the world of the text, foregrounding 
the text’s spatial character as it creates relations between entities simultaneously present. Thus, 
I will look into the history of the term in literary theory and narratology, where description, 
although intrinsic to narrative, has always been considered antithetical to the latter’s 
temporally progressive mode of presentation. A change of hierarchy between description and 
narrative in complex films has implications for the modes of reception as well, and creates 
doubt as to whether the types of sense-making associated with narrative are appropriate when 
it comes to the spatialized forms of reception that these films put forth. 
 
The ‘complex of space’ in cinema and narrative 
 Space is an important axis around which the viewer composes the story world of a 
film. It is an abstract relationship between entities, a spatial arrangement, that the term ‘space’ 
primarily implies. Yet there can be a connection between this space and the topographic space 
(the locations) in which the action unfolds. Film theorist André Gardies distinguishes between 
four types of spaces in cinema: the cinematographic space (with its iconic, verbal and musical 
modes of signification), the diegetic space, the narrative space, in which space becomes an 
“actant” and serves the development of the story (as the order of the places presented might be 
telling their own story), and the space of the spectator. His conception of diegetic space is of 
particular interest here, since it connects the notion of space with that of place, but also 
differentiates between the two. Gardies sees the place as actualizing space, and making it 
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visible to the viewer. Thus, the places, i.e. all location marks appearing in the text of the film, 
are paroles—in Saussurian terms—through which the spatial system of the film (as langue) is 
composed. The place adheres to perception while the space to cognition (Gardies 1993: 90). 
 In narrative theory but also in film theory,136 we mostly find conceptions of space tied 
to its ‘topographical’ aspects, in the sense of locations that are cognitively composed in larger 
arrangements. Summarizing the existing literary-narratological literature on space, Ryan 
distinguishes between five different levels of space in narratives, which can also be considered 
to be spatial ‘layers’, because they are not exclusive but coexistent, each one extending and 
completing the other. Thus, according to Ryan’s classification, there are the “spatial frames”, 
defined as “the immediate surroundings of actual events, the various locations shown by the 
narrative discourse or by the image”. Then, there is the “setting”, which corresponds to “the 
general socio-historico-geographical environment in which the action takes place”. The 
category/layer of “story space” refers to “the space relevant to the plot, as mapped by the 
actions and thoughts of the characters”. The story space contains the immediate surroundings 
of the action plus other mentioned locations. The “narrative (or story) world” is “the story 
space completed by the reader’s imagination on the basis of cultural knowledge and real world 
experience”. The narrative world corresponds to the construction of a coherent space in which 
the various places of the narrative form a unity in the mind of the reader/viewer. Lastly, the 
layer of the “narrative universe” is superimposed on other layers and refers to “the world (in 
the spatio-temporal sense of the term) presented as actual by the text, plus all the 
counterfactual worlds constructed by the characters as beliefs, wishes, fears, speculations, 
hypothetical thinking, dreams, and fantasies” (Ryan 2011: paragraphs 9-13). As it becomes 
apparent especially in this last category, the spatial-topographical aspects of narratives are 
interwoven with ontological aspects, concerning different levels of reality being involved.  
 In Gomorrah, the category of ‘setting’ remains rather obscure, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. But also the ‘spatial frames’ in the same film acquire strange dimensions and 
properties because of the multiple ‘shifts’ effectuated by the camera work and editing. The 
‘story space’ becomes difficult to compose through the vague and often out-of-context 
mentioning of places. The levels of narrative world and narrative universe are rather abstract 
and depend on the cognitive processing of each viewer. This processing is arguably affected 
by the way each of the other spatial levels is constituted. 
 A general remark that Ryan makes is that the narratological conception and 
categorization of space is done retrospectively, “from a static perspective as the final products 
of interpretation”. However, in the process of reading, the different layers of space mentioned 
above are gradually constituted. When a text provides information about places it could be 
said that it describes. Narrative is coupled with purposeful action, as discussed in Chapter 5, 
	  
 
142 
and topographical space (or place) is not just described as in tourist guides but narrated, only 
as long as it serves the unfolding of events. As Ryan notes, “We may call the dynamic 
presentation of spatial information the textualization of space [she refers to Gabriel Zoran’s 
“textual level” of space—see Zoran 1984]. This textualization becomes a narrativization when 
space is not described for its own sake, as it would be in a tourist guide, but becomes the 
setting of an action that develops in time” (Ryan 2011: par.14). However, sometimes whole 
narrative segments and the action unfolding through them can be described, as we will see 
later in this chapter, but this implies a step away from the topographical conception of space 
(which I find more precisely defined as ‘place’) and into the cognitive one. 
 A process of cognitive layering involved in the construction of space by the viewer—
and not necessarily bound to location markers—has informed film narratology. In Narration 
in the Fiction Film Bordwell divides the scenographic space (the space we perceive in the end 
product of a film)137 in three—both on-screen and off-screen—subspaces: the “shot space”, 
the “editing space”, and the “sonic space” (1985: 113). The shot space includes the texture, 
“atmospheric perspective” (manipulated by the lens focus, the depth of field and various 
effects that can be used), light of objects or bodies on the screen, movement of figures, etc. 
(114). All these features are the ways in which a shot can provide us with spatial cues. 
Different cues are provided by the editing, which demands from the viewer to construct an 
“intershot space” (117), aided by his or her short and long-term memory, as well as cognitive 
schemata and (narrative) cause and effect sequences that act as links between the separate 
shots and scenes.138 Thus, the construction of the space of a series of shots (the editing space), 
involves a process of cognitive and temporal layering, between the spatial cues that we have 
already collected and the ones that follow. Sonic space is created by the composition of voice 
and sound, and its texture depends on the distance of the microphone from the action, the 
stereo or mono recording as well as many other technical choices.  
 Space in narratives has been called “a complex”, in the sense that it consists of 
multiple interwoven layers.139 The borders between these spatial layers, which can 
retrospectively fall into theoretical categories such as the ones mentioned by Ryan, are not 
always brought to the attention of the reader/viewer by the text. In classical Hollywood films, 
narrative—even in its dynamical and temporal unfolding and not in retrospect—achieves a 
seamless interlocking of these layers into a multi-layered whole, ‘a complex’ that subsumes its 
elements. While a viewer follows the film, their attention is not attracted to the borders 
between different spatial layers but is aided to construct the complex of space in a way that 
does not disturb their immersion to the story. This is exactly the service of continuity editing, 
which was the bedrock of classical Hollywood cinema.  
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 The textual organization of space in films (in terms of shot space, editing space and 
sonic space, to use Bordwell’s categories) and the way it is composed through cinematography 
and editing arguably affects the cognitive organization of the story world on behalf of the 
viewer. In certain complex narrative films, the continuity of editing space is often disrupted, 
but also the shot space becomes discontinuous, as pastiche techniques are used in the shot 
composition. Thus, as I am going to argue, complex films, the visual space of which has been 
characterized as “discontinuous and opaque” (Thanouli 2006: 193), foreground a 
heterogeneous distribution and spatial composition of elements, rather than a smooth layering 
of levels. This heterogeneity becomes manifest in their syuzhet as well.  
 The juxtaposition of heterogeneous spatial elements is a characteristic of complex 
films. Let us take as an example Tom Tykwer’s Run Lola Run (Lola Rennt 1998), one of the 
most oft-cited films of the 1990s complex narrative tendency. Tykwer’s film is characterized 
by spatio-temporal discontinuity in a number of different analytical levels (scene, plot, story). 
In Run Lola Run, the diegetic space or “story space”, in Ryan’s terms, is constructed out of 
bits and pieces of contemporary Berlin. Thus the film creates, according to Everett, “a 
hyperrealist architecture” of the city, which functions in a way reminiscent of Foucault’s city 
as heterotopia: “juxtaposing in a single real space, several sites that are in themselves 
incompatible” (Everett 2005: 167).140 Run Lola Run performs such juxtaposition not only in 
terms of story space but also in terms of editing space. Visually, the film uses abrupt inserts of 
animation and Polaroid stills. There is also a fast transition between different and 
discontinuous points of view, aided by dizzying vertical and horizontal zooms and swirling 
camera movements (in this respect, Everett comments on the shift from the aerial to the street 
view in the beginning of Run Lola Run). In terms of sound, Run Lola Run is a collage of loud 
techno beat, street sounds, silence and dialogue. Regarding the plot-level, the film contains 
three alternative forks of Lola’s destiny. Michael Wedel points at the film’s “discontinuity” in 
sonic rhythm, in editing, in space, and in plot structure. As to the latter, he refers to the way 
the plot does not progress in a linear temporal sequence but returns to specific starting points 
to unfold again differently, providing Lola, the protagonist, with three alternative destinies 
(2009: 144-145). The alternative destinies of Lola coexist not only in the syuzhet but also in 
the fabula, as the film does not allow us to reject any of them as false as we construct the 
story.141 I would argue that the temporal discontinuity of the plot in Run Lola Run, with its 
iterative rhythm, is also a spatial discontinuity at the cognitive level of the film’s composition. 
This happens as long as the spectator has to place the three alternatives of the plot as 
coexistent albeit heterogeneous pieces in the same cognitive space.  
 In Gomorrah, discontinuity is found between episodes but also between and within 
shots. The scene composition in this film is elliptical, omitting large segments of action in a 
	  
 
144 
sequence (for example at the scene where Don Ciro goes out of his house, described in the 
previous chapter) and also discontinuous, in terms of an abrupt transition from shot to shot. 
Moreover, the mise-en-scene contains multiple layers, both in depth, when action unfolds 
simultaneously in the foreground and the background—with the two sometimes disconnected 
through shifts in the lens focus—and on the vertical axis, especially in the scenes shot at the 
housing complex, in which different action going on at its different levels is placed in the 
same frame.  
 Narrationally, discontinuity is produced in Gomorrah due to the ‘uncontaminated 
mixing’ of the different episodes. The shift from one character/episode to the other is at the 
same time a shift in point of view and location. This creates a spatialized cognitive experience 
of the diegesis, which also has to do with the film’s withholding of what Zoran calls global 
information: 
When the global information appears at an early stage in the description, the 
concrete items join in later on, and the picture takes on a unified character. On the 
other hand, it is possible to delay the appearance of this global information, in 
which case the individual items appear—at least for a while—without clear-cut 
context, and one receives the impression of a non-unified, disconnected space. 
(1984: 322)  
In the case of Gomorrah, the “global information” is the information provided at the end, 
about how the individual stories connect to each other, through the common denominator of 
Camorra. The fact that the film withholds this information (in an extreme degree, unlike what 
happens in other ‘network’ films) places its separate episodes in a disconnected space. 
 Narrative construction, as a spatio-temporal composition that needs to impose some 
degree of (causal-logical) coherence to the story it forms, is arguably affected by the 
discontinuity observed in films of the complex narrative tendency. I find that three aspects of 
textual narrative structure, as indicated by Zoran (1984: 320), are challenged to a greater or 
lesser degree by these films: “the essential selectivity”, “the temporal continuum” and the 
“point of view”. Thus, complex films do not select (only one character/plot thread/version 
upon an event). It often happens that there is no one finite version of events. The development 
of the films is done in a non-sequential way and by following an iterative rhythm, revisiting 
persons and events. Moreover, films of the complex narrative tendency often include a 
multiplicity of viewpoints (for example, as multi-character films do), which sometimes 
contradict each other, as happens in Pulp Fiction, for instance. The multiplicity of viewpoints 
offers the viewer different and constantly shifting entry points into the diegesis. This keeps the 
viewer in a state of dis/re-location, as s/he is never comfortably following one single story or 
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story version, but has to cognitively juxtapose and ‘juggle’ alternatives. This has an overall 
spatializing effect upon narrative.  
 It is not just the illumination of the spatial layering that every text or every artwork 
creates but the way that films such as Run Lola Run ‘produce’ space (to borrow Lefebvre’s 
expression) out of their diegetic pieces, that is of interest here. While we may a priori separate 
different spatial layers and look at how they are embedded/connected to each other, or how 
individual texts activate them, as most narratological theories of space do, it is a different 
strategy that we need to follow in order to account for the spatialized experience that many 
complex films evoke, through the tensed juxtaposition of diegetic units—which are 
highlighted in their heterogeneity (audiovisually and narrationally) rather than unified. 
Moreover, it is not by following the temporal unfolding of the story that viewers gradually 
construct the complex of space, as it happens in every story. Rather, a spatialized perception of 
the different units becomes the primary contact zone between the film and the viewer, and this 
infiltrates the viewer’s following of the story. As Thanouli observes, “in films like Fight Club, 
Lola Rennt, Trainspotting or Magnolia we are asked to follow the action in a fragmented 
manner and to construct the story out of excessively intermittent diegetic pieces” (2006: 191). 
The piecemeal articulation of stories spatializes narrative, and in a sense adjusts it to the larger 
complex filmic space, of which narrative becomes one constitutive element. 
 Everett names many of the films belonging in the complex narrative tendency 
“fractal”. Fractal films express, according to Everett, “a new narrative and spatial awareness 
based on multiplicity, simultaneity and fragmentation” (2005: 160). Multiplicity, simultaneity 
and fragmentation, are the properties that in literary theory have been associated with 
description as opposed to narrative. Description arguably occupies a central position in 
contemporary complex films, and prioritizes the spatial juxtaposition of textual elements over 
that of the causal-temporal transformation of narrative.  
 
Literary theories of description  
 There has been a tension drawn in both literary and film theoretical tradition between 
narrative and description. The traditional view of narrative considers it to be distinct from 
description, because description does not conform to the overall causal and temporal 
succession of the story; it rather suspends time and action. This tension between description 
and narrative is not new. It comes from the period of Enlightenment and its system of ideas 
and was systematically treated by Lessing in his distinction between temporal and spatial arts, 
and particularly literature and painting. Joseph Frank notes that Lessing used to advise poets to 
give emphasis on action and not on description, because action fits the linear temporality of 
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language (Frank 1978: 282). In the same vein, descriptive passages in narratives have been 
considered extra-narrative prostheses rather than organic parts of narrative.  
 In narratology as well as in literary criticism, description is traditionally considered 
spatial, while narration is thought of as temporal. However, since space and time cannot be 
separated, both forms express their own temporality. The temporality of narrative differs from 
the one of description, Todorov contends, as the former pertains to a successive unfolding of 
time—through the changes and ‘events’ that are the constitutive units of narratives—while the 
latter to the “perpetual present” of poetry (1971: 39, 42). As he notes elsewhere, logical order 
(causality) and temporal order (succession) are the fundamental processes of fiction, whereas 
poetry has a distinct, spatial order, based on repetition (Todorov 1977: 136).142  
 There have been periods in literary and art history where the descriptive and spatial 
aspects of texts come to the fore. Description has been a central characteristic of baroque art 
and poetry, as Genette notes (1976: 6). The development of narrative, however, gave 
prevalence to another, “symbolic and explicatory” function of description, for example in the 
novels of Balzac, where the description of things is expressive of the inner life of the 
characters, and thus in a way serves the development of the narrative. Like Todorov, Genette 
finds that description has a spatial character that brings it closer to poetry, while “narration 
puts emphasis on the temporal and dramatic aspects of narrative” (1976: 7). Description 
lingers on objects, turning actions into “scenes” (7). The word scene is relevant to the 
arrangement of objects in space: 
[…] narration restores, in the temporal succession of its discourse, the equally 
temporal succession of events, while description has to model in successiveness 
the representation of objects coexisting and juxtaposed in space.143  
Genette finds the case of Balzac exemplary because of the harmonic coexistence of 
description and narration in his novels. In general, for Genette, description comes to serve the 
needs of the dramatic unfolding of the diegesis, and thus is in a sense subordinate to narrative 
(1976: 6).  
 The revival of description in late modernist novels such as those of Robbe-Grillet is 
seen by Genette as just an attempt (certainly innovative) to constitute narrative by descriptive 
means:  
it appears clearly that description as a mode of literary representation does not 
distinguish itself sharply enough from narration, either by the autonomy of its ends 
or the originality of its means, to make it necessary to break the narrative-
descriptive unit (with the narration dominating) which Plato and Aristotle named 
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narrative. If description marks a boundary of narrative, it is an internal and rather 
ill-defined boundary. (Genette 1976: 7)  
 ‘Spatial’ representation of objects and people (description) may be included in 
narratives, but, according to Genette, it has just a supportive role and never becomes their 
defining characteristic. Rather, Genette considers the temporal progression of action and 
events to be the defining characteristic of narratives. Spatial dimensions of texts, like 
description and self-reflexive reference (the latter here discussed in Part 1), are thus 
considered to be in a constant internal tension with narrative.  
 In his article “Spatial form: Some further reflections”, Frank refers to Genette’s essay 
“Borders of Narrative”, and to the discussion of self-reflexive discourse and description 
therein. In this article, Genette refers to the novels of Robbe-Grillet, which he reads as 
somehow extreme examples of how description, even when occupying the entire text, still 
remains subordinate to narrative, as it is, in Genette’s view, ultimately stories that Robbe-
Grillet’s novels tell. Frank, despite being a big admirer of Genette (as well as of Todorov) and 
considering this specific essay of his “brilliant”, he nonetheless comments: “Whether one can 
still speak of description as subordinate in a work composed exclusively of the variation of 
descriptive fragments seems very doubtful; but disagreement on this point does not detract 
from the usefulness of Genette’s categories” (1978: 287). Frank uses Genette’s insights in the 
“Frontiers” essay in order to hint at the connection between description and a text’s “spatial 
form”—which will be discussed in the last chapter. 
 There have been, however, scholars who studied description and descriptive genres in 
their autonomy from narrative. From this perspective, perhaps the ‘canonical’ theorist of 
description in literature is Philippe Hamon. Hamon explicitly relates description to notions 
such as “piece”, “fragment”, or “detail” (Hamon 1981: 24). He also connects it to the 
paradigmatic dimension of a text, as opposed to its syntagmatic one, which prevails in 
narration. The effect of temporal ‘delay’ that we find in an extreme degree in Gomorrah and 
also in many ‘network’ films, this suspension of “global information”, in Zoran’s terms, is 
characteristic of description. Hamon explains how description creates a “digression” and 
“expansion” (amplification) of the text and its temporality (1981: 96-97). As long as the 
temporal dimension is concerned, Hamon calls the descriptive system synchronic and he 
differentiates it from the diachronic system of narrative (1981: 18). There are specific 
mechanisms that hold the descriptive system together synchronically, such as parallels and 
antitheses, and “subsystems of equivalences (analogies, comparisons, metaphors)” (Hamon 
1981: 131).  
 Hamon makes a historical link between description and topographical space. In literary 
critique, description had somehow been neglected and considered a qualitatively inferior part 
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of the text, but a change of attitude can be observed in the end of the 18th century. Then, 
description becomes visible (especially in prose poetry) as a textual unity worth of 
investigation in the European circles of literary critique, especially in France. Among the other 
factors that contributed to this ‘visibility’ of description has been, according to Hamon, “the 
spreading of travels and the creation of the notion of ‘site’, classified in the Guides, cultural 
objects to visit with the Baedeker at hand” (1981: 24).144 The reference to places, sites and 
‘details seen’, made the textual mode of description more prominent.  
 Not only the descriptive gains ground in texts because of cultural transformations 
affecting the notion of space,145 but also the experience of the recipient becomes spatial in his 
or her encounter with description. Hamon points out that the object of description (for the one 
who describes, but also for the one who follows the description) is considered “a surface, a 
space, rationalized-rationalizable, articulated, fragmented, segregated” (1981: 61).146 
Description and its “aesthetics of fragment”—with manifest influence, according to Hamon, 
upon the European realist tradition—favours the staging of a discourse of transit (“discours de 
parcours”), in which “mobile persons cross and link these juxtaposed spaces” (62).147 This 
mode of discourse that description stands for is different from that of narration. The latter can 
also be compared to a ‘journey’ (parcours), but this journey is always towards a destination.  
 Description at once encompasses two seemingly opposite tendencies, one towards 
fragmentation and another towards linkage of the fragments. This linkage does not however 
surpass the aesthetics of the fragment, but rather coexists with it. The pieces maintain their 
heterogeneity, and it is through this heterogeneity that a world comes to existence: describing 
the pieces is a way, according to Hamon, to build a “lived space” or a chronology and situate 
oneself within it (1981: 57). Description thus, I would add, fleshes out “experimental 
constructed realities”, to use Hamon’s expression, for both words/terms (in a text) and 
readers/recipients to feel at place.  
 The linkage of pieces implies a systemic quality of description. Description does not 
contradict the systemic logic, by suggesting a juxtaposition of elements without any 
connection to each other. As Hamon points out, description at once creates heterogeneous 
pieces, and operates on them by linking the pieces in a different way than narrative does. 
Thus, description proposes a different connection between units, prioritizing spatial disparity 
over temporal progression. Hamon refers to the way description creates a topos—literally ‘a 
place’ and figuratively a pattern or motif—and this happens only as soon as there is some sort 
of organization to the otherwise dispersed elements: he notices that both in Jules Verne and 
Emile Zola, and despite the differences in the function of description in the work of each one 
of them, “the topos distributes and puts in correlation certain number of posts, postures, 
objects and subjects, habitats, inhabitants and habits” (1981: 251; emphasis mine). The 
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function of description as topos implies a double movement of distributing and correlating, 
juxtaposing and linking, which is fundamental in description. The space that description 
creates is thus a complex topos, a system or network where heterogenous elements are 
connected through links, rather than placed in a sequence.  
 
Description in film  
 But how does description work in the medium of cinema? Seymour Chatman, perhaps 
the main representative of classical structuralist narratology in film, wrote extensively on the 
role of description in narrative cinema. Among other influences, he drew on the work of 
Hamon and his questioning of the—often presupposed—hierarchical superiority of narrative 
to description. Chatman quotes: “Classical theoreticians seem to have seen in Description only 
a risky ‘drift’ from detail to detail—a process which, among all else, threatens the 
homogeneity, the cohesion and the dignity of the [narrative] work” (Hamon, as cited in 
Chatman 1990: 23). Chatman, like Hamon, also points at the ‘systemic’ qualities of 
description. As he stresses, “Description has a logic of its own, and it is unreasonable to 
belittle it because it does not resemble the chrono-logic of Narration” (1990: 24). Description 
for him renders contiguity (spatial proximity) more important than causality. Thus the 
impression of a “‘putative drift’ from detail to detail” that description creates is not aimless. I 
will use some of Chatman’s remarks on the role of description in cinema in order to argue that 
contemporary complex films do not just question but subvert the hierarchy between 
description and narrative. 
 Chatman does not reject Genette’s contrast between narrative and description in 
cinema; like Genette, he problematizes the role of description in narrative films. In his book 
Story and Discourse (1978) Chatman declares his conviction that “description per se is 
generally impossible in narrative films”. Description in literature is associated with pause and 
lingering; in film, however, “the story-time keeps going as long as images are projected on the 
screen, as long as we feel that the camera continues to run” (74). Thus, ‘pure’ description is 
for Chatman impossible in the medium of film. Films do not permit the ‘lingering’ found in 
literary narratives. In film, even when no action takes place, “the focus remains on the event”. 
Descriptive details, Chatman repeats in Coming to Terms (1990), “can only occur as a 
byproduct of plot action; they do not have a separate existence” (42). Description for Chatman 
is the opposite of the cinematic summary of action; it is “pause, which occurs when story time 
stops, though the discursive statement continues” (1990: 50). Such instances of description as 
pause and lingering is possible in cinema in the case of “freeze frame” (1978: 75), according 
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to Chatman. A freeze frame, instead of serving plot needs, would allow more time to be given 
to objects or persons in the frame “to reveal their own properties” (Chatman 1990: 50). 
 In literature, description is vital exactly because the viewer does not see; in film, 
however, there is a plenum of visual details in every frame that cannot be avoided (40). Films 
do not need to describe because they show. Their modes of description can only be “tacit” and 
not explicit, Chatman contends (38). Thus, on the one hand, film is always descriptive (in 
terms of the “cornucopia of visual details” (40) provided in every frame), on the other hand, it 
is seldom descriptive on purpose. In my view, in both cases of tacit (cinematic) and explicit 
description, the latter is a mode of discourse that demonstrates, even implicitly, a textual 
(describing) agency. 
 In cinema, it is by means of contiguity and parallelism that description might evoke 
patterns connecting disparate images, objects or episodes. In order to reveal the cinematic 
“logic” of description, and the “topos” it creates, in Hamon’s terms, Chatman draws on 
Christian Metz, who identified the descriptive as one of the two chronological syntagmas of 
film, the second being narrative. Metz refers to description in the editing space, and not the 
shot space. Thus, in the chapter “Problems of Denotation in the Fiction Film” from Film 
Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema, Metz defines description as the “absence of 
consecutiveness” and the presence of simultaneity between shots.  
There is one syntagmatic type in which the relationship between all the motifs 
successively presented on the screen is one of simultaneity: the descriptive 
syntagma […]. […] In the descriptive syntagma, the only intelligible relation of 
coexistence between the objects successively shown by the images is a relation of 
spatial coexistence.  (1991: 127)  
Action, one of the main foundations of narrative, is possible to be described instead of 
narrated in cinema, provided that this action is composed by elements, the relation between 
which is one of “spatial parallelism at any given moment in time” (ibid: 128). This is a type of 
action that, as Metz points out, is impossible for the viewer to “mentally string together in 
time” (ibid). To explain this Metz brings the example of “a flock of sheep being herded”, an 
action which is described through a montage of shots of “the sheep, the shepherd, the 
sheepdog, etc.” (1991: 128). It is not that one of these shots precedes the other in a causal-
logical way; rather, they are chronologically simultaneous.  
 Based on Metz’s descriptive syntagma, Chatman defines instances of this kind of 
syntagmas in fiction films as cases of cinematic description. He borrows another example used 
by Metz, that of a landscape described through a shot sequence including “a tree, followed by 
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a shot of a stream running next the tree [sic], followed by a view of a hill in the distance, etc.” 
(Metz 1974: 127, as cited in Chatman 1990: 42). In such instances, Chatman stresses,  
the point is not that the shots are diegetically simultaneous but that story time has 
temporarily been suspended. The [descriptive] shot sequence forms a narrative 
pause. The sign of the pause is precisely the temporally unmotivated shifting from 
one shot to the other. On the other hand, exactly the same sequence of shots would 
be narrative if the preceded or followed shots indicating the eye movements of a 
character looking at something (“first he looked at the tree, then at the stream, then 
at the hills”).  (Chatman 1990: 42)  
In this line of thinking, Chatman suggests that “camera movements that have no other motive 
(for instance, to communicate a character’s perception of a scene) are often purely descriptive” 
(43). Thus, apart from freeze frames, there is another mode of cinematic description, and this 
is the parallelism of objects that appears as the purposeful (and self-reflexive) act of the 
camera, and not that of the characters. The camera acts as “a describer”, when it moves 
independently of a perceptor’s point of view, undermining the viewer’s conventional—in 
narrative cinema—sense of eyeline matches. This creates an effect of “spatial disorientation” 
(Chatman 1990: 52), which I also stressed in the case of Gomorrah. Chatman uses as an 
example of description Antonioni’s film The Passenger (Professione: Reporter, 1975). There, 
the camera work and editing disturbs the viewer’s sense of scale, rendering the dimensions of 
objects indeterminate (Chatman 1984: 8-9). It also ‘tricks’ the viewer with eyeline match shots 
that suddenly ‘bump into’ the figure of the supposed perceptor. In Gomorrah exactly the same 
effect has been stressed as creating a mise-en-abyme impression as well as disorientation to the 
viewer.   
 
Narrative being described: A change of hierarchy 
 The hierarchy between description and narrative does not always place narrative higher 
than description, Chatman contends. There are cases where narrative is contained to 
description rather than the other way around. It is not always description that “serves” 
narrative, according to Genette’s formulation; sometimes it is narrative that serves description: 
“in many works whose overriding text-type is Description, the ‘service’ is performed by a 
contained Narrative, not the other way around” (Chatman 1990: 24). The example that 
Chatman uses in order to prove his point is an oft-cited passage from Homer’s Iliad, with the 
detailed description of Agamemnon’s armor. Chatman characterizes this description as “a 
mini-narrative” (33), because the parts that compose the armor are mentioned in an order that 
corresponds to the process of dressing, which may be considered a narrative, because it 
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follows a causal-logical sequence. Here Chatman relies on Hamon, who, referring to the same 
scene of the Iliad, observes how “the ornamental aspect of the descriptive is integrated into the 
finality of the narration; thus the paradigmatic aspect of the list becomes one with the 
syntagmatic aspect of the narration, the derivational into the transformational” (Hamon 1981: 
17). However, according to Chatman, this mini-narrative serves the description of 
Agamemnon’s armor, and this description in turn “subserves the overriding narrative of the 
Iliad” (1990: 33). Therefore Chatman observes “a multiple layering of ‘service’” taking place 
between narrative and description, and rejects the presumption that it is always description that 
serves narrative (34). At the same time, he refuses to ascribe a qualitative value to ‘service’ 
(and to imply that the textual type that each time serves the other is in a sense ‘inferior’), 
proposing the term as a textual device.  
 There have been other theorists apart from Chatman, who have proposed a 
reconsideration of the role of description, which cannot anymore be considered just “ancilla 
narratienis”—according to Genette’s expression (1966: 157).148 The prevailing view among 
these proposals is that description is not inferior to narrative but an important constituent of 
narration. Ryan, for example, holds that description is not antithetical to narration—it rather 
establishes the spatial relations that are essential to its construction: “Though description is 
often regarded by text typologists as the antithesis of narration, it is also the major discourse 
strategy for the disclosure of spatial information” (Ryan 2010: paragraph 27).  
 My suggestion for reconsidering the role of description, taking as a starting point 
contemporary complex films, would nonetheless differ from the above views, as well as from 
that of Chatman. The example of Gomorrah can be used as indicative of how the hierarchy 
between narrative and description tends to be not only challenged but more decisively 
subverted in the case of contemporary complex films, as narrative is found more often overall 
‘serving’ description than the other way around. The aspect of description is highlighted 
through the iterative rhythm of Gomorrah, which suspends the diegetic relations between the 
separate characters. Characters resemble objects where the narration lingers on, in its 
‘parcours’ from one story to the other, a parcours which is not motivated by narrative action 
and causality but rather by the self-reflexive agency of the camera. This parcours participates 
in the overall piecemeal aesthetics of the film (which new media theorists like Manovich 
would call ‘database’). The multiple episodes of the narrative thus become themselves objects 
of description.  
 At the (micro-)level of shot space, the camera work and editing follow a drift 
unmotivated by narrative. The camera is driven from piece to piece, only that now the pieces 
are not the characters’ stories, but shots of the setting from different, discontinuous and 
sometimes contradicting angles. The “disorienting effect” that Chatman talks about is created 
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through the shifts in scale and lens focus, discussed in Chapter 8. At the (macro-)level of 
episodes, the drift is performed between the five mini-narratives that are used in order to 
describe the world of Camorra—and make it emerge out of its fragments. The editing of the 
episodes could be considered as subsuming narrative under description. The excerpts from the 
lives of the different characters become pieces that are juxtaposed in the space of the film, 
considered to be contemporaneous and with no temporal successiveness between them. More 
than a “multiple layering of serving”, like the one Chatman finds in the Iliad, and that, in his 
view, ultimately serves and not subverts the narrative, I find in Gomorrah a subversion of the 
narrative-description hierarchy, more decisively ‘privileging’ the side of description. Thus, the 
mini-narratives of Gomorrah do not serve the composition of an overarching narrative. There 
is not a beginning, middle and end in which we can place these autonomous stories. If this 
applies in other complex films too (and I think it does in forking-path films such as Run Lola 
Run and in other films with multiple contained stories), then we can legitimately doubt their 
overall labeling as narratives. 
 Chatman’s primary concern in Coming to Terms seems to be to show how description 
can be incorporated in narrative films, not as inferior to narrative but as an equal helper. He 
also pointed at instances of narrative serving description; however, there seems to be, in the 
examples he used, a ‘narrative umbrella’ that covers this layering of ‘serving’ going on 
underneath. My concern here is to show how description, along with other traditionally 
considered “anti-narrative” or “non-narrative” features, now becomes the ‘umbrella’. Starting 
form the pieces that are being juxtaposed, and moving in a bottom-up way, description 
participates in the incorporation of narrative into forms of (complex) textual and cognitive 
organization that subsume and transgress narrative.  
 
New media and description   
 As Hamon observed, description is in semantic terms closer to the paradigm, as 
opposed to narrative that is closer to the syntagm. Semantic units have a paradigmatic 
relationship to each other as long as the replacement of one with another does not affect 
meaning. On the contrary, a syntagmatic relationship implies that the existence of one unit 
depends upon its specific placement in a sequence of units. Drawing on Saussure’s and 
especially Roland Barthes’ theory of sign systems, Manovich argues in The Language of New 
Media that the prevalence of digital computer and electronic storage devices tends to make 
paradigmatic forms of organization more prominent in contemporary culture than they have 
been since the beginning of the 20th century, when (narrative) cinema was gradually 
established as the prevailing cultural form. As he points out, with new media “[t]he paradigm 
is given material existence, while the actual narrative (the syntagm) is de-materialized” 
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(Manovich 2001: 230-231). However, Manovich finds that, when the formation of cultural 
objects is at hand, most interfaces, although constituted paradigmatically out of databases, 
tend to finally impose a syntagmatic order upon their elements. Nonetheless the cultural 
penetration of the paradigm is nowadays much more pervasive than it was for the most part of 
the last (20th) century.  
 ‘Complex narrative’ films illustrate this centrifugal, as I call it, tendency to organize 
their elements paradigmatically rather than syntagmatically. Of course, the syntagmatic mode 
of narrative is still present and coexistent with the paradigmatic mode in complex films; 
however, the hierarchy between the two seems to be shifting more often. A hierarchical shift 
from syntagm to paradigm would thus be one from narrative to description. Although the 
relations between the pieces of complex films eventually give rise to a whole that we may call, 
after Hamon, a topos, the initial selection of elements is contingent. In the example of 
Gomorrah, the principle characters and their developed stories were contingently selected out 
of a database of characters contained in the homonymous book. Moreover, some of the five 
stories of the film could possibly be altered with different ones without affecting the overall 
organization of the film, because the latter is not dependent upon that of the particular 
narratives included in it. The film contains them, yet it subjects them to an ordering principle 
that is ‘more than their sum’. As I already pointed out, like Gomorrah, complex films appear 
non-selective, containing multiple points of view, and temporally discontinuous. They thus 
subject themselves to an overriding paradigmatic principle that treats the narrative segments as 
units that can be individually accessed and altered with others out of a set of possible 
elements, without affecting the overall organization. The transformation that narrative cinema 
goes through, and which becomes manifest in complex films, cannot be explained away as a 
superficial imitation of new media modes. Independently of the duration and the inevitable 
commercial appropriation that this cinematic phenomenon may have, it nevertheless provides 
a chance to question some of our certainties about narrative and its relation to cinema.  
 Although Manovich sees the concept of description relevant in the case of new media 
techniques of image composition, he does not connect it to new narrative forms. In his 
reference to description, he does not draw on literature but on painting, and specifically the 
work of art historian Svetlana Alpers on the 17th century Dutch painting, in which the 
descriptive mode prevailed, as opposed to the Italian Renaissance painting, which privileged 
the narrative mode (Manovich 2001: 327). Manovich relates this descriptive mode to the 
“aesthetics of density” that resurface in the context of new media and “new cinematic 
aesthetics”, as long as digital compositing offers more options to create dense and synthetic 
images, putting every detail in focus. This aesthetics of density can also be applied in films as 
compositions of mini-narratives. This can work in a wide range of films, from Short Cuts and 
	  
 
155 
Magnolia to Gomorrah. Description becomes a mode that fits the dense diegetic aesthetics of 
complex films. 
 The way new media use software that operates upon individual units is also 
reminiscent of how description functions. Ian Bogost suggests that the logic of “unit 
operations” that software technology follows,149 may also characterize our critical approach 
and analysis of cultural objects, apart from informational data. Bogost makes an attempt to 
apply the logic of unit operations in film analysis discussing the film The Terminal (Steven 
Spielberg, 2004). The unit operational approach could be developed, as he suggests, into an 
alternative to the classical narrative approaches to films, by privileging “discrete components 
of meaning over global narrative progression” (2006: 19). In this view, The Terminal is not a 
narrative system (“the story of a handful of developed characters”), but a “procedural” one, “a 
framework for general figures of waiting” (2006: 18-19). He explains:  
As the film plays out the interwoven stories of Viktor, Dixon, and Amelia, it 
challenges the viewer to abstract the film’s specific representations of waiting into 
general, individual units of meaning that the viewer naturally combines with his or 
her own experience. In my unit analysis of the film, the story serves as the glue for 
a configurative work about specific modes of uncorroborated waiting. (Bogost 
2006: 19)  
 From the perspective of description, the mini-narratives I referred to can be seen as 
“units of tightly encapsulated meaning” (ibid: xii) which operate independently of each other 
but still can have relations between them that may be conceived by means of contiguity, 
analogy, parallelism or metonymy, the relations that description gives way to. Approaching 
semiotics from the point of view of his theory of unit analysis, Bogost uses Saussure’s 
distinction between parole and langue, noting that parole refers to a unit operation, a “single 
use of a sign”, while langue refers to “the general system underlying the use of any particular 
sign” (23). Description is in my view a “unit operational” process, performed by ‘old’ media 
such as literature and film. It highlights elements as units that may relate to other elements and 
form aggregates and emergent organizations.  
 The units of complex films may be heterogeneous and distributed, but they nonetheless 
form a system, or a topos as Hamon called the textual systems that description forms, and this 
feature differentiates them from the elements of a heap or a catalogue, as discussed in Part 2. 
This topos, however, while connecting the elements in the same space, maintains the 
elements’ heterogeneity from each other. These elements are not connected by necessity (as a 
syntagmatic structure would imply) but by contingency. They are codependent only at higher 
level of the pattern they form, but this pattern is also contingent and uncertain, characterized 
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by the non-stationary dynamics of complexity. Thus, the way that narratives are turned into 
units makes it possible to operate upon them in a way that subsumes narrative under the 
parallel and distributed modes of organization that expand in contemporary culture, and make 
narratives nodes in larger complex networks of media and cultural production, which, as 
complex systems, are never static.     
 In this chapter I tried to show that description as a type of discourse produces a textual 
‘system’ different from that of narrative. It facilitates relations among units that suggest a 
parallel and spatialized processing of them on behalf of the recipient. Calling this type of 
processing ‘spatial’ I do not refer to the topographical notion of space (the place depicted in a 
film or novel), although place and its markers can also be processed spatially; I rather refer to 
the type of cognitive processing that emerges from the ‘parcours’ through different units 
(objects/characters, shots, sequences, embedded narratives) of a film and their relations to 
each other. The mode of discourse that facilitates this parcours, i.e. description, can be 
connected to an epistemological stance towards complexity.  
 Pia Tikka, filmmaker and researcher, refers to a paradigm shift that has taken place 
from the governing of complexity—a stance prevailing in cybernetics—to its description, a 
stance represented by complex systems theory, according to Tikka (2008: 287). Governing 
corresponds to the classical cybernetic approach that aimed at the control of complexity 
(homeostasis) while description to the interest in what complexity might bring when it is left 
to develop, even in a preconstituted environment (emergence). Emergent and ‘descriptive’ 
approaches suggest following in a bottom-up way the patters of the connections between units 
in their never-ending drift. In the next chapter I will examine whether such an emergent sense 
of ‘pattern’ can have application in contemporary complex films. 
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9. The pattern of complexity 
 
In Part 2, I referred to pattern-based causality as a term that may better account for the 
complex causal relations involved in “ensemble” or “network” films. This type of causality 
was connected to the nonlinear dynamics and complex interrelations among many different 
agencies within and beyond the diegesis. Here, the spatialized texts of complex films, that are 
discontinuous and give the impression of being composed by multiple units, will be generally 
connected to pattern-based forms of organization, since patterns are always formed out of 
heterogeneous and ‘noisy’ ensembles of units. Complex systems theory addresses the process 
through which spatially distributed units form aggregates and develop in time. The aggregates 
of units into systems appear as patterns. I will evaluate the already existing theoretical 
approaches of contemporary complex films from the aspect of pattern making, and attempt to 
resituate the term pattern as it is used in film theory in the context of complex systems theory. 
Seen as complex systems, contemporary complex films participate into the formation of 
emergent cinematic patterns that combine contingency and order into complex adaptability.  
 
Pattern, randomness and narrative 
 ‘Pattern’ is a generic term that may have several meanings. In common language it 
might connote a “model, a copy, or example”, or “a regular or decorative arrangement”, as in 
the case of decorative ornaments (Oxford English Dictionary). In information theory and 
computation, patterns are mental models that help us distinguish regularities in the shape and 
sequence of perceived elements that make them unities intelligible to a perceiver, by 
eliminating the amount of ‘noise’ contained in them. As Katherine Hayles mentions, in the 
‘traditional’ information theory of Claude Shannon, noise corresponds to randomness, while 
information corresponds to pattern (1999: 18). In the complex systemic strands of information 
theory, however, pattern and randomness are found in a productive dialectic, as systems 
achieve higher levels of complexity with the “infusion of noise” (ibid: 25). Therefore, through 
the development of information theory and chaos theory, “randomness is not “simply […] the 
lack of pattern” but “the creative ground from which pattern can emerge” (286).150  
 Complex systems theory goes a step further than this. Not only does it demonstrate that 
pattern is an order that is produced from randomness, but more decisively merges randomness 
with pattern. Thus, pattern does not come after randomness but is infused with it. Emergence 
in complex systems is considered to be the formation of a pattern. According to the definition 
provided by the New England Complex Systems Institute, a pattern is “a simple kind of 
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emergent property of a system […] a property of the system as a whole but […] not a property 
of small parts of the system” (Bar-Yam 2000). 
 From the perspective of autopoietic complex systems theory, as Francisco Varela, 
Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch point out, the constitution of patterns, which I will here 
call, using an informal expression, “pattern making”, is fundamental to the way a system 
‘couples’ with its environment, and is associated with the way autopoietic organisms self-
organize by relating and dealing with external complexity: 
...over time this coupling [of a system with its milieu] selects or enacts from a 
world of randomness a domain of distinctions (‘odd sequences’ or ‘two successive 
perturbations’) that has relevance for the structure of the system. In other words, 
on the basis of its autonomy the system selects or enacts a domain of significance. 
(Varela et al. 1993: 155-156)  
The process of creating the “domain of distinctions” and “odd sequences” is a process of 
pattern making. To make a pattern is to create a domain of significance, and therefore a world 
that is meaningful to the system.  
 In complex systemic approaches that emphasize adaptation, such as that of complex 
adaptive systems (cas), pattern making is a generic name for the processes involved in a 
variety of mechanisms (such as tagging, internal models and building blocks) that cas use in 
order for their micro-agents to self-organize and create aggregates (see Holland 1995). Pattern 
making is necessary in order for complex systems to organize themselves. Characteristic in the 
cas approach is that it considers the mechanisms of complexity and adaptability not only a 
matter of epistemology (of how an external observer discriminates a pattern that is formed out 
of the aggregation of individual units), but also one of ontology, of how living or non-living 
systems organize themselves, by converting “patterns into changes in [their] internal structure” 
(31). As discussed in Part 1, complex systems “reintroduce the distinction” between 
themselves and their environment into their own structure, and thus the patterns they form in 
order to deal with environmental complexity change their own structure, making it more 
complex. The circle of complexity is one that connects an organism/system with its 
environment, and creates a world as a “domain of significance”, as Varela would have it, for 
the system.  
 The use of the word pattern in complex systems theories implies a different process of 
pattern formation, and to some extent contrasts the common association of pattern with a pre-
existing order, with a model that is simply copied. There are scholars, among whom Hayles, 
who, based on the complex systemic conception of emergent organization through an interplay 
of pattern and randomness, compare narrative with such organization. They seem to imply that 
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narrative, although it can be conceived as pattern, because it has a certain order and regularity, 
nonetheless contains randomness and complexity. Tsoukas and Hatch, from a complex 
systems perspective, relate pattern making to the weaving of past, present and future that 
narrative effectuates (2001: 1006). Along with them, also other scholars (indicatively see 
Stoicheff 1991, Argyros 1992, Randall 2007) see in the flourishing of complex systems 
theories and their openness to randomness a chance to reevaluate the role of narrative, 
considering it through the lens of complexity. Narrative for them is not just a regular pattern, 
and it does not necessarily eliminate noise. It is rather the process through which order 
emerges out of randomness. Narrative couples with contingency, and is generated by it. Thus, 
every text is a selection out of multiple possibilities, and every choice that is made in order to 
tell or to construct a story is one that moves between pattern and chaos. In this context, 
contemporary “complex narratives”, with their openness to contingency and their hesitation to 
make absolute selections, could be seen as demonstrating the complexity inherent in every 
narrative. They become manifestations of the complex processes that take place before 
narrative manages to construct a finite ‘story’ with a beginning, middle and end.   
 There are, however, points that have not yet been explored, although many films of the 
complex narrative tendency raise them. Such as, when a story with a beginning, middle and 
end cannot finally be constructed, as it happens in Gomorrah and other complex films, are we 
allowed to name the process of viewing a fiction film narrative, or should we look for other 
terms to describe the contact between its text and the recipient? And if this process is indeed 
one that could be characterized as an emergent pattern, then how can we talk about this pattern 
without defining it as (and confining it to) narrative? Emergence, as discussed in Chapter 6, 
but also as broached in the beginning of the present chapter, is a pattern-based process, but the 
pattern it creates is not finite and it does not simply come after randomness; rather, it retains 
randomness, and it never becomes a decisively clear form. Complex systems oscillate from 
one pattern to another, from one assemblage/aggregate to another, generating in this lingering 
process further complexity. Narrative, no matter how emergent a process can be conceived, it 
always evokes “a sense of an ending”, due to its partial holding on the pole of ‘story’ or 
‘fabula’—in the sense of a beginning-middle-end structure. My opinion is that following the 
nonlinear dynamics generated before narrative, we can move to concepts and theories that 
better address the complexity of the interaction between a film and a viewer, a text and a 
recipient, a complexity that is invited and stimulated by texts that allow a greater degree of 
‘disorder’, lingering, and, indeed, ‘parcours’ in them, such as complex films. 
 
Pattern formation in ‘ordinary’ and complex narrative films 
 The notion of pattern has been used by film scholars in different ways; indicative of 
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the association of pattern with a film’s form and organization, as well as with narrative, is 
Bordwell’s and Thompson’s account of the term. The whole process of film viewing is a 
pattern making process according to Bordwell and Thompson, as they use the word pattern for 
everything that means “form”, a shape that elements take when they are related. As they note 
in Film Art: An introduction (2008), “form is a specific system of patterned relationships that 
we perceive in an artwork” (71), and films are no exceptions to this rule. Pattern for Bordwell 
and Thompson is a system; it is a way to organize perceived elements so that they become 
meaningful (intelligible) to a human observer/beholder. As a representative of cognitive 
narratology in film theory, Bordwell here too relies on cognitive theories that relate perception 
to preexisting schemata, which he and Thompson call patterns.  
The mind is never at rest. It is constantly seeking order and significance, testing 
the world for breaks in the habitual pattern. Artworks rely on this dynamic, 
unifying quality of the human mind. They provide organized occasions in which 
we exercise and develop our ability to pay attention, to anticipate upcoming 
events, to construct a whole out of parts and to feel an emotional response to that 
whole. (Bordwell and Thompson 2008: 54) 
Bordwell and Thompson make a rather generic use of the word pattern. From the perspective 
of the viewer and his or her cognitive activity, they use the term pattern to refer to cognitive 
schemata against the backdrop of which the viewer tests every new stimulus given by the 
film.151 As far as the textual characteristics of the films themselves are concerned, Bordwell 
and Thompson again find pattern a useful term. They thus mention that films offer a 
“patterned experience”, that a film’s style is a pattern, and that narrative is also a pattern (style 
and narrative are according to the writers the two organizing principles of the overall form of a 
film). Everything that becomes an intelligible form may be called, according to Bordwell and 
Thompson, a pattern. 
 The approach of Bordwell and Thompson to film is systemic—as long as they refer to 
the composition of wholes out of elements—and a useful place to start off with for the study 
of narrative films as systems. However, this common ground with my approach makes even 
more striking the difference between the conceptions of ‘system’ at play. I find that even 
though Bordwell (in Film Art with Thompson) sets off from a systemic theory of film viewing, 
he tends to focus on the way complexity is gradually ‘domesticated’ with the help of familiar 
schemata, rather than on the way complexity grows; his approach is centripetal, while I see the 
need for a centrifugal and complex systemic approach to films, and especially those that have 
been characterized as complex.  
 Bordwell and Thompson relate the neuropsychological human tendency towards 
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pattern making with an “urge for form” that film viewers have (56).  
Why does an interrupted song or an uncompleted story frustrate us? Because of 
our urge for form. We realize that the system of relationships within the work has 
not yet been completed. Something more is needed to make the form whole and 
satisfying. We have been caught up in the interrelations among elements, and we 
want to develop and complete the patterns. (56)  
This tendency towards pattern making is acceptable by contemporary neuroscience,152 but the 
point I disagree with Bordwell’s and Thompson’s application is on their insistence to link the 
pattern making cognitive processes with a ‘completion’ schema that bears similarities with 
that of (classical) narrative. Thus, especially when it comes to the narrative form, Bordwell 
and Thompson translate this “urge” for completion of the patterns into a need for narrative 
closure. Narrative is according to them a pattern with a beginning, middle, and end:  
Typically, a narrative begins with one situation; a series of changes occurs 
according to a pattern of cause and effect; finally, a new situation arises that brings 
about the end of the narrative. Our engagement with the story depends on our 
understanding of the pattern of change and stability, cause and effect, time and 
space. (75) 
As it might have become apparent, for Bordwell and Thompson pattern is not specific to any 
specific kind of film or genre, nor of course to complex films.  
 Nonetheless, a more specific application of the word pattern in the context of complex 
films is attempted by Bordwell in his article “Film Futures”, which, as I mentioned in the 
Introduction, set off the debate on the complex narrative tendency in contemporary cinema. In 
this article Bordwell refers to pattern making in order to show how ‘forking-path’ films (i.e. 
films with branched stories such as Sliding Doors, Run Lola Run, Too Many Ways to Be No.1 
and Blind Chance), which initially appear more complex than the standard narrative films, do 
not differ so much from any other narrative film in terms of the cognitive processes they 
evoke. Here Bordwell makes particular reference to the spatial patterns put forth by these 
films, although he sees them as ‘serving’ the beginning-middle-end ‘pattern’ of narrative.  
 In forking-path films, according to Bordwell, the viewer’s handling of the narrative’s 
complexity becomes an easy task, because the alternative versions of the story are constructed 
to be very similar, except for some striking differences that highlight the parallelism between 
the different versions of the characters’ destiny. Thus, he notes, “forking-path plots can bring 
parallelisms to our notice quite vividly, thereby calling forth well-practiced habits of sense-
making” (2002: 97). The recurrent return to the crucial moment from which the three stories 
begin and develop as alternative branches, for instance in Run Lola Run, becomes a pattern 
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that once developed, makes it easier for the viewer to follow the film, and moreover, to 
integrate this pattern into the overarching “narrative patterning” (92). The forking-path pattern 
can be “enacted” every time that we encounter a film that uses it, in order to help us deal with 
narrative complexity. Thus, Bordwell concludes, “artists should test the limits of story 
comprehension, but those very limits, and the predictable patterns they yield, remain essential 
to our dynamic experience of narrative” (2002: 103; emphasis mine). Narrative may be a 
dynamic process but it is always a cognitive activity that seeks closure—once the separate 
elements constituting it fall into place and become intelligible in their pattern. As Bordwell 
shows, the intense presence of parallelism in forking-path films and their spatial patterns 
ultimately falls into place in the larger pattern of narrative, with its sequential, beginning-
middle-end, form. 
 This extensive discussion of the—rather generic—use of pattern by Bordwell and 
Bordwell and Thompson wants to show how pattern making in narrative film theory, even 
though ‘systemic’ and ‘emergent’ to the extent that it presupposes a dynamic cognitive 
process, is nonetheless not really complex, as it is associated with the closure of meaning, the 
order and the ending that narrative implies. The combination of pattern making with narrative 
ends up being less emergent and open-ended than it sets off to be. In the continuation of this 
chapter I will focus on the spatial patterns that prevail in complex films and evaluate different 
takes on the connection between them and pattern making.  
 
Pattern and spatial form  
 I will now clarify what I think is the specific connection of pattern making with 
complex films and why this lies in the spatialized form of their texts. According to literary 
scholar Gabriel Zoran “a spatial pattern is any pattern perceived solely on the basis of the 
connection between discontinuous units in a text, demanding therefore a perception of the 
whole text or part of it as given simultaneously in space (which is for example, the case of 
analogies)” (1984: 311). I think that this definition of pattern fits the case of contemporary 
complex films. According to this definition, textual discontinuity triggers the creation of 
patterns, as far as the aspect of perception is involved. Yet, in my opinion, pattern making 
cannot be conceptualized as a function of the perceiver alone. It rather involves, from a 
complex systemic perspective, two different systems: the textual system and the cognitive 
system of the recipient. Pattern making may be evoked by the text’s structure and by its mode 
of discourse, particularly description, as discussed in the previous chapter, with the relations it 
creates between units through juxtaposition or contiguity.  
 The genealogy of the theoretical connection between textual pattern making and 
emergence of meaning can be traced back in the work of Joseph Frank, whom I have 
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mentioned in other parts of this dissertation as well. Frank’s discussion of the “spatial form” in 
poetry and literature up to a point follows the tradition of Lessing (even though turning it 
upside down), in the sense that Frank tends to create a binary opposition between space and 
time that has become redundant, and for which Frank has been heavily criticized (among 
others, by G. Giovannini and Frank Kermode). However, I find that his insights should not be 
easily dismissed, as Frank was aware that the spatial form has its own different “chronicity”, 
which he called spatial in order to distinguish it from the linear (sequential) chronicity 
traditionally assigned to literature. Referring back to his original 1945 essay Frank explains:  
I merely stated what has since become a platitude—and what I can now put in 
more precise linguistic terminology—that the synchronic relations within the text 
took precedence over diachronic referentiality, and that it was only after the 
pattern of synchronic relations had been grasped as a unity that the “meaning” of 
the poem could be understood. (1977: 235)  
Although the object of Frank’s theory had been modernist poetry and literature, he later saw 
the spatial form having a potentially broader application, being inspired by French 
structuralism and its prominent narratologists such as Todorov and Genette.  
 The spatial form is a pattern, according to Frank. He points out that the spatial form 
has its own “logic”, the “space-logic” of reflexive reference, as he calls it, which makes it 
necessary “to suspend the process of individual reference temporarily until the entire pattern 
of internal references can be apprehended as a unity” (1977: 232, citing himself from the 
original essay). As William Holtz comments,  
[for Frank the] spatial form is not, as we might guess, necessarily “descriptive” 
writing aimed at the mind’s eye but rather a form that grows out of the writer’s 
attempt to negate the temporal principle inherent in language and to force 
apprehension of his work as a total “thing” in a moment of time rather than as a 
sequence of things. 
Here Holtz refers to the association of the spatial form with the “descriptive”, but also 
emphasizes its being a result of the conscious negation, on behalf of the writer, of linear 
sequentiality—a consciousness that has been attributed to modernism.153 In modernist texts, 
and according to Frank’s theory, “the sequential or temporal principle is replaced by the 
principle of ‘reflexive reference’: that is, suspension of meaningful reference until the whole 
pattern is perceived” (Holtz 1977: 272-273). Meaning is for Frank a spatial pattern—in the 
sense that it connects and helps unify distributed and disconnected elements.   
 A similar suspension of meaningful reference and negation of sequentiality is the case 
in many of the contemporary films discussed as “complex”. Through the analysis of 
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Gomorrah in Chapter 7 I emphasized the obscurity of the film’s world, its avoidance to name 
places and its discontinuous and ‘shifting’ view upon the surroundings. This obscurity could 
be interpreted as a ‘suspension of meaningful reference’, until the ‘whole pattern’ is perceived 
or ‘faced’ in the end, through the last disclosure that the film makes.  
 Moreover, in Gomorrah as well as in other contemporary complex films, we find a 
characteristic ‘bottom-up’ perspective on place, or a ‘spatialization of place’ as I called it in 
the previous chapter. This is one more feature connecting these films with the spatial form. 
The example of the city of Dublin in Joyce’s Ulysses, turned into an emergent pattern in the 
way it is analyzed by Frank, might remind us Gomorrah’s Naples or Run Lola Run’s Berlin. In 
Holtz’s words:  
To illustrate this concept [of reflexive self-reference], Frank ranges over a wide 
variety of works. In Ulysses, for example, the narrative is so fragmented, the key 
allusions and symbols so scattered, that the reader must continually suspend 
reference until he imperceptibly gains a sense of Dublin in its entirety: Joyce 
demands that the reader achieve “the same instinctive knowledge of Dublin life, 
the same sense of Dublin as a huge, surrounding organism, that the Dubliner 
possesses as a birthright. It is this birthright that, at any one moment of time, gives 
the native a knowledge of Dublin’s past and present as a whole; and it is only such 
knowledge that would enable the reader … to place all the references in their 
proper context. ... Joyce ... proceeded on the assumption that a unified spatial 
apprehension of his work would ultimately be possible.” (1977: 273, citing Frank 
in The Widening Gyre, 1968) 
The obscurity of place, and the disorienting parcours through it in complex films such as 
Gomorrah and Run Lola Run, gives way to an emergent pattern to be formed, as a world 
created out of the disparate pieces. 
 In Chapter 8 I mentioned that Frank considered description to be an expression of the 
text’s spatial form. Taking his insight as a starting point I would argue that description is a 
mode that creates synchronic relations between textual elements so that patterns emerge. The 
feeling of lingering and temporal suspension that description creates, serves, according to a 
text’s “space-logic”, the formation of patterns. Patterns, in the complex systemic view, are 
emergent ‘wholes’, not reducible to the sum of their parts. A necessary condition for their 
formation is the existence of relations that connect the disparate elements into a unity, marking 
a shift to a higher level of organization.  
 Despite description’s association with metonymy,154 the whole-part relationship 
prevailing in metonymy is often transcended, and this becomes particularly apparent in the 
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case of cinema, when description, or “the descriptive”, becomes a way to loosely connect 
elements in space—the way that Chatman showed using examples from Antonioni. In 
complex systems, the connection between pieces and their aggregates is nonlinear, as soon as 
these aggregate ‘wholes’ do not preexist but emerge out of the interrelations between the units. 
Thus, the units that constitute the emergent wholes are not ‘parts’, because they are by no 
means subtracted from a preexisting whole. In this line of thinking, description’s focus on 
individual and heterogeneous elements points at the potential emergence of wholes in the 
sense of complex, emergent systems, and not in that of a preexisting system or schema.  
 It is a cognitive process that the theory of the spatial form points at when it refers to the 
way the discontinuity of a text and the synchronic relations between its elements bring to the 
forth patterns. Holtz notes: 
For the “spatiality” he [Frank] finds in literary form is not the spatiality objectively 
present in a painting or a sculpture (except for “shaped” poems and other such 
typographical devices); rather, this literary spatiality seems to be an operation of 
the mind synthesizing data which may (in some instances Frank cites) form a 
visualizable image with communicable spatial dimension but which (in most of his 
examples) do not necessarily cohere in any demonstrably spatial way. […] Thus 
the spatial order of a painting and the “spatiality” of The Waste Land are of 
different ontological orders, and the critic should not confuse them. (1977: 274) 
Where is then the ‘space’ of the spatial form? As Holtz argues, it lies in the pattern, and does 
not have the objective dimensions and spatial relations that a painting has. But Frank himself 
is explicit connecting the spatial form with a cognitive process, when he points out that spatial 
form is a pattern through which meaning is produced. This pattern, however, has a clear, even 
though not direct and ‘linear’, connection with the text’s form. It is not a pregiven, ‘natural’ 
cognitive process of pattern making that is here at hand, but one that emerges from the text 
and its discontinuous ordering and triggers a cognitive response from the recipient. 
 The theory of spatial form, as John Tolva argues,155 finds application in hypertext 
literature, to which the plot structure of complex films has been compared. Hypertext connects 
story-chunks through links that are followed in a non-sequential order. Using the example of 
the “Mola Web” (a hypertext created by the collaboration of several hypertext authors, among 
whom Michael Joyce), Tolva refers to the way the hypertext reader may perceive the “implicit 
and dynamic designs” of the text as “patterns, juxtapositions or recurrences” (Joyce, cited by 
Tolva 1996: 69). Tolva explains how the experience of such designs becomes meaningful: “As 
in a splatter-painting by Jackson Pollock, what emerges from seeming chaos is distinct, though 
random, pattern—what [Michael] Joyce calls ‘contour’” (71). The process of going from one 
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link to the other and the relations between the units of a text thus created, generates space:  
Rather than disrupting the concept of spatial form […], links generate it, thwarting 
temporal flow and opening a space for the reader’s mind to construct the extra 
dimension needed to rationalize the act of “traveling” a link in a Euclidean 
universe that physically, logically disallows it. We think space, therefore it is. 
(Tolva 1996: 73) 
 The juxtapositions and recurrences found in hypertext and its spatial form have 
similarities to those of complex films. Space is generated by the film’s discourse and by the 
cognitive effort of the viewer to accommodate to it and to follow the discontinuous syuzhet. 
The links that Euclidean space disallows are those that the viewer has to generate in order to 
connect the disconnected units of complex films; (when these units are temporally separated, 
the effect might be the ‘time-juggling’ I referred to in Part 1). ‘Fractal’ films, such as Run Lola 
Run, and their characteristic features of “multiplicity, simultaneity and fragmentation”, realize, 
according to Everett (2005: 160), Slavoj Zizek’s assertion that cinema will evolve by creating 
through its fiction films experiences similar to those that cyberspace hypertext generates. 
Zizek saw hypertext as an expression of that sense of fragility, contingency and multiplication 
that characterizes both contemporary life and contemporary science; he also observed a clash 
between hypertext and the linear forms of literature and cinema (2001: 206). This sense of 
uncertainty and contingency, with which any emergent order has to couple, is also a core 
element of contemporary complex systems science and theory. Thus, the spatial (and for some 
hypertextual) form of contemporary texts might be an expression of an uncertainty that makes 
all pattern making processes generated by these texts emergent and incomplete, drifting rather 
than closing.   
  
Ready-made patterns 
 The privileging of spatial forms of reception, such as those triggered by parallelism, 
analogy, recurrence and juxtaposition of units (and could be considered to be the ground of 
pattern making), are not at all a new characteristic of texts. Manovich refers to the way 
similarly spatial types of processing were prevailing before the expansion of industrialization; 
later on, the linear modes of industrial production put forth more sequential modes of 
processing (2001: 232). The resurfacing of spatial textual modes in contemporary culture is 
found in a certain tension with the classical narrative form. Particularly, the ‘spatial form’ of 
contemporary films is not as easily compatible with narrative as Bordwell would have it. 
Rather, as I would argue, it shows the gaps, inconsistencies and limitations inherent in 
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narrative. Thus, contemporary complex films cannot be placed in a smoothly continuous 
narrative tradition.  
 Pattern may be considered as emerging out of the dynamics and internal relations of 
the filmic text. To study the specifics of pattern making in either the textual system of the film 
or the cognitive system of the viewer, a bottom-up approach would be required, that would 
focus on the dynamics generated, without presupposing that every text ‘naturally’ creates 
patterns, just like every brain does. Having talked about pattern making as an emergent 
process, one could argue that in contemporary complex films there is pattern but it is not 
emergent but somehow ‘pregiven’. For instance, in Gomorrah one could argue that the 
‘pattern’ that emerges in the end allowing the disparate stories contained in the film to form a 
unity under the name of Camorra, is not constructed by the viewer but somehow provided 
‘ready-made’ by the film. This function of pattern, which resembles but also contrasts (in its 
consequences) Frank’s conception of it, is one point of criticism that Sean Cubitt addresses to 
films of the contemporary complex narrative tendency.  
 Cubitt has a different stance from Bordwell regarding the recent phenomenon of 
complex films, tending to emphasize the discontinuities these films introduce, rather than their 
seamless adjustment to the traditional narrative form and the corresponding cognitive 
processes. Likewise, Cubitt gives a special importance to the function of pattern in the groups 
of complex films that he calls, after Marsha Kinder, “database”, and after Angela Ndalianis, 
“neobaroque”—the latter being for him the Hollywood (sometimes blockbuster) counterpart of 
database narratives. Cubitt uses a spatial notion of pattern, and emphasizes that it is the 
spatialized modes of presentation in database and neobaroque films that make pattern 
particularly relevant in them. Yet, Cubitt offers a critical perspective to pattern making in 
relation to these films. On the one hand, in contrast with Bordwell, he considers the spatial 
patterns of database and neobaroque films to be radically different from narrative and not 
easily integrated into the narrative order. On the other hand, like Bordwell, Cubitt also 
associates pattern making with a certain kind of ‘closure’, which is different from the narrative 
closure. The spatial patterns that contemporary films contain do not suggest, according to 
Cubitt, openness to the contingent but rather the closure of an ordered and ‘pre-calculated’ 
universe. Pattern, as Cubitt perceives it in contemporary complex films, leans towards order 
and regularity rather than chaos, noise and contingency; it is not a matter of emergent self-
organization but of a pre-given model or copy, the sense that the word pattern has in common 
language and not in science and theory of complex systems.  
 Cubitt argues that in database and neobaroque films, the diegetic world might appear 
fragmented and disordered, but its coherency is not achieved by the viewer’s own ‘free 
wandering’, but, in a way, it is ‘imposed’ to him or her ‘ready-made’ by the film. The 
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coherence and meaningfulness of the film lies in a preexisting pattern, which, once revealed, 
turns the film into a “self-enclosed world”. Thus, as Cubitt states, “the purpose of subjectivity 
is fulfilled at the moment in which it is absorbed entirely into the pattern of the world”. 
Referring not only to the level of narrative but also to that of shot composition, Cubitt 
continues: “as image becomes composition, [neobaroque films are extremely graphical] 
narrative becomes pattern, and the whole comes to a moment of gestalt coherence” (2004: 
240). The spatialization of texts suggests for him a shift from narrative to pattern, but this shift 
does not point at the direction of emergent self-organization through contingency, but rather 
eliminates contingency. Even though Cubitt does not call this predestined path “narrative” 
(rather, he sees it as its opposite), he certainly finds contemporary complex films more 
‘closed’ than Bordwell does. Thus, Cubitt observes how narrative seems to become a micro-
element in a neobaroque spectacle, composed by eventful worlds, ‘miniatures’ of the classical 
plot, succeeding each other. Cubitt finds this ‘logic’ being pervasive in contemporary film 
production, and functioning in a wide range of films from blockbusters to titles of ‘complex’ 
films, such as The Usual Suspects, Sixth Sense, Memento, Snatch and Dark City. The multiple 
chunks that constitute the storyworld in these films makes Cubitt consider pattern making, 
rather than narrative, becoming the primary ordering principle in them. Pattern spatializes 
time:  
the construction of the database narrative is modular, encouraging games with 
flashback (Memento), Time Travel (Twelve Monkeys), and temporal dislocation 
(Pulp Fiction) to demonstrate with even more brilliance the command over events 
enjoyed by the pattern-making impulse. The effect is to make the narrative, like 
the diegesis, spatial. (2004: 239)  
 As long as their diegetic ‘worlds’ are constituted by loosely connected units, and 
events open to multiple interpretations, contemporary complex films might create to the 
viewer the impression that they are exploring the filmic universe more freely. However, what 
in fact happens, according to Cubitt, is the reverse: “Locking into a pattern at its conclusion, 
the database narrative reveals its gestalt. The task of the protagonists is to realize themselves 
as elements of an infinitely repeatable, enclosed horizon of rule-governed patterning” (2004: 
240). For Cubitt, pattern making seems to be the way to approach and construct the filmic 
world both intradiegetically—by the protagonists—and extradiegetically—by the viewers. In 
both cases, it is a seemingly miraculous and passive absorption into a ‘rule-governed’ whole 
that is effectuated by these complex films.  
 Cubitt’s approach to contemporary films of the complex narrative tendency appears 
rather pessimistic. It is infiltrated by the way image, shot and narrative composition works in 
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commercial neobaroque films and does not take as a starting point more alternative and 
independent films. Still, as I wrote in the Introduction, we cannot ignore the fact that complex 
modes of narration now become the norm rather than the exception, and that Hollywood and 
independent cinema mutually affect each other. Thus it is important to take Cubitt’s remarks 
into consideration. At this point I would like to highlight two aspects of his theorization that I 
find fruitful and relevant to my theoretical approach to complex films. On the one hand, as I 
already broached, Cubitt certainly disagrees with the stance represented by Bordwell, that 
pattern making in films of the complex narrative tendency is ‘business as usual’, that it can be 
easily integrated into the narrative form or that it works in all films in the same way. Cubitt 
sees in contemporary complex films a break with the modes of narration and interpretation 
promoted by classical Hollywood films. He emphasizes the ‘spatial’ effect that pattern has on 
narrative form, and also makes the observation that the latter tends to be succumbed to the 
pattern making impulse, which now becomes prevalent. This is in accordance with my own 
conclusions in Chapter 8. On the other hand, in his criticism on the spatialization of narrative 
and the pattern making impulse, Cubitt seems to dismiss the—other than superficial—
connection between the contemporary “database narratives” and the modernist texts in which 
Frank saw pattern becoming the emergent product of their spatial form. Modernist theory and 
structuralist narratology, under which Frank’s theory may also be classified, drew useful 
conclusions about complex texts and distinguished them from other literary forms. Although 
some of these conclusions, especially those that have to do with discourse and spatialization, 
are applicable to contemporary complex films, they should nonetheless be contextualized in 
the current complex environment of cinematic production.  
 The spatialization to which Cubitt refers is different in its means and its purpose from 
the one of modernist novels or even that of Godard’s films. In many contemporary complex 
films, spatialization might be present inside the shot, with techniques of image composition—
the digital equivalent of the descriptive mode—that bring all details to the foreground, as 
pointed out by Manovich. It is also present in the baroque-like proliferation of pieces in the 
image or the sequence of shots, and the pastiche techniques found in film such as Run Lola 
Run, but also in the character and plot-thread assemblages of network films, discussed in Part 
2. 
 In my view, complex films do not always promote passive absorption in their emergent 
worlds. The films I took as starting points in this dissertation are open-ended and not self-
enclosed universes. An important factor always remains the function of each film within its 
own ecosystem, i.e. its embeddedness in a certain film tradition, a genre, a social and political 
context. In some non-commercial films, a process of world emergence similar to the one 
criticized by Cubitt may actually function as a call for critical reflection and active 
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engagement, as is (potentially) the case in Gomorrah, in which, from a totally different 
perspective, we have a process analogous to the one that Cubitt criticizes: a ‘locking’ of its 
world into a closed horizon (and it is hard to imagine an horizon that feels more closed than 
the one we literally see at the end of this film), and a ‘rule-governed’ failure of every attempt 
for individuation on behalf of the characters. Moreover, almost all films classified under the 
complex narrative category demand a laborious cognitive activity on behalf of the viewer, 
which could be pictured as a cognitive mapping (suggesting spatial juxtaposition) of elements 
either disconnected and out of order, or complexly interwoven and dense. The spatialization of 
the diegesis, and the ‘exploration’ it performs and also demands on behalf of the viewer, has 
already been highlighted in this dissertation in different ways: through the multiplication of 
characters, each of whom offers a different perspective upon the film’s diegesis; through 
methods of filming that invite the viewer to orientate themself in a world that seems 
incomprehensible and perplexing; through plot twists, usually requiring a shift of perspective 
(or ontological level) that reveals hidden dimensions of the film’s story world.  
 In contemporary database narratives, according to Cubitt, viewers are led to identify 
with worlds, not characters (2004: 236). This emphasis on pattern-governed, according to 
Cubitt, ‘worlds’ seems to be a market demand, apart from a stylistic or formal tendency.156 
Even when worlds or ‘patterns’ ultimately make their appearance in the end of a film like a 
gestalt or a magic picture, taking the viewer by surprise, most of the time there is something 
missing and left to the viewer (and not always to the film’s sequel) to decide—a viewer who is 
constantly, as I pointed out in Chapter 2, addressed by the deictic markers of the diegesis and 
explicitly called to participate in its construction. This feature of complex films does not allow 
us, however, to exaggerate the degree of ‘interactivity’ in them. As it is the case in other, more 
‘properly’ interactive works of the contemporary media art sphere, where it is the algorithm 
that controls the degree of interactivity, in complex narratives too, the piece of the puzzle that 
might be missing in the end is one carefully calculated to do so.   
 Two different conceptions of pattern and pattern making have been contrasted in this 
chapter. The one considers pattern to be a noise-eliminating regularity, a ‘world’ that becomes 
meaningful by forming a closed system, and the other an emergent whole that can be coupled 
with contingency rather than eliminate it. The latter is closer to the complex systemic sense of 
the word pattern. However, according to criticism such as that of Cubitt, even though the films 
of the contemporary complex narrative tendency seem to be challenging or even surpassing 
the narrative form by being increasingly spatial, discontinuous and open-ended in their textual 
structure, nonetheless fail to trigger emergent patterns. Cubitt seems to be arguing that 
(classical) narrative has this potential in a much greater degree than the contemporary tightly 
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calculated and ‘neobaroque’ cinematic constructions—which are not narrative, this being their 
demise.  
 In my view, complex films combine the two different versions of pattern, and at times 
lean towards the ‘emergent’ one. Moreover, their potential for emergent pattern making is not 
incompatible with their divergence from narrative. On the contrary, the fact that they subsume 
narrative under another, complex systemic type of organization, reveals openness and not 
closure, to which contemporary cinema as a complex system is in a way ‘doomed’, as I 
pointed out in the Introduction. What is needed is a shift of level, or a combination of 
analytical levels, the one of individual films and the other of the institution cinema, in order to 
see how openness, contingency and uncertainty of the latter (the institution cinema) may 
‘masquerade’ as closure, structure and self-enclosed ‘pattern’ in the former (certain individual 
films of the complex narrative tendency).  
 
Emergent patterns and cinematic adaptability  
 Gomorrah is certainly not the average case of contemporary ‘complex’ films. 
Although, as I showed in Chapter 7, it shares some common characteristic with other 
complex/network films, Gomorrah could not be easily classified as a ‘neobaroque’ film, the 
film category to which Cubitt mainly addresses his criticism. Its embeddedness into very 
diverse filmic traditions makes Gomorrah an incarnation of pattern and randomness. On the 
one hand, the pattern of the classical Hollywood gangster film, the bleak atmosphere and 
doomed protagonists inherited from the Godfather tradition, exerts its influence on 
Gomorrah’s narrative pieces, which have a certain beginning-middle-end structure. On the 
other hand, the lack of a single narrative focus, the episodic structure and parcours through 
different characters, places and perspectives, features drawn from its neorealist roots, suggest 
openness to contingency.  
 Neorealism did not reject narrative, but it opened it up to the “fragility and contingency 
of life in the aftermath of war” (Shiel 2006: 13). The Italian director Luigi Comencini 
considered as the reason for neorealism’s unpopularity with the wider audience the fact that 
the public wanted to be told a story, while neorealist films ‘illustrated a situation’. Taking as a 
starting point his comment, film theorist Christopher Wagstaff observes:  
Neorealist cinema was not the heroic narrative of a society that, through armed 
resistance, had achieved a victory over chaos. It was the far, far more profound 
thinking of a society that had to give up the infantile illusion of a heroically 
vanquishing anything, and instead had to discover the garden in what it had been 
living with along. (Wagstaff 2007: 64)157 
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 Gomorrah is an amalgam of different ‘patterns’ in the cinematic tradition, one that 
tends towards order and another than opens to contingency. But the final contrast that 
Gomorrah creates between contingency and order does not happen at the level of narrative, 
but between its already contingent enough ‘mini-narratives’ and a higher level of order, the 
‘world order’ of Camorra, as well as the one of the actual network of economy, and the 
networks of interrelated complex systems that contemporary society consists in. This order is 
of a different kind than the one of narrative, and seems to be for good or evil subsuming all 
forms of ‘linear’ organization, signification and anthropomorphic meaning. This order couples 
with contingency but also tries to tame it by taking forms of organization that allow it to adapt 
to the volatile conditions of contemporary ‘reality’. Thus, in Gomorrah the dialogue between 
contingency and structure takes place not only inside narrative, i.e. through an interplay 
between the ‘classical’, sequential ordering of events and contingent happenings, as it usually 
happens in other ‘complex’ films, or, even in the loose narratives of neorealism, but also 
beyond narrative. This reflects what seems to be the case for contemporary ‘narrative’ cinema, 
which of course continues to produce stories, but does so by reproducing within these very 
stories its own observing distance.  
 Apart from the different patterns of storytelling that Gomorrah embodies, it also 
embodies the different poles of the notion ‘pattern’ that the complex narrative tendency 
combines. One that goes towards contingency, openness to the unknown, and ‘free’ parcours, 
and the other towards ‘rule governed’ reproduction of carefully calculated diegetic worlds. It 
seems as if the pattern that Gomorrah reveals at the end, which is not just Camorra but, as I 
pointed out in Chapter 7, the world economy, is the one that governs the ‘domestication’ of the 
once emergent complex narrative tendency by transmedia market forces. Complex films, just 
like the protagonists of Gomorrah, exhaust the degrees of freedom given to them by means of 
performative agency, and in the end they are defeated by the ‘rules’ that govern the game of 
systems that lie beyond their reach. No matter how bleak this ‘observation’ sounds, it is 
however made from a spot located inside these systems. Gomorrah is a product of a new 
world order in ‘post-narrative cinema’; as such a product, and by its ability to ‘observe’ the 
structures of distributed control in contemporary globalized society (and here this structure is 
Camorra, while in Burn After Reading it was the CIA), it suggests that the tendency of 
complex films, despite the top-down patterning, still leaves seeds for bottom-up evolvement 
and transformation.  
 The complex narrative tendency may thus be considered itself to be a pattern, a 
temporary organization that combines order and chaos, narrative and non-narrative, and a sign 
of cinema’s own working as a complex system, which follows a pattern making ‘drift’ in order 
to deal with the complexity of its environment. In complex systems theory, pattern making is 
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the process through which a system moves from pattern to pattern, from one organization to 
the next. Varela described this drift as a “selfmovement” that characterizes all “complex, 
nonlinear, and chaotic systems”. In them, “there is never a stopping or dwelling […] state, but 
only permanent change punctuated by transient aggregates” (Varela 1999: 291). Emergence is 
pattern-based as long as it ‘transits’ from one aggregate to another. Pattern-based self-
organization thus couples with contingency; it always weaves certain new ‘ordered’ areas, 
new patterns, but these are never stable; they are always in transit. The contingency they 
contain transforms these patterns at the very same moment that they become discernible, 
bringing new fluctuations, and allowing further bifurcations. Such fluctuations might be 
coming from inside the group-‘pattern’ of complex narratives, from their ‘borderline cases’, 
such as the one of Gomorrah.  
 Although emergent patterns appear as ‘indiscernible’ and ‘noisy’ to external observers, 
as cognitive philosopher Daniel Dennett puts it, “in the root case a pattern is ‘by definition’ a 
candidate for pattern recognition” (1991: 32). The complex narrative tendency was itself an 
emergent pattern in the 1990s, but later this pattern was recognized by big studios which 
imitated the modes of narration that certain complex films introduced. However, shifting the 
scale of analysis, both the complex narrative tendency and Hollywood can be seen as different 
organizational levels of the complex system of cinema, which through bifurcations, such as 
the one created by the complex narrative tendency, builds further complexity, adapts to its far 
more complex environment, but also constitutes this environment. 
 As it can be observed in individual films, narrative seems to become a relatively 
smaller component in the complex organization of cinema production than it has been in the 
past, and this facilitates the workings of the growing transmedia market. Thus, the fact that, in 
individual films, narrative becomes multiplied and miniaturized (as in the mini-narratives of 
network, ‘thread structure’ or even neobaroque films), an internal component in the larger 
network of a film’s diegetic world, might serve, at a different scale, the larger self-
organization of a media system in which the ‘cinema-system’ participates. Hence, the way that 
the textual/filmic space of individual films is constructed, affects—and is affected by—the 
broader space in which cinematic production develops. Cinema thus displays a fractal-like 
(self-similar in different scales) architecture, which is so characteristic of complex systems. 
And, as it happens with fractals, “understanding how a system works at one scale might lead 
to understanding how it works [at] other scales” (Manson 2008, referring to Mandelbrot 
1977).  
 Self-organizing systems form patterns both in space and in time. They are adaptive as 
long as the aggregates they form change without losing their organization. Complex adaptive 
systems remain coherent under change (Holland 4). As they evolve to further complexity, they 
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are never the same as before, but they are self-similar, in the sense that they maintain their 
coherence, which consists in their organization and not their structure (i.e. the form that an 
organization takes at a specific moment in time). The fractal-like space that a complex 
systemic approach to cinema reveals, might be not just a sign of cinema’s participation to 
wider social, technological and economic developments, but also one of cinema’s adaptive 
capabilities in an ever changing and increasingly complex media and social environment, and 
its potential to transform this environment through its own self-transformation. Carried by 
emergent and nonstationary dynamics that never allow it to take a stable structure, cinema is 
nonetheless challenged to maintain its organization in time, and to continue enabling the 
constitution of worlds that are cinematic, as far as they engage and surround the viewer in 
his/her embodied presence. To paraphrase Holland, who talks about the city as a complex 
adaptive system (1995: 1), “cinema is a pattern in time: no single constituent remains in place, 
but cinema persists.”  
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS  
 
 Complex films are not ‘complex’ in the common sense of the word, meaning 
something that is so complicated that it is difficult to understand. I do not use this label with a 
qualitative loading, implying that the films of the recent complex narrative tendency are more 
clever or skillful than other—contemporary or older—films. The word ‘complex’ is used from 
the perspective of complex systems theory, implying that these films are configurations 
produced in contemporary cinema amidst the perturbations and volatile conditions that 
characterize its environment. In the context of this environment, individual films, film 
tendencies and the cinema institution produce their organization, on the backdrop of fleeting 
conditions, contingency and, not least, complex systemic crisis. Cinema is a complex system 
on any scale and at every level, and complex films are the units of its larger organization. In 
this specific point in time, they are configurations that contribute into rendering cinema 
adaptable to new media, cultural and economic conditions, but also allow it to transform these 
conditions.  
 The complex films I chose to analyze do not come from the peak of the complex 
narrative tendency in cinema, which was between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s. They are 
rather latecomers in this trend. However, for precisely this reason they picture the way 
complex narrative features ‘fertilized’ a wide range of Hollywood, independent and world 
cinema filmmaking. In between the prevalence of the complex narrative tendency and its 
possible future fading, or dissolving into larger, and more complex (in the sense of developed 
and differentiated) formations, these films are snapshots of a post-‘post-narrative’ filmmaking 
that is evolving. 
 Through a shift from the narratological to the complex systemic framework, I tried to 
show how three ‘post-narrative’ characteristics—self-reflexivity, loose causality and 
description—perform an organizational, rather than disorganizing, function in relation to the 
diegetic world. I linked these characteristics to processes necessary for the self-organization of 
complex systems, namely, self-observation/self-reference, aggregation (of units) and emergent 
pattern formation. Through these characteristics, texts produce wholes that are meaningful and 
communicate with the recipient in ways that ‘partly knock out the conscious mind’.  
 Literary theory, linguistics and semiotics are fields that study textual characteristics 
such as the ones I here connected to complex systemic functions. The study of language and 
texts is certainly not confined to the study of narratives. What I explored are the borders 
between narrative and these non-narrative forms, when they coexist textually, as in complex 
narratives. Moreover, I focused on how self-reflexivity, loose causality and description 
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produce systemic meaning, and by becoming the ordering principles of the film’s diegesis, 
turn the latter into a complex systemic entity. 
 There exist films that are perhaps even more causally loose, descriptive and self-
reflexive and that do not belong in the recent complex narrative tendency. Such films could 
be—and have been—called avant-garde, modernist or postmodern in different socio-historical 
periods. As to whether the complex systems framework can find a broader application in film 
analysis and be developed and applied in films and film constellations different from the ones 
I analyzed here, this is a question that future research could answer. The identification of links 
between specific textual characteristics and complex systemic functions I made in this 
dissertation will hopefully be useful to other researchers who are interested in exploring the 
organizational dynamics of ‘non-linear’ fictional films and possibly of other kinds of texts. 
These dynamics transcend the level of individual films, and reach out to their environment, 
which also becomes, in a process of reciprocal causality between the micro and the macro-
level, more complex. The existence of emergent dynamics shows texts not just as cultural 
products but as living cultural organizations, that determine and transform the cultural 
structures and the media that host them.  
 Having identified the links between textual modes and characteristics of complex 
systemic processes, I took a first step towards drawing a framework for the analysis of 
complex films. I did not however configure a specific complex systemic methodology for the 
analysis of individual complex films. This would be a second step worth pursuing in the 
future. The self-referential moments in a film’s plot and the agents’ interactions could be 
isolated in their units and analyzed more systematically in the patterns they form. In this 
respect, film analysis could borrow from the complex systemic epistemology terms and 
methods in order to build diegetic models that follow the units and their aggregates and better 
capture the reciprocal causality between different levels of diegetic organization (similar to the 
way agent-based approaches to complex systems do). With an eye to the increasing 
collaborations between film and media theorists and computer scientists, it seems reasonable 
for media theory to develop adequate tools and models and take advantage of the capability of 
computer simulations to follow collections of many heterogeneous elements and to foresee, 
identify or develop further their patterns. Then the nonlinear links between individual films, 
film tendencies and (changing) cinematic practices, as well as the reciprocal determination of 
these levels, could be explored, with potentially fascinating results for media and cultural 
studies. 
 
 By posing the question ‘before or beyond narrative’, already in the title of this 
dissertation, I do not imply that there is a need to make an exclusive choice between the two, 
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in an ‘either-or’ way. Rather, the two options, as I see them, contain and generate one another. 
Complex films are incomplete and open-ended narratives, as ‘before’ narrative would imply, 
but also formations that include and surpass narrative, multiplying it and miniaturizing it (as in 
Gomorrah), driving it out of control and observing it from a mocking distance (as in Burn 
After Reading), making it one instant in an ongoing loop (as in The Final Cut), and ultimately 
moving ‘beyond’ it. Before and beyond also refer to different but connected levels of analysis, 
the one of individual films and the other of film networks and networks of practices that 
constitute cinema as an institution. The complex systems framework allows us to address both 
levels, and most importantly, the emergent dynamics and feedback loops that connect them.  
 The narrative structure and analysis is of course still applicable to a large number of 
texts, and is also able to partially address the cinematic complex narratives that have been my 
focus here; however, narrative analysis has a blind spot, which becomes visible only from a 
different standpoint. It does not capture the other kinds of distributed and ‘dissipated’—in 
Prigogine’s terms—structures that contemporary society and its cultural products form, 
structures which follow a different kind of ‘order’ than narrative does, and envelop narrative 
in their own self-organizational drift. 
 I would situate complex films and complex cinema both before and beyond narrative, 
in the space of a temporal fold that every observation creates, as Luhmann would have it. In 
complex systems, the spatialization of time through the doubling moment of observation 
makes possible a temporalization of space. With every self-observation, a certain section of 
the past is selected to relate to the present, and the resulting organization also determines the 
future selections that a system will make, the paths that it will draw. The fragmented, 
recomposable and spatialized films of the complex narrative tendency mirror cinema’s own 
recomposable—at the current moment of observation—history. Cinema now ‘remembers’ its 
pre-narrative past (since narrative was established as a filmmaking form in the years between 
1907 and 1909) and prepares for itself a post-narrative future. It is a similar observation that 
complex films, the units of the complex organism called cinema, fractally produce and also 
demand from their viewers: by thematically playing with the idea of surveillance they 
formally create instances of distributed and multiplied observation. And by systemically 
observing their own constitution as narratives, they already situate themselves beyond it.  
 
 Four years ago, starting this dissertation without having the faintest idea about 
complex systems theory, and wanting to study contemporary films as cultural formations and 
not only as films, I decided to first pick certain films and follow their texts closely before 
linking them to a specific theoretical framework. I tried out many diverse theories, from 
philosophy to sociology, in order to approach theoretically the cultural function of ‘complex’ 
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films, but none of them seemed to fit all the cases; there was always something missing. 
Without abandoning the films I initially selected as cases, even when the theories I was trying 
out were failing, I feel like I gradually also witnessed an emergent process. These films 
seemed totally different at first, and the space they occupied discontinuous. However, the 
more I engaged in their plots, the more their dynamics showed me a common space, a pattern 
which all these cases form. The selection of the films was counter-intuitive; not only had these 
films not been classified under the complex narrative tendency by film theorists, but also they 
did not seem, at first sight, able to fit in it. However, considering the exceptions more 
illuminating for the rule than its ‘canonical’ cases, I believe I stayed truthful to these marginal 
cases, relating them together but not dissolving them into a unity, and connecting them with 
the broader cultural tendency of complex narratives in cinema without suppressing their 
differences from it. This, after all, is what (their) complexity is about: to distinguish some 
units, follow their aggregation in space and time, and to be ready to capture the pattern before 
it dissolves to new and unforeseeable shapes.      
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NOTES 
                                                
1 See Film Criticism’s special issue “Complex narratives” edited by Janet Staiger (fall 2006). For an 
overview of the wave of complex narratives in cinema and the theories about them see Simons 2008. 
2 Complex narratives have a long history in literature. Narrative “complexity” has been discussed by 
literary critics in relation to texts coming from entirely different backgrounds: the tradition of 
‘metanarration’, extending from Cervantes (Don Quixote, 1605, 1615) and Lawrence Sterne (Tristram 
Shandy, 1759) to Italo Calvino, the literary modernism of, among others, James Joyce, Marcel Proust 
and Virginia Woolf, or the late modernist movement of nouveau roman, are among the most oft-cited 
sources of complex narratives.  
3 Other oft-cited examples include: Twelve Monkeys (Terry Gilliam, 1995), Lost Highway (David 
Lynch, 1997), Sliding Doors (Peter Howitt, 1998), Fight Club (David Fincher, 1999), Code Unknown 
(Michael Haneke, 2000), Donnie Darko (Richard Kelly, 2001), The Others (Alejandro Amenábar, 
2001), Mulholland Drive (David Lynch, 2001), Irreversible (Irréversible, Gaspar Noé 2002), 21 
Grams (Alejandro González Iñárritu, 2003), Babel (Alejandro González Iñárritu, 2006), etc. 
4 Complex narration is not new in cinema either. Unconventional and ‘complex’ ways to present stories 
have proliferated in the various modernist avant gardes, the new waves of the 1960s and 1970s, the art 
film tradition, and even ‘classical’ Hollywood films in certain historical eras of “narrative 
experimentation” (e.g. Orson Welles’ Citizen Kane, RKO production, 1941). Besides Welles, other 
contemporary directors have been considered as pioneers of complex narratives in cinema: Alfred 
Hitchcock (The Trouble with Harry, 1955), Alain Resnais (Last Year at Marienbad [L'année dernière 
à Marienbad], 1961), Louis Buñuel (The Obscure Object of Desire [Cet obscur objet du désir], 1977), 
and Krzysztof Kieślowski (Blind Chance [Przypadek], 1981) are some oft-cited names. The work of 
these directors has been recently discussed through the lens of the contemporary complex film 
tendency: for Welles and Hitchcock, see Bordwell 2006: 74; for Resnais, see Alan Cameron 2008: 34; 
for Buñuel, see Marsha Kinder 2002; for Kieślowski, see Cameron 2008, Bordwell 2006 and Ruth 
Perlmutter 2002. 
5 Bordwell refers to three such eras: 1940-1955, mid-1960s – early 1970s and mid-1990s until today 
(see Bordwell 2006: 72-73). 
6 Two peaks in the debate about these new forms of cinematic narration took place in 2002 and 2006. 
In 2002, the articles on forking-path narratives that appeared in Substance#97 (Bordwell’s and 
Branigan’s contributions) opened a debate on the level of complexity that narratives can afford. In 
2006, apart from the publication of David Bordwell’s The Way Hollywood Tells It, which contained an 
extensive discussion of “puzzle” and “network” films, two special issues dedicated to this tendency 
appeared in the fall of the same year: Film Criticism’s “Complex narratives” edited by Janet Staiger 
and The Velvet Light Trap’s “Narrative and storytelling”. More recently, in 2009, the edited volume 
Puzzle Films (Warren Buckland) continued the debate and expanded culturally the scope of “complex 
storytelling” with the addition of many case studies from Asian cinema.  
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7 Several avant-garde literary movements, with the most striking example being perhaps that of 
nouveau roman, have relied on anti-novelistic and narratively unconventional ways of structuring 
stories, as prominent literary critics have discussed (see Kermode 2000: 22). The difference of the 
contemporary “complex narrative” tendency from such avant-garde experiments is the popularization 
and cultural pervasiveness that the traditionally unconventional means of narration now gain.  
8 Post-classical narratology incorporates into the study of narrative influences from post-colonial 
theory, gender studies, cognitive psychology and philosophy, and gives more emphasis to the medium-
specificity of narrative. For recent works that revise the classical narratological tradition see the book 
series Frontiers of Narrative (University of Nebraska Press, edited by D. Herman) and the series 
Narratologia, by the German publisher Walter de Gruyter, edited by Fotis Jannidis, Matías Martínez, 
John Pier and Wolf Schmid. 
9 According to Kenneth Bailey (1994: 121), the main currents in systems theory have been four: 
cybernetics, information theory, general systems theory (GST) and nonequilibrium thermodynamics 
(established through the work of Ilya Prigogine on entropy). According to Melanie Mitchell, the 
complex systems research has its predecessors in all those theoretical and scientific attempts (in 
cybernetics, GST, biology—with Humberto Maturana’s and Francisco Varela’s theory of 
“autopoiesis”—and physics, with Hermann Haken “synergetics” and Prigogine’s “nonequilibrium 
systems”) to find common and universal principles applying to different systems (see Mitchell 2009: 
297-298). 
10 For a detailed overview of the precursors of systems theories in Russia of the end of the 19th  and 
beginning of the 20th century, see Tikka 2008:72. Tikka also points to the German organicism of the 
1920s as a movement that anticipated systemic self-organization in biology, with a main representator 
the zoologist Jakob von Uexküll (2008: 73-75).  
11 For the epistemological background of simulation, see Hartmann 1996. For the use of simulation in 
complex systems modeling, see Law and Kelton 2000.  
12 A constitutive complex is, according to Ervin Laszlo (1972), one that exceeds the mere addition of 
its parts, acquiring a functional role of its own, and is thus differentiated from a summative complex.  
13 IMDb has been a popular object of research in several studies of systemic (network) complexity in 
the 2000s (indicatively see Ravasz and Barabási 2003). 
14 Narratives have been thought of in the context of complex systems in the past, and in this respect the 
work of Hayles in the context of literary texts has been significant. In film theory, this direction has not 
been pursued as systematically, although there have been theorizations of groups of complex films with 
an eye to complex systems theories (this is the case in some of Bordwell’s writings and also in Wendy 
Everett’s conceptualization of the ‘fractal’ films). Jan Simons has linked the group of contemporary 
complex narratives in cinema with narrative as a complex system (2008). Allan Cameron has also 
referred to the play between contingency and order in his ‘modular’ films, although he associates this 
interplay with modernism and not with complexity theory (2008: 26). This dissertation, although 
posing certain counter-arguments to the association of narrative with complexity, would not have been 
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possible if the aforementioned but also other scholars had not already opened up a ‘space’ for the 
connection between texts and complex systems.  
15 Characteristic of this tendency is Bordwell’s discussion of multiple-draft films in his article “Film 
Futures”, which turned the issue of complex films into a point of controversy in contemporary film 
theory. 
16 Emphasizing their complex function I do not deny the existence of—an often overt— thematic 
influence by complexity theory on contemporary films. This influence has been stressed by other 
theorists as well. For instance Wendy Everett provides examples of scenes that directly refer to chaos 
theory, in films such as Free Radicals, Magnolia, Amelie, The Butterfly Effect (see Everett 2005).  
17 Taglines retrieved from IMDb. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0364343/taglines.  
18 IMDb mentions Vancouver and Berlin as filming locations. 
19 ‘Hakman’ literally means ‘cutter’ in German. 
20 According to the Classic Encyclopedia (online encyclopedia based on the 11th edition of the 
Encyclopedia Britannica), a “sin-eater” is “a man who for trifling payment was believed to take upon 
himself, by means of food and drink, the sins of a deceased person. The custom was once common in 
many parts of England and in the highlands of Scotland, and survived until recent years in Wales and 
the counties of Shropshire and Herefordshire.”  
21 This happens in The Final Cut, but also in various other films, such as The Sixth Sense (1999), 
Donnie Darko (2001), Cypher (2002), Casshern (2004) etc.  
22As cinema foreboded at the expiration of the 19th century, the objectification of technology does no 
longer seem manageable. Our time and our perception is cyborgian. The ‘machine’ is not a graspable 
thing anymore, it is everywhere and nowhere, but most importantly, it is inside our bodies, it is us, as 
Donna Haraway would say (see Haraway 1991).  
23 José van Dijck finds that The Final Cut “coveys a philosophical reflexivity based on Deleuze’s 
contention that cinema is not about concepts, but is itself a conceptual tool” (van Dijck 2008). My 
intention is to use the film as a conceptual tool to rethink the notion of reflexivity.   
24 In the 1990s, with a scholarship by the Fares Foundation, Naim began his studies at the Emerson 
College, Boston. The Final Cut, with a total domestic gross of $551,281 (according to the Box Office 
Mojo database, see http://boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=finalcut.htm), had a rather disappointing 
career at the box office, for a Lionsgate production. It was however nominated in a number of festivals 
and awarded the prize for “best screenplay” at the Deauville Film Festival, 2004. 
25 Grand Theater is a documentary about the Lebanese Civil War. 
26 See also the chapter “VR from Cimnemonics to Digitime” in Stewart 2007: 164- 203. 
27 The faded sepia colors of the scene, as well as its placement in the beginning of the film before the 
credits, give some indication that it might be temporally situated in the past. The scene thus temporally 
anchors the film to the past and prepares the viewer for a return to it.  
28 In this respect, the opening of The Final Cut brings to mind the self-referential opening of the 
classical Hollywood films, which, according to Elsaesser and Buckland, suggests a mise-en-abyme 
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“condensation” of the whole film, as well as a “manual” for the viewer’s interpretation. (2002: 47). 
However, in The Final Cut, the opening is as much guiding as misguiding. 
29 In his book on modular narratives Cameron emphasizes the elements of redemption in the films 21 
Grams and Irreversible (2008: 35). Both Cameron and Sean Cubitt, through the latter’s book The 
Cinema Effect and the chapter “Infernal Affairs and the Ethics of Complex Narrative” that they co-
wrote (in Puzzle Films, 2009), have set the basis for a more elaborate ethical critique of the 
puzzle/complex film tendency.  
30 The moment when Alan runs away from the ‘scene of the crime’ and we watch him passing in front 
of the wall where his name is written with big capital letters, could be seen from a Lacanian 
perspective as the ‘symbolic birth’ of the character.  
31 Johnny Mnemonic is a film based on the homonymous cyberpunk novel by William Gibson. 
32 According to Stewart, the implant has already a totalizing effect upon consciousness, lived 
experience and memory: “With no lag time between perception and desire, with all impressions 
instantaneously retraced in process, such an omnivorous totality has […] excluded from its 
transcriptive register anything we would really call ‘memory’ in the first place.” (2006: 189)   
33 Retrieved from http://www.investor.amctheatres.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=144188 
34 For the same reason Charles Ramirez-Berg excludes from his taxonomy of alternative plots science 
fiction films such as The Matrix, because he finds that their non-linear temporality is genre-dependent, 
and fundamentally remains a linear quest for truth (or “for deciphering the mystery”) by a single 
protagonist, without allowing for alternative interpretations (2006: 11-12). 
35 This digital recording eliminates, according to Stewart, the time-lapse characteristic of filmic 
temporality (linked to the virtualization of the present, according to Deleuze) and leads to the 
alienation of experience and self-consciousness. 
36 In philosophy, reflexivity has been associated with self-reflection as a generative condition of self-
consciousness and subjectivity itself. Since Descartes’s cogito ergo sum, the subject’s critical reflection 
is the foundation of its relation to the world. However, the “reflexive” turning of the subject upon 
itself, making itself the object of its own reflection, became more explicitly, after Kant and through 
German Idealism (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel)—and especially with Hegel and Nietzsche—a procedure 
not presupposing but constituting subjectivity (Stern 2000: 114). Michel Foucault (1984: 41) 
considered reflexivity inherent to modernity’s ethos, which requires from the subject of reason to 
subject itself to this very reason. According to Foucault, reflexivity, as soon as it embraces the 
unthought and “articulates itself upon it”, is not compatible with Enlightenment and its project 
(Foucault 1970: 325). This happens because reflexivity shifts the focus on issues of relativity, 
difference and the “unthought”, and constitutes, as scholars like Hilary Lawson have pointed out, “the 
postmodern predicament” (Lawson 1987). With the circular dynamics it develops, reflexivity becomes, 
as Dick Pels notes, “a standing critique of linear narratives, both everyday and scientific, which rely 
upon an objectivist ontology and a conventional logic of representation”. The result is “a radical 
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uncertainty in all our accounts of the world and in all our critical maneuvers in the agonistic space of 
science” (Pels 2003: 177).  
37 Anthropology and sociology were significantly affected by the impact of reflexivity in the 1970s and 
1980s. Particularly these fields tried to render reflexivity into a methodology of research. For the 
reflexive methods in anthropology see Scholte 1972, and for a critical perspective on them see Salzman 
2002. For the discussions over reflexivity in Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) and its kin field 
of Science and Technology Studies (STS) see the work of Alvin Gouldner, considered as the founder 
of “reflexive sociology”. In the 1980s Steven Woolgar and Malcolm Ashmore made important 
contributions in the field of SSK with their declaration that “the exploration of reflexivity is the next 
natural development of the relativist-constructivist perspective in the social study of science” (Woolgar 
and Ashmore 1988: 7). Ashmore’s work The reflexive thesis: Wrighting sociology of scientific 
knowledge, published in 1989, re-reads the whole recent history of SSK (since the 1970s) through the 
scope of reflexivity, making links to similar concerns about reflexivity in other fields. Ashmore’s book 
furthermore contains an “encyclopedia of reflexivity”, as an attempt to clarify misunderstandings about 
this complicated term. In the 1990s Barry Sandywell’s large-scope work Logological Investigations 
(1996) connected reflexivity not so much with postmodernism, as with the phenomenological, 
hermeneutic and praxiological traditions. Sandywell’s conception of 20th century reflexivity has 
affinities with Scott Lash’s “hermeneutic reflexivity” (1994).  
38 This iterative process tends to be triggered by first-degree self-reference itself. In philosophy, the 
self-referentiality of the self’s constitution is a paradoxical process which has troubled many thinkers. 
Dieter Henrich’s account of Fichte’s theory of self-reference reveals a “double aporia”: “The double 
aporia besetting the theory of reflection […] is that, first, the subject must somehow exist prior to the 
reflexive turn in virtue of which it becomes its own object, but this undermines the assertion that it is 
reflection itself that constitutes subjectivity; and secondly, in order for the subject to recognize itself as 
the object of its reflective act, it must presuppose a knowledge of itself that is supposed to be explained 
by the theory of reflection” (Stern 2000: 114—referring to Dieter Henrich’s “Selbstbewußtsein. 
Kritische Einleitung in eine Theorie”, 1970 and “Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht”, 1970).  
39 Genette’s narratological model is considered to be one of the most refined in the study of narrative. It 
discriminates between three basic entities: story, narrative and narration (histoire – récit  – narration) 
and four analytical categories: mood, narrating instance, level, and time.  
40 The debate over the role of the narrating instance in narrative dates back to proto-narratological 
concerns such as the one expressed by the critics Friedrich Spielhagen and Käte Friedemann. The 
former declared, anno 1883 (Beiträge zur Theorie und Technik des Romans), that “the ideal narrative 
never alerts the reader to the ongoing process of narration” while the latter (Die Rolle des Erzählers in 
der Epik, 1910) considered the narrating instance an indispensible feature of narrative (Meister 2010). 
41 Here ‘purity’ is not meant as qualitative category; it rather refers to the linguistic ‘autonomy’ of 
narrative in relation to other modes of linguistic expression.  
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42 According to Nünning’s classification (as summarized by Monika Fludernik, 2003: 4), metanarrative 
remarks in different media include: “stage directions, references to previous or later sections of 
narrative, and self-reflexive passages – these all invoke the narrator figure and the act of narration as 
well as the very process of narration.” 
43 Christian Metz, drawing on Benveniste, related the absence of self-referential discourse in (classical) 
film with ideology (when the purity of histoire gives the impression of objectivity) and employed 
psychoanalysis to explain the workings of filmic enunciation (see Metz 1985). 
44 Early “rube films”, such as Uncle Josh at the Moving Picture Show (Edwin S. Porter/ Edison, 1902), 
displayed self-reflexivity, most of the times involving situations of “film within a film”, as Elsaesser 
points out (2006). Elsaesser considers rube films symptomatic of a transition from cinema of 
attractions to cinema of narrative integration, but also as characteristic illustrations of his expanded 
notion of diegesis, which incorporates the deictic dimensions of discourse, still apparent in early 
cinema, with the temporal and spatial markers of narrative.  
45 Barthes’ text has also been influential for the theory and practice of hypertext literature; see the 
“Electronic Labyrinth” project (Keep, McLaughlin and Parmar 1995).  
46 In addition, Ruby mentions that (self-)reflexivity is not always a product of the “intentionality and 
deliberateness” of the makers, mentioning examples of “accidental reflexivity” in documentary films, 
which he regards as “narcissistic”, because of the lack of any intention to ‘arouse’ the spectator’s 
consciousness in them. 
47 Lash here refers to Umberto Eco’s A theory of semiotics, 1976.  
48 Here there is an echo of the distinction between the “two avant-gardes” that Peter Wollen made in 
the 1970s, one represented by the—mostly New York-based—“co-opt” movement and mainly 
focusing on the “play of the signifier” remaining indifferent to signification, and the other by European 
modernist filmmakers such as “Godard, Straub and Huillet, Hanoun, Jancso”, who remained to some 
extent devoted to a ‘mission’ of constructing a new cinematic language, which would break with older 
bourgeois chains of signification but still maintain a dialectical relationship between signifier and 
signified. See Wollen 1975.  
49 Cameron, who finds that contemporary “modular” narratives in cinema display mainly “an analytic 
perspective on time” rather than “an analytic perspective on narrative” (2008: 25), appears reluctant to 
regard the traditional notion of self-reflexivity as a key feature of these films. He thus finds that “the 
precursor to the contemporary modular narrative is not so much the self-reflexive games of such 
French New Wave directors as Jean-Luc Godard, but more the contemporaneous ‘New Cinema’ of 
Alain Resnais” (1998: 34). However, the play with time in films such as Last Year at Marienbad is 
also self-reflexive in a metanarrational sense.  
50 In his Figures III, parts of which compose the translated book Narrative Discourse, Genette made a 
complex analysis of a paradigmatic complex novel, Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu. 
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51 As Frank notes (1978: 278), more developments in the coming decades after WWII (especially the 
influence of linguistics and structuralism) attracted the attention of subsequent critics and narratologists 
on how the relations in a text are spatial rather than temporal. 
52 Ludwig von Bertalanffy in his General system theory: Foundations, development, applications (first 
published in the U.S.A. in 1969) refers to the “systems science” of his times as being centered in 
“computer technology, cybernetics, automation and systems engineering” (2001: vii).  
53 Steven J. Bartlett has been the first editor who, together with Peter Suber, contributed to the 
publication of an interdisciplinary historical overview of the concept of reflexivity: Self-reference: 
Reflections on reflexivity (1987). 
54 The most significant inconsistencies appeared in the gulf of mathematical set theory as paradoxes, 
just a few of the most well-known of which are Cantor’s paradox (1899), Russel’s paradox (1901), and 
the Zermelo-Konig paradox (1905). The culmination of reflexive undermining of the “formal deductive 
systems” came, according to Bartlett (1992: 6), with Godel’s “incompleteness theorem” (1931), and 
the research that it triggered that brought about even more ‘proofs’ of undecidability.  
55 The Macy Conferences on Cybernetics, sponsored by the Josiah Macy Foundation, took place on an 
annual base between 1946 and 1953, and many prominent scientists of the period took part in them, 
like Claude Shannon, Norbert Wiener, John von Neumann and Warren McCulloch (Hayles 1999: 7). 
The development of systems theoretical thinking in the specific time period and geocultural area can be 
traced through the history of the conferences. 
56 Other participants in the Macy conferences had also made contributions towards the same direction; 
for instance psychoanalyst Lawrence Kubie suggested to combine systems theory with the 
psychoanalytic approach to language (Hayles 1995: 84). 
57 Hayles is critical towards this shift in the conceptualization of reflexivity, which, as she argues, came 
at a high cost: the “erasure of the environment”, reducing it to the status of a medium with which the 
organism effectuates “structural couplings”. This is a point of criticism that Hayles addresses to 
Luhmann’s epistemology too, which is based on Maturana’s theory of autopoiesis. Hayles implies that 
what Maturana started (a tendency of systemic closure and erasure of environment) continued in the 
work of Luhmann. The closure of the autopoietic theory downplays, according to her, the importance 
of the “living systems’ explosive potential for transformation” (Hayles 1999: 147). In this way, the 
theory might gain in epistemology, but is not capable of accounting “for dynamic interactions that are 
not circular in their effects” (ibid), that is, that do not have as their only goal the homeostatic 
preservation of the organism’s structure. According to my opinion, this criticism is partially valid: 
indeed Luhmann’s systems theory is not yet influenced by the complex systems developments in other 
fields like physics and thermodynamics. It also tends to exclude the not-meaningful information as 
“noise” (see Leydesdorff 2000: 277, 286). Still, the criticism does not do full justice to Luhmann’s 
approach, because Luhmann’s theory contradicted the sociological Parsonian model of social systems 
(based on equilibrium), and emphasized the increasing complexity and thus evolution that a system 
achieves through structural coupling. As Kenneth Bailey suggests, in the context of cybernetics and 
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systems theory, Luhmann’s theory of social systems can be seen as an attempt, parallel to those of 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy and Ilya Prigogine, to couple the second law of thermodynamics (increase of 
entropy) with organizational complexity (see Bailey 1994: 150).  
58 Systems theory had already a background in sociology, mainly through Talcott Parson’s 
functionalism. Although Luhmann has been a student of Parsons, the latter’s (Parson’s) account of 
social systems emphasized equilibrium and its ‘automatic’ restoration in social systems. For a 
discussion of the differences between the Parsonian and the “new” systems theory in sociology (under 
which Luhmann’s work can also be classified)—see Bailey 1994.  
59 Hayles notes that Maturana distinguishes between the functional circularity of systems in themselves 
and the inferences that an external observer (scientist) makes about them, studying them in the context 
of their environment. In Maturana’s epistemology, reflexivity seems to rely on the self-awareness of 
the borders between the observer and what is being observed, borders that also define the object of 
study (organism) as separate from the scientific subject (scientist) (Hayles 1999: 142).  
60 In order to provide an answer to “the Kantian quest for the condition of possibility of experience”, 
traditional ontology had to invent the subject-observer (Luhmann 1995b: 50). On the contrary, in social 
systems theory, there can be no systemic Subject, observing itself from a transcendental vantage point. 
The subjective moment becomes duplicated, because the subjective pole is already induced as being 
observed by another system–—which need not be only human but also animal, machinic, social… 
(Katti 2002: 63); and the only sense of individuality that can remain lies in the functioning of systems 
as “closed, circular, self-referential network[s]” (Luhmann 1990: 18).  
61 In his book The Reality of the Mass Media (2000b—originally published in German in 1996 by 
Westdeutscher Verlag), Luhmann emphasizes the systemic processes involved in the way media 
double and construct reality.  
62 Here, meaning has a systemic sense. It has to do with a selection according to the system’s 
organization and internal coherence, rather than with a rational form of intelligibility that the common 
sense of the word meaning implies.  
63 Social Systems was originally published in German in 1984, as Soziale systeme: Grundriß einer 
allgemeinen theorie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag).  
64 In Bal, fabula (defined as “a series of logically and chronologically related events that are caused or 
experienced by actors”, Bal 1985: 5) is distinguished from ‘story’, which is the particular way in which 
the fabula is presented through a text. Bal here combines Genette’s distinction between story and 
discourse (histoire/récit) and the earlier one by the Russian Formalists, between fabula and syuzhet.  
65 By contrast, Katherine Hayles stresses the difference between narratives and autopoietic systems, 
having particularly in mind Maturana’s and Luhmann’s theories. According to her, narrative is a 
contextual form of meaning-making, which always exceeds the “closed” borders of autopoietic 
systems, and implies the existence of a future goal and a sense of past and present that systems do not 
have (see Hayles 1995). Nonetheless, Hayles finds more connections between narratives and other, not 
autopoietic, strands of systems theory, such as chaos theory (see Hayles 1991).  
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66 Basal self-reference is the self-referential observation upon the way a system selects its elements in a 
contingent way, out of the unorganized and noisy complexity of its environment. 
67 In his 1966 article “Reflexive Mechanismen” Luhmann “introduced the distinction between 
reflexivity and reflexion depending on whether an act refers to another act of similar kind or to the 
system which it is part of respectively” (Rossbach 2000: p. 11 notes). Rossbach indicates pages 99-100 
in Luhmann’s untranslated article.  
68 As Luhmann notes, “Here the self that refers itself is not an aspect of the distinction but a process 
constituted by it” (1995a: 443). 
69 Every selection made by the system—which can be binary codified in relation to the options that 
were not selected—feeds back upon the system becoming a new selector and making the system more 
complex (see Leydesdorff 2000: 286). Reflexivity is related to feedback but also to “feed-before” 
mechanisms (see Ciborra 2004).  
70 Apart from Luhmann, Francisco Varela and mathematician Louis Kauffman have also developed the 
notion of re-entry, extending it into a “calculus of self-reference”. See Kauffman and Varela  (1980).  
71 “A distinction discriminates; its mere occurrence creates a difference. To become relevant as form, 
the occurrence must be observed (retrospectively by the same system, simultaneously or later by 
another system); only then does the unity of the distinction become apparent as the blind spot that 
enables observation. This unity remains invisible while the distinction is used—this holds for all 
distinctions. It is as indisputable as our certainty about the world, a certainty based on inaccessibility.”  
(Luhmann 2000a: 32) 
72 Here Luhmann’s conceptualization of reflexive temporality could be paralleled to Augustine’s idea 
of distensio (a mode of temporally distended attentiveness, explained in Augustine’s Confessions), 
which Paul Ricoeur applied to the analysis of narrative—as well as Frank Kermode and Joseph Frank 
did earlier, the latter in the context of his theory of the “spatial form of narrative” (Frank 1977: 246). 
Ricoeur finds that in Augustinian time, as opposed to Aristotelian time, “the future and the past exist 
only in relation to a present, that is, to an instance indicated by the utterance designating it. The past is 
before and the future is after [not by means of movement from cause to effect, as in Aristotle, but] only 
with respect to this present possessing the relation of self-reference, attested to by the very act of 
uttering something” (Ricoeur 1988: 19). As Haridimos Tsoukas and Mary Jo Hatch note in their 
narrative approach to complexity, distensio creates the experience of temporality, when past and future 
are bridged in the present moment: “it is the relationship between expectation, memory and attention 
forged by distensio that gives us the experience of time” (Tsoukas and Hatch 2001: 1005). However, 
Ricoeur finds that “Augustine’s attempt to found the measurement of time in the distension of the mind 
alone” (15) does not suffice to solve what Ricoeur calls the “aporia of temporality”, as the latter needs 
a combination of the human and the cosmological time (14), which narrative poetics effectuate, 
“between internal time-consciousness and objective succession” (22).  
73 Luhmann notes that every event is a self-referential element because it reflexively refers to other 
events (1995a: 509n). 
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74 Luhmann stressed the factor of contingency in systems. As he writes, “action cannot be 
temporalized, cannot be anchored to a specific temporal point, without a certain component of surprise, 
without deviation from what is factually fixed. Therefore without an aspect of surprise there would be 
no structural formation because nothing would happen for other things to link onto.” (Luhmann 1995a: 
288)   
75 Joel and Ethan Coen refer to these “two worlds” in their interview at about.com guide (see 
Bibliography). Although it received mixed critiques, Burn After Reading was a financial success, and 
became “the second highest-grossing [Coen] film to date” (Doom 2009: 174), with a $37 million 
budget, and over $60 million gross. 
76 Commenting on the music score by Carter Burwell in Burn After Reading, Joel Coen mentions: “We 
wanted something big and bombastic, something important sounding but absolutely meaningless” 
(Coen 2008).  
77 According to Edward Branigan, “surface” POVs are point-of-view shots representing what the 
character sees. Borrowing the distinction between intenal and external focalization by Genette, 
Branigan notes that surface POVs form part of internal focalization, but they are contrasted to other, 
“deep” types of it, which reproduce the character’s mental state (see Branigan 1992: 112, 179). In 
Branigan’s classification, internal focalization differs from the external one; the latter is achieved 
through eyeline matches (shots following the direction of the character’s look and establishing 
continuity through reverse shots), and not through POVs (ibid: 179). Thus, all POVs are instances of 
internal focalization. 
78 Sandy’s plotting, concealed in the most part of the film, becomes disclosed only near the end. Her 
secret plan, however, has been one of the most important for the cultivation of Burn After Reading’s 
paranoid atmosphere. 
79 The comment, reproduced from prejudicemadeplausible.wordpress.com, appears under the title “The 
Coens’ funniest film since ‘The Big Lebowski’” in the IMDb user reviews for Burn After Reading 
(posting date 12 September 2008). 
80 The emphasis upon positive feedback is what differentiates, according to Maruyama, the first from 
the “second cybernetics”. 
81 In this context, Robert Detmering hints at the importance of informational networks in Burn After 
Reading and considers the film as a useful example for information literacy education. According to 
him, “Burn after Reading becomes a satire of information literacy and the political information 
networks that dictate what can be known and by whom” (Detmering 2010: 273).  
82 The same pattern on zooming-in and out of the globe is found also in other films, such as Men in 
Black (Sonnenfeld 1997) and Night on Earth (Jarmusch 1991)—with the latter offering a lower-tech 
version of this shot. 
83 Although the role of causality in narratives is very important, for some narratologists it is not the 
defining characteristic of narrative. Coste maintains that “nontransactive narratemes”, which do not 
involve a change of state brought by a subject to an object (or another subject), are “narratemes of 
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simple ‘becoming’” and do not need an “external agent of change” (Coste 1989: 42). Change may as 
well be internal, without being non-narrative. Thus, elements that for other narratologists are not 
included in the narrative, such as descriptive texts or passages within a text, or “nontransactive 
narratemes” and “descriptemes” for Coste, are still parts of the narrative, as “they make use of some 
temporal coordinates without necessarily inferring any form of causality” (ibid: 51). This view, 
however, is already oriented, through the notion of “narratemes”, to narrative pieces or units instead of 
narrative as a whole.   
84 For an analytic description of these five stages through examples such as The Swan-geese fairy tale 
(also analyzed by Vladimir Propp) and Henry James’s In the Cage, see Todorov 1971.   
85 With regard to the static and dynamic nature of motifs, Todorov draws on the Russian Formalist 
Boris Tomashevsky. 
86 Berg notes that, although Robert Altman’s Nashville (1975) has been considered as a 
characteristic—and pioneer—example of the revival of this type of plot, its origins are to be found in 
the big studio practices of the 1930s. For instance, MGM launched the trend of ‘all star casts’ in 
multiple-character films such as Grand Hotel and Dinner at Eight. According to film theorist Paul 
Kerr, these multiple-protagonist films continued being produced after the war in many different 
countries, from Japan to Mexico, and became again popular in the mid-1990s (Kerr 2010: 38). Other 
authors give more emphasis to the differentiation of contemporary complex films from older 
‘ensemble’ films, which they consider more traditional. For instance, Evan Smith (2000) points at 
contemporary complex films that contain fragmented “thread structures”, as their characters do not 
necessarily form part of the same “single dramatic journey”, but have independent trajectories. 
87 Kerr has also referred to network narratives as “tales of interlocking lives and converging fates” 
(2010: 38). According to him, the popularization of this narrative strategy is relevant to the 
transnational networks imposed by the fiscal strategies of film production, and reflects the cross-
cultural and cross-national mobilization of directors (many of whom belong to an emerging ‘social 
class’ of expatriates), crew, and funds. He considers Alejandro González Iñárritu’s film Babel as a 
paradigmatic case of this filmic tendency.   
88 Convergences and connections are sometimes technologically mediated and sometimes not. Wesley 
Beal, who finds network narratives to be “the narrativized theorization of connectivity”, or a way of 
“narrating the network”, distinguishes two axes along which this connectivity becomes manifest: “a 
characterological axis that sketches connectivity along unmediated links of human relationships” and 
“the material axis, which sketches interrelationships according to concrete systems—the internet, the 
radio, the railroad, etc.” (2009: 405). We saw both these axes being present in Burn After Reading, 
where the lives of the individual characters get entangled through ‘acquaintances of acquaintances’ or 
through technological means such as a CD, and the internet.  
89 In Physics II 3 and Metaphysics V2 Aristotle defined four categories of causes of change in nature: 
the material cause (the matter of an object), the formal cause (its shape), the efficient cause (the agency 
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that triggers a change of state in an object), and the final cause (the end-state of the change, or its 
purpose). 
90 Following a categorical form of organization, a film provides different examples/categories of the 
same subject.  
91 Branigan differentiates narratives from heaps, considering the two as different types of data 
organization: “The film’s events are linked together [as “focused causal chains”] by probability 
whereas elements of a heap or a catalogue are all equally likely with no single element necessary” 
(1992: 26). 
92 The type of communication to which I am referring here is the systemic communication of the film 
at the level of its components, and not the narrational “communication” between narrator and narratee 
through the film’s text (which has to do with the amount of information that is shared with the 
viewers). 
93 Branigan points out that it is information’s disparity that makes narrative possible. In a world where 
all information is “equally available” there is no need for narrative (1992: 66). He describes narratives 
in dynamic terms, as “a rapid oscillation in the balance of knowledge” between viewer, focalizer and 
narration (81). However, communication that makes a system more knowledgeable as a whole than it is 
when its units are taken independently, does not necessarily have to be called narrative, especially 
when the latter refers to a type of cognitive organization which boils down, according to Branigan 
himself, to a “cause-effect chain of events with a beginning, middle, and end”.  
94 “Agent-based” simulations of complex systems, also referred to as “multi-agent approaches”, are 
used in the study of natural, economical and social systems. Referring to such simulations, computer 
scientist Pierre Marcenac distinguishes between “micro-agents” who lack knowledge of global 
constraints, “medium-agents” who model the interactions of micro-agents and who feed back (through 
a process called “back-propagation”) upon the micro-agents’s behavior, introducing constraints to it, 
and lastly, “macro-agents”, who observe self-organization and “generate” the medium-agents that 
model it (1998).  
95 Strong emergence holds that the new properties of a system are not connected to the system’s 
previous states but rather consist in ontologically novel properties. Thus, although it shares the 
attributes of “supereminence” and “downward causation” with weak emergence, strong emergence 
denies the existence of any kind of link between “the aggregation of the micro-level potentialities” and 
“the supervenient downward causal powers” upon them (Bedau 1997: 377). However, as Jaegwon Kim 
stresses (2006: 200-201), talking about human consciousness as an emergent property (based on the 
complex interactions of the brain’s neural network), this negative—because of the absence of causal 
links—definition of irreducible, “strong” emergence tells nothing about what emergence is, and about 
the relations that connect the different levels with each other. Thus he poses the challenge for the 
researchers of emergence “to show that emergent properties do not succumb to the threat of 
epiphenomenalism, and that emergent phenomena can have causal powers vis-à-vis physical 
phenomena.”  
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96 Chalmers (2006) has suggested the term “intermediate emergence” to describe systems “in which 
high-level facts and laws are not deducible from low-level laws (combined with initial conditions)” and 
in this case, a change of level is necessary in order to understand the emergent procedure, a level in 
which combinations not deducible from the basic laws but only effectuated with a change of initial 
conditions occur.  
97 There is also critique to this ‘synthetic’ approach. It has been argued that simulation already creates a 
somewhat isolated system in the beginning. According to Katherine Hayles, similar bottom-up 
approaches in the field of Artificial Life remain reductionist: “In place of predictability, which is 
traditionally the test of whether a theory works, they emphasize emergence. Instead of starting with a 
complex phenomenal world and reasoning back through chains of inference to what the fundamental 
elements must be, they start with the elements, complicating the elements through appropriately 
nonlinear processes so that the complex phenomenal world appears on its own” (Hayles 1999: 231-
232). According to Hayles, the “analytic approach” of breaking down reality into more and more 
simple constituent parts that could be treated mathematically, in Artificial Life is supplemented by a 
“synthetic approach”, according to which the system is able to generate “complexities” spontaneously, 
in a procedure of emergence (234). However, both the analytic and the synthetic aproach, Hayles 
maintains, are just the two sides of the same coin, as synthesis presupposes analysis, and emergence 
presupposes reduction. Hayles’ criticism is not unjustified. As computer scientist Ashok Sengupta also 
notes, adding complexity to the so far mainly linear scientific approaches “seeks to break down natural 
systems to their simple constituents whose properties are expected to combine in a relatively simple 
manner to yield the complex laws of the whole” (2006: vii-viii). However, the benefits of simulation 
and bottom-up approaches to complexity should not be dismissed altogether. My position is closer to 
the one of philosopher Manuel De Landa, who shares some of Hayles’ concerns but still finds value in 
bottom-up approaches. According to him, “emergent […] properties belong to the interactions between 
parts, so it follows that a top-down analytical approach that begins with the whole and dissects it into 
its constituent parts (an ecosystem into species, a society into institutions), is bound to miss precisely 
those properties. In other words, analyzing a whole into parts and then attempting to model it by 
adding up the components will fail to capture any property that emerged from complex interactions, 
since the effect of the latter may be multiplicative (e.g., mutual enhancement) and not just additive” 
(2009: 17-18). The determining factor here is the degree of spontaneity with which the properties 
emerge in simulations. In De Landa’s own emergent approach to the historical development of 
societies, starting from the basic subsets of geological and organic materials, each layer co-exists and 
interacts with others in a nonlinear fashion. So, viewed from the scope of emergence, the units and the 
subsets they form are not closed entities anymore, but open to interaction, re-negotiation and mutation 
(De Landa 2009: 21). 
98 According to Peter Corning (2002: 22), synergy refers to “the combined (cooperative) effects that are 
produced by two or more particles, elements, parts or organisms—effects that are not otherwise 
attainable.”  
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99 John Holland maintains that complex adaptive systems have four properties: aggregation—
sometimes also referred to as the “synergistic” attribute of emergence—diversity, flows, and 
nonlinearity (1995: 10-37). 
100 This mathematical model is an alternative to the thermodynamical model of Ilya Prigogine. 
101 Instability, appropriation of randomness, as well as “the actualization of potentials” are also causally 
related to emergence in dynamical systems —the latter being the effect of the former three attributes 
(ibid).  
102 With ‘retrospectively’ here I do not refer so much to a temporal but to a structural category. It is not 
necessarily after the film/narrative that causality is established as a top-down process, but also during 
the film/narrative, through a process of trial and error of different, tentative narratives and causal-
logical sequences, characteristic of which is the process followed by the recipient in the case of 
detective stories.   
103 The phrases in quotation marks are Nietzsche’s formulations in The Will to Power (1967, section 
477, p. 551). Boje also quotes Nietzsche’s phrase that causality is “an invention, a projection of our 
will onto an event, making some other event responsible for something that happens” (Boje 2001: 93).  
104 The citation is from Ann Langley’s article “Strategies for Theorizing from Process Data” (The 
Academy of Management Review, 24(4), 1999).  
105 Sengupta notes that in fact these two factors are the prerequisite for complexity: “In the vision 
proposed by complexity, we can identify forms and evolutive characteristics common to all, or almost 
all, systems that are made up of numerous elements, between which there are reciprocal, nonlinear 
interactions and positive feedback mechanisms. These systems, precisely for this reason, are generally 
called complex systems.” (Sengupta 2006: 269). 
106 Marion makes reference to Stuart Kauffman’s The Origins of Order (1993, p. 37). 
107 Network science (as opposed to network theory) is a relatively recently scientific field devoted to 
the study of networks as complex systems. Although the study of networks preexisted in various 
disciplines, from mathematics to sociology, it is only in the last decade that a unified science of 
networks made its appearance, with “a growing group of applied mathematicians and physicists [who] 
have become interested in developing a set of unifying principles governing networks of any sort” 
(Mitchell 2009: 230). The development of network science moves beyond the static (or reductive) 
graphic depiction of networks and considers how emergence takes place in them. The science of 
networks as complex systems uses models from statistical physics in order to analyze networks as 
dynamical processes, and not anymore as “haphazard sets of points and connections” (or 
“nodes”/“vertices” and “edges”/“links”, in the language of graph theory). As Barrat, Barthelemy and 
Vespigniani point out, dynamical and statistical approaches to complex phenomena are similar, in that 
their aim is “to predict the large-scale emergent properties of a system by studying the collective 
dynamics of its constituents” (2008: 64).  
108 Emirbayer and Goodwin also refer to a model of “structuralist constructionism” as the one that 
achieved some relative balance in its payment of attention both to individual agency and cultural 
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determinations. However, this model also again fails—according to the writers— to adequately deal 
with the “interconnections among culture, agency, and social structure” (1994: 1436).  
109 Todorov formulated this model through his analysis of Boccacio’s Decameron in the 1960s, a 
period when the popularity of functionalism in sociology had started fading, but not the interest in 
equilibrium. 
110 Research in the field of nonequilibrium thermodynamics contributed to a paradigm shift with regard 
to entropy, which was initially considered to indicate the gradual disorganization and ‘death’ of a 
system. Out-of-equilibrium processes maximize entropy but also create—in open systems—an order 
that is different from the one of systems in equilibrium. This order is produced by the self-organization 
of a system in a “state of increased complexity” (Prigogine and Stengers 1997: 64). Thus 
nonequilibrium and entropy can be considered forms of organization. 
111 Beyond the Parsonian tradition, social systems theory also engaged with Maturana’s and Varela’s 
research on self-organization and autopoiesis. Here the social domain is viewed as composed by 
“networks and hierarchies of intersecting systems of operationally closed and structurally coupled 
individuals”—such as biological organisms (in the case of autopoiesis) or social systems. According to 
the social systems theory, each agent makes its unique “structural adjustment”, depending on its 
particular ontogenetic history, in order to contribute to the overall pattern, the “structure” or “norm” 
(Goldspink and Kay 2007: 51).  
112 According to Bailey (1994: 121), there are four main currents in systems theory: nonequilibrium 
thermodynamics (established through the work of Prigogine on entropy), cybernetics, information 
theory and general systems theory (GST). These currents with their combined principles generate the 
transdisciplinary field of “new”, as Bailey calls it, complex systems theory. 
113 Albert Einstein and Josiah Willard Gibbs used the word “ensemble”, although they ended up with a 
model of “superimposition of trajectories”, as Prigogine and Stengers note (1997: 34). 
114 “The System” (“O Sistema”) is the title of a documentary by Matteo Scanni and Ruben Holiva 
(2006) that also deals with the issue of Camorra. The organization of Camorra, which operates in the 
wider area of Naples, should be distinguished from the Sicilian Cosa Nostra (widely known as Mafia). 
The latter has a more hierarchical structure, while the former has a looser distribution. Camorra is 
structured as a network of semi-autonomous clans, which makes it more flexible and adaptable to new 
constellations of power. In this respect, it is a model for various contemporary mob organizations, 
which also operate in a less hierarchical way. In his book Mc Mafia: Crime without frontiers (2008), 
the British journalist Misha Glenny describes the effects of globalization on organized crime, and 
explains how crime also takes the form of a network: “What is important to understand is that the 
organized crime is a phenomenon without central coordination, but in the same time, a global 
phenomenon” (Glenny 2009). Control does not come from a sovereign centre but is instead 
materialized in local commercial transactions in every part of the world. Glenny also speaks about 
“mob franchising” that takes place across countries, with clans lending their ‘brand name’ to other 
emerging groups that extend the network of their business. Organized crime (itself far from a unified 
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object with similar tactics in every place and every time) can now be seen as operating through these 
‘glocal’ networks, with older organizations trying to track, patronize and exploit the new ones, but 
without creating them.  
115 The character of Maria is based on the true story of Carmella Attrice, who died in a similar way in 
January 2005 in Scampia (see Williams 2005).  
116 As Saviano mentions in the book Gomorrah, this parable from Genesis was used by a priest in 
Saviano’s hometown (Casal di Principe) in a speech he addressed to the locals. The priest urged 
particularly the local ‘bosses’ of Camorra to look behind and face the monstrous artifice of their 
conduct, like Lot’s wife did in the Biblical story. 
117 For a journalistic  account of this feud see the article “Naples police in huge mafia swoop” from that 
period, available at the BBC online archive: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4075269.stm 
118 The place, although seldom named, is inevitably betrayed by the use of language. To an external 
observer, the recognition of the Italian language situates the action somewhere in Italy. An Italian 
observer would possibly locate the place with more precision, because of the use of a very strong 
Neapolitan dialect. In Italy the film was released with Italian subtitles, and, as the director comments in 
an interview, the language spoken in the film was a shock even to the people of Naples, who found 
themselves unfamiliar with the slang spoken in the most part of the film, as well as with Camorra’s 
activity (Garrone 2009b). Commenting on the use of dialect in Gomorrah Mario Pezzela (2009) notes: 
“The Neapolitan dialect spoken by the bosses and, especially, by the younger boys is a sort of neo-
language—broken, guttural, elementary, barely deciphered by the subtitles.”  
119 This may also be seen as part of a strategy that made it possible for Garrone to shoot on location and 
to use locals as walk-ons. The local people would probably be more hesitant to participate if anonymity 
was not kept.  
120 Gomorrah does not make exclusive use of non-professional actors. For instance Toni Servillo who 
plays the role of Franco is a well-known Italian actor. The mixing of professional and non-professional 
actors was a practice common in Italian neorealism; for example Roberto Rossellini’s Rome, Open City 
(Roma Città Aperta, 1945) starred Anna Magnani and Aldo Fabrizi among other non-professional 
actors.  
121 Apart from a number of short films, Garrone, who was initially trained as a painter, directed the 
following feature films before Gomorrah: Terra di mezzo (1996), Ospiti (1998), Estate romana (2000), 
L'imbalsamatore (2002) and Primo amore (2003). 
122 However, some neorealist films like How to Kill Bad People and Miracle in Milan overrule this 
‘general principle’ (see Bondanella 2000).  
123 This multiplicity has been a characteristic of the book as well. Particularly about Saviano’s narrative 
style in Gomorra, writer Wu Ming 1 observes: “C’est toujours ‘Roberto Saviano’ qui raconte, mais 
‘Roberto Saviano’ est une synthèse, un flux imaginatif qui se propage d’un cerveau à l’autre, qui 
emprunte le point de vue d’un être multiple […] ‘Je’ recueille et fusionne les mots et les sentiments 
d’une communauté, bien des personnes ont façonné – dans des camps opposés, dans le bien et dans le 
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mal – la matière du récit. La voix de Gomorra est une voix collective […]” (2008: 8-9). [“It’s always 
‘Roberto Saviano’ who narrates, but ‘Roberto Saviano’ is a synthesis, an imagined flux that spreads 
from one brain to the other, that adopts the point of view of a multiple being. […] ‘I’ collects and 
merges the words and sentiments of a community, [in the sense that] many persons have shaped—from 
opposite camps, for good or evil, the story’s material. The voice of Gomorra is a collective voice […].” 
(Translation mine)]  
124 Something similar happens in the end of the film Babel, when a scene with a phone call re-
structures the temporal order of the episodes and turns Babel, as Cameron notes, from just a multiple-
protagonist film into a modular one (2008: 24). 
125 In this respect the people from Campania resemble the inhabitants of the Biblical Gomorrah, out of 
whom God was not able to find even ten righteous men (see Curi 2009: 241-242). 
126 This view is complicit with Curi’s alternative reading of Gomorrah, according to which, the film 
stresses the agency of its characters against the established order (or ‘State’) of Camorra, as it becomes 
particularly apparent in the story of Ciro and Marco (see Curi 2009).  
127 It is worth noticing that the director of Gomorrah mentions in an interview that this ‘final 
information’ was the only thing he was uncertain about when the film was over: “As we mentioned 
before, the film is less journalistic than the book and goes in a different direction. But at the end, we 
thought, yes, it’s important to point out that this situation is something more universal. It’s just not that 
there have been a handful of people killed; there have been thousands. To be honest, I don’t know if 
including these titles at the end were the right decision. And putting them at the beginning would have 
predetermined the audience’s response; another kind of film would have been expected. A change of 
register might be jarring. It’s the only thing about the film I’m not sure about.” (Garrone 2009a) 
128 Both Saviano and Garrone, as they stress in their interviews, tried to highlight the universality of the 
Camorra situation. Rather than a local phenomenon, Camorra represents the hidden side of the 
European economy, which is supported by criminal organizations such as the one of Camorra.  
129 It has been argued that due to financial restrictions and international co-productions world cinema 
favors the network narrative form (see Bordwell 2007:197-198; Kerr 2010).  
130 ‘Wu Ming’ is pseudonym for a collective of five Italian writers (see the official website of Wu Ming 
foundation: http://www.wumingfoundation.com). The names of the writers are known, but they prefer 
to call themselves Wu Ming 1…5. The real name of Wu Ming 1 is Roberto Bui.  
131 With the term ‘New Italian Epic’ Wu Ming 1 refers to the literary tendency that appeared in the first 
half of the 1990s in Italy with writers such as Valerio Evangelisti, Gianfranco de Cataldo, Andrea 
Camilleri, Carlo Lucarelli, Helena Janeczek, Roberto Saviano and Wu Ming. The novels participating 
in this tendency are “hybrid novels”, according to Wu Ming 1, based on participation, not only of 
writers from different generations and literary backgrounds, but also of different genres, styles and 
voices into the narrative itself. Thus, the novels of the New Italian Epic contain “unexpected and 
uncommon points of view, including those of animals, objects, places and also immaterial fluxes” (Wu 
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Ming 1 2008; translation from French mine). As Wu Ming 1 adds, these new Italian novels are not 
based on the traditional ontological grounds of realism, but on those of multiplicitous forms of being. 
132 What has also been stressed in the theorization of the New Italian Epic by Wu Ming 1 (2008) is the 
narrative ‘complexity’, both in terms of structure as well as in terms of content. These novels have high 
cognitive demands from the readers (thus rejecting the assumption that the audience is composed by 
passive receptors), but also offer them reading pleasure, as the readers become active participants in the 
solution of narratological problems and the decompression of tension. Often their texts are based on a 
“what if” assumption, a “non-time” (unchronie), where historical events are revisited to be imagined as 
proceeding differently (as it happens in ‘multiple-draft’ films, or counterfactual stories). 
133 Gomorrah’s transmediality is not to the same degree market-driven as that of most of the cases 
Jenkins discusses (for example, The Matrix or The Lord of the Rings). Gomorrah participates not only 
in wider narrative and media tendencies but also in an emerging political movement, which has been 
inspired—among others—by Saviano and his book, and has been finding expression in the anti-
Berlusconi protests in Italy. This movement has also presence at online communities such as various 
Facebook groups, blogs etc. (for example see http://www.antiberlusconi.it, 
http://www.facebook.com/pages/Anti-Berlusconi/98138518859). It is worth noticing that Berlusconi 
has publically opposed Roberto Saviano for glorifying Camorra through his book (see Popham 2010; 
the video is also available on Saviano’s official website at: 
http://www.robertosaviano.it/rassegna/berlusconi-mafia-famosa-grazie-a-gomorra/). Indicative of this 
opposition is also the tension that has been created between the producers of the cultural show “Vieni 
Via Con Me” (that Saviano currently presents on Italian television (RAI3) together with the journalist 
Fabio Fazio) and the general management of RAI (see the article of Corriere della Serra “Fini e 
Bersani da Saviano: è scontro. ‘Masi : Invitare anche Berlusconi e Bossi’”, 12 November 2010. 
Available online at:  http://www.corriere.it/politica/10_novembre_12/fazio-bersani-fini_679f6e24-
ee46-11df-8dee-00144f02aabc.shtml). 
134 From an autopoietic systems theoretical perspective, such a move would be seen as drawing a line 
between the film as a system and its environment of other films and media systems. 
135 According to the now classic model that philosopher and linguist Alexander Bain proposed in his 
English Composition and Rhetoric (1866), there are four main modes of discourse: narrative 
(narration), description, exposition, and argument (persuasion). 
136 For a discussion of the role of space particularly in European cinema see the recent publications 
Spaces in European Cinema (2000, edited by Myrto Konstantarakos) and Space and Place in 
European Cinema (2005, edited by Wendy Everett and Axel Goodbody). 
137 Borwell defines this space as “the imaginary space of fiction, the ‘world’ in which the narration 
suggests that fabula events occur” (1985: 113). 
138 Editing space can be distinguished in “continuity” and “contiguity” space, depending on whether 
the editing is continuous or parallel. Michael Wedel indicates this duplicity of the editing space, as well 
as a number of other spatial layers, such as the “filmic space of the screen”, including the “shot space” 
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in its “left-right division”, “the story space of the narrative”, referring to the location where the story 
takes place and also to the location of shooting, the performative space of the acting, and the 
“imaginary space” that results for the audience in the cinema (Wedel 1996: 209, 212).  
139 Gabriel Zoran, literary professor in Tel Aviv University and author of the article “Towards a theory 
of space in narrative”, uses the term “complex of space” to refer to the multi-level constitution of space 
in—mostly literary—narratives. His analytical model of space in narrative distinguishes between three 
different spatial levels, the topographical, the chronotopical and the textual, across which “scenes”—
the units of narrative space—are distributed, in the form of “places”, “zones of action” and “fields of 
vision”, respectively (see Zoran 1984: 323). 
140 Everett quotes Foucault from his article “Of Other Spaces”, published in Diacritics (1989: 25). 
141 This is despite Bordwell’s analysis of the film in “Film Futures” (2002: 100), where he argues that 
the last version of Lola’s story becomes the most ‘valid’ one in the eyes of the viewer, and is the “least 
hypothetical one”. Thus, Tykwer’s film as well as other multiple-draft films provide a “final draft”, 
according to Bordwell. 
142 The spatial attributes of poetry have been highlighted by linguist Roman Jakobson. Jakobson argued 
that, in the poetic message, equivalence is of greater importance than selection—which prevails in 
ordinary language (see Frank 1978: 280-281).  
143 In the original French “Frontières du Récit”, we read: “la narration réstitue, dans la succession 
temporelle de son discours, la succession également temporelle des événements, tandis que la 
description doit moduler dans le successif la représentation d'objets simultanés et juxtaposés dans 
l'espace” (Genette, 158). In my text I use the translation of Frank (1978: 286) because I find it more 
accurate and less confusing than that of Levonas in New Literary History: “narration, by the temporal 
succession of its discourse, restores the equally temporal succession of events, while the description 
most successively modulate the representation of objects simultaneously juxtaposed in space” (1976: 
7).   
144 In the original: “la diffusion de voyages et la création de la notion de ‘site’ (classés dans les Guides, 
objets culturels a visiter Baedeker à la main)”. Here Hamon refers to the Baedeker travel guides, 
published by the homonymous German publishing house founded by Karl Baedeker in 1827.  
145 Our perception of place affects our spatial thinking, in a way reminiscent of the connection between 
space and place in film theory, discussed above. Geographers and philosophers have been playing an 
important role in the theorization of space in the second half of the 20th century. The influence of the 
ideas developed in France in the 1960s, by thinkers such as Gaston Bachelard, Michel Foucault and 
Henri Lefebvre (see The Production of Space, 1974/1991) where the first “spatial turn” in 
philosophical thought took place, according to political geographer Edward Soja (2009: 20), is carried 
until the recent—after the mid-1990s—‘re-turn’ of theory, especially in the social sciences, arts and 
humanities, to spatial concepts. Since the mid-1990s there have been other influential thinkers of space 
such as geographer David Harvey, cultural theorist Fredrik Jameson, anthropologist Marc Augé and 
Soja himself (see Postmodern Geographies, 1989) who played a major role in this spatial re-turn (for 
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an overview of this turn see Barney Warf and Santa Arias 2009). This new spatial turn of theory can 
also be considered as a reason why description, as a concept associated with space in literature, 
becomes again—also in this dissertation—worth of attention. Moreover, not only theory but also new 
types of media and informational networks transform and ‘spatialize’ our conception of place, and 
arguably affect the contemporary texts, such as the so-called complex narratives in cinema. 
146 “Le référent à décrire est considéré comme une surface, comme un espace,  rationalisé-
rationalisable, articulé, découpé, segmenté […].” 
147 “Le descripteur, c’est donc à la fois le périégète, le voyageur, aussi bien que Bouvard et Pécuchet, 
l’arpenteur d’espace comme l’arpenteur de bibliothèques. D’où, textuellement, nous l’avons vu, une 
esthétique du ‘fragment’, du ‘morceau’, de la ‘tranche de vie’,  du ‘tableau’ (étymologiquement : 
idylle), du ‘cas’, de la ‘coupure’ (de presse, ou autre), du ‘lambeau’, de la ‘classe’, du ‘détail’, etc., et 
symétriquement une tendance à mettre en scène un discours de parcours, où des personnages mobiles 
viendront traverser et relier ces espaces juxtaposés”.   
148 See, among others, Don Paul Fowler (“Narrate and Describe: The Problem of Ekphrasis”, 1991), 
Peter Klaus (“Description and Event in Narrative”, 1982) and Ruth Ronen (“Description, Narrative and 
Representation”, 1997).  
149 Bogost proposes the term “unit operation” as an amalgam referring to procedures also found in 
physics and cybernetics, apart from software technology; see Bogost 2006: 1. 
150 In part 2, I mentioned that in nonequilibrium thermodynamics, through an analogous shift of 
perspective, entropy became an organizing force instead of a sign of disintegration. 
151 In Narration in the Fiction Film, a book that is not primarily addressed to undergraduate students 
like Film Art, Bordwell seems to associate pattern making with “schema driven perception” (1985: 
102). Thus he draws on Constructivist Psychology, which connects perception and cognition and 
renders the former into a process of “active hypothesis-testing” (31). In the same book, Bordwell 
maintains that stylistic patterning plays a significant role in the type of narration that he calls 
“parametric”, and he finds prominent in the work of directors such as Bresson and Ozu, but also in the 
novels and films of Robbe-Grillet. Bordwell considers parametric narration the only case where style 
becomes equally significant or even dominates narrative in films that involve storytelling. He also 
emphasizes the spatial effect that this type of narration has, due to motifs of repetition and difference of 
stylistic elements that structure the syuzhet. Pattern making as I will discuss it in the context of 
contemporary complex films lacks the parametric precision of the avant-garde works that Bordwell 
discusses; moreover, it does not result from the composition of elements of style distict from the 
narrative elements. Nonetheless, the complex systemic function of parametric narration and the 
applicability of this type of narration to contemporary complex films would be hypotheses worth of 
future research.  
152 Especially the neuroscientific complex systemic theories, which are not the ones that Bordwell and 
Thompson refer to, conceive pattern making as fundamental in the brain activity. According to Varela, 
the brain is always found in a process of “drift”, which drives it towards the creation of patterns, 
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through “fast oscillations between neuronal populations” (Varela 1995: 333), which happen 
independently of the stimulus that is each time being processed. For Varela, the process of pattern 
formation is emergent as long as it is the product of the coordination and co-resonance of a number of 
individual and distributed units/neurons, which are never found in a state of ‘rest’. Rather, a drift keeps 
the brain activity in a continuous dynamic state. Varela takes from biology the notion of “genetic drift” 
and resituates it in the context of cognition dynamics. Therefore, drift is for him the driving force that 
keeps the mind in perpetual movement. Not only Varela but also Scott Kelso, psychologist and 
researcher at the Center for Complex Systems at Florida Atlantic University, who introduced the 
approach of “dynamic patterns” to cognitive self-organization, considers the brain as a complex 
system. The brain, according to Kelso, possesses a “tremendous heterogeneity of structure” and is 
characterized by “nonstationary dynamics”, which are inherently kept in constant instability, ready to 
respond with pattern formation when encountered with a meaningful task (1995: 283-284). It is this 
chaotic “dynamic instability” in the neuronal activity (manifested by the increase of fluctuations) that 
gives rise to pattern formation, which involves synergetic coordination of ensembles of neurons (276). 
Kelso’s theory of cognitive pattern formation does not only refer to the level of neurons and the 
patterns emerging from their synchronized firing but also to the (organizationally) higher level of 
consciousness and sensorimotor behavior. The formation of thoughts is, according to him, a distributed 
and nonlinear process. Thus, thoughts are emergent patterns, just like neural aggregations.  
153 Holtz notes: “The guiding principle here is Ezra Pound’s definition of the image as ‘that which 
presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time’.” (1977: 273) 
154 The logic of description has been associated, as both Chatman and Hamon mention, with that of 
metonymy in rhetoric. Metonymy is, according to Meir Sternberg, “a strong ordering principle [which] 
drives the contents of the descripta” (Sternberg, as cited by Chatman 1990: 24). The relation 
“container-contained” is prevailing in metonymy (ibid). 
155 Tolva, with a background in English literature, was until recently the manager of the cultural 
program of IBM, working in the construction of 3-D environments such as virtual cities and museums. 
156 In Convergence Culture Jenkins suggests that contemporary films, especially those that can fall 
under the category of complex narratives, from The Matrix and The Sixth Sense to Fight Club and Run 
Lola Run, involve the creation of a world before that of a story (2006: 119). He considers this to be a 
result of corresponding pressures from the film industry. Filmmakers are nowadays encouraged—and 
expected—to “pitch” worlds rather than characters or stories, in order to attract the interest of the 
producers, who have an eye for the potential transmediality of their film product (Jenkins 2006: 114). It 
is easier to create a new film or other media products such as video games out of the idea of Zion in 
The Matrix or out of Tolkien’s fantasy worlds rather than out of a completed, finite story. 
157 Wagstaff refers to the ‘garden’ comparing neorealism with the melodramatic genre, which seems to 
be metaphorically based on the “lost idyll” of a “Garden of Eden” (2007: 64), and thus focusing on the 
characters’ suffering this loss. Although neorealism has some common characteristics with melodrama, 
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its stance differs from the melodramatic one, as neorealist films tend to (re-)discover a garden in the 
contingency of everyday life.  
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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
 
 In this dissertation three films are used as lenses in order to approach the complexity 
inherent in contemporary ‘complex’ films and to revisit three ‘anti-narrative’ notions: self-
reflexivity, loose causality and description. The framework of complex systems theory and 
philosophy is used to show how these notions are textual organizing principles, corresponding 
to processes at work in complex systems and their organization and evolution, namely, self-
observation/self-reference, aggregation (of units) and emergent pattern formation. Time, 
causality and space, the traditional axes along which narratives are organized, become the 
products, rather than the starting points, of these self-organizing functions.  
 Part 1 puts into focus the growing tendency for self-reflexive narration that has been 
observed in complex narrative and ‘post-classical’ films. In my consideration of self-reflexive 
narration, I adopt the perspective of (post-)classical cinema by using the film The Final Cut 
(Omar Naim, 2004) as a starting point. The Final Cut is an ‘experimental’ Hollywood film, as 
it coincided with the attempt to popularize digital film distribution. Combining this ‘top-down’ 
form of self-reference with a plot-oriented bottom-up investigation of the self-referential 
moments in The Final Cut as well as in other complex films (as pointed out by other scholars), 
I show how the time-juggling they perform through flashbacks, flashforwards and mise-en-
abyme structures can be considered moments of self-observation and self-organization of the 
diegesis along the dimension of time. Although self-reflexive moments have traditionally been 
considered disruptive for the smooth constitution of narrative, and have acquired an ‘anti-
narrative’ status in this respect, I argue that through a shift from the narratological to the 
complex systemic framework these same self-reflexive gestures may be re-appreciated as 
organizational, rather than disorganizing, devices.   
 In Part 2, I further engage in the nonlinear, emergent dynamics of complex films. The 
particular issue I address in this part of the dissertation is the nature of causality that the 
diegesis of complex films shows when conceived as a complex system. In order to highlight 
this causal function of complex films, I distinguish it from the representational causality that 
connects the events depicted in the film, which, in complex and especially ‘network’ films, 
appears to be rather loose. Using the film Burn After Reading (Joel and Ethan Coen, 2008) as 
the primary point of reference, I show that the application of the complex systems framework 
to complex films allows us to connect causally, by way of ‘emergence’, the representational 
with the non-representational levels of the diegetic organization. In between the two levels, 
multiple and distributed elements (such as the multiple characters and agents of ‘ensemble’ or 
‘network’ films) form aggregates through nonlinear connections, and thus generate causal 
dynamics that shape the structure of the plot. This dynamic movement drives the syuzhet into a 
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type of organization that is different from narrative, as long as it rejects the causal-logical 
attempts of interpretation and opens out instead of closing into a beginning-middle-end 
schema.  
 The analysis of individual films through the complex systemic framework, as I further 
argue in Part 3, ‘opens out’ to the function of cinema as a complex system, and the way the 
contemporary complex film tendency, combining characteristics of older waves and traditions, 
transforms the current and future practices of film production, distribution, and reception. As a 
particular case of this transition I take the film Gomorrah (Matteo Garrone, 2008), which 
‘belongs’ to contemporary world cinema and shares common characteristics with various 
classes of complex narratives. What is striking in Gomorrah is the bottom-up and ‘obscure’ 
way through which the film constitutes its diegetic world, as a space that, in order to be 
weaved, demands from the viewer to invest sensorimotor and cognitive effort. With Gomorrah 
as a point of reference, and also referring to other films of the complex narrative tendency, I 
suggest that description, as a mode of discourse traditionally subordinated to narrative, 
becomes more pertinent in complex films, which are characterized by a discontinuous (and in 
this sense spatial) distribution of their diegetic and filmic elements—elements that description 
aggregates in a bottom-up way. In the concluding chapter I argue that, from the complex 
systems perspective, these aggregates are emergent patterns, instantiations and agents of an 
interplay between order and randomness, contingency and structure, through which every 
complex system, like cinema, creates its world. 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING  
 
 In deze dissertatie worden drie films gebruikt als lenzen, met als doel het behandelen 
van de complexiteit inherent aan hedendaagse ‘complexe’ films en het herzien van drie 
bekende ‘anti-narratieve’ begrippen: zelf-reflexiviteit, losse causaliteit en beschrijving. Binnen 
een kader van complexe systeemtheorie en filosofie wordt aangetoond dat deze begrippen 
fungeren als tekstuele organisatieprincipes, corresponderend met complexe systeemprocessen 
en hun organisatie en evolutie: zelfobservatie/zelforganisatie, de aggregatie van eenheden, en 
emergente patroonformatie. Tijd, causaliteit, en ruimte (de traditionele organisatiebeginselen 
van narrativiteit) zijn in dit perspectief niet de beginpunten maar juist de resultaten van zelf-
organiserende functies. 
 Deel 1 adresseert de groeiende tendens van zelf-reflexieve narratie die breeduit wordt 
waargenomen in complexe narratieven en ‘post-klassieke’ films. Ik behandel zelf-reflexieve 
narratie volgens het perspectief van (post)-klassieke cinema, met de film The Final Cut (Omar 
Naim, 2004) als vertrekpunt. The Final Cut is een ‘experimentele’ Hollywoodfilm, die 
samenviel met pogingen om digitale filmdistributie aan populariteit te doen winnen. Door 
deze ‘top-down’ vorm van zelfreferentie te combineren met een plot-georienteerde ‘bottom-
up’ analyse van de zelf-referentiële momenten in deze film en andere voorbeelden (zoals door 
andere onderzoekers behandeld), toon ik aan hoe het spel met temporaliteit in deze en andere 
complexe films door middel van flashbacks, flashforwards en mise-en-abyme structuren kan 
worden beschouwd als momenten van diëgetische zelfobservatie en zelforganisatie via de 
dimensie van tijd. Hoewel momenten van zelf-reflexiviteit traditioneel beschouwd zijn als 
verstorende elementen in de vloeiende totstandkoming van een verhaal (en in die zin een ‘anti-
narratieve’ reputatie hebben verworven), stel ik dat zulke zelf-reflexieve gebaren een 
herwaardering verdienen: in de verschuiving van een narratologisch naar een complex-
systemisch denkkader fungeren ze niet als verstorende, maar juist als organiserende 
elementen.  
 In Deel 2 richt ik mij verder op de nonlineaire, emergente dynamiek van complexe 
films. Het centrale aspect in dit deel van de dissertatie is het soort causaliteit dat zich 
manifesteert in de diëgese van complexe films, wanneer die als een complex system 
beschouwd worden. Om deze causale functie te belichten onderscheid ik die van de 
representationele causaliteit waardoor filmische gebeurtenissen aan elkaar worden verbonden 
(welke in complexe, en vooral ‘netwerk-gestructureerde’ films, vaak nogal losjes schijnt). Aan 
de hand van de film Burn After Reading (Joel en Ethan Coen, 2008) als centraal referentiepunt 
toon ik aan dat de toepassing van het complexe systemen-denkkader op complexe films het 
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mogelijk maakt om—via het concept ‘emergence’—de representationele niveaus van 
diegetische organisatie causaal te verbinden met de niet-representationele. Tussen deze twee 
niveaus in formereren veelvoudige en gedistribueerde elementen (zoals de vele personages in 
een ‘ensemble-’ of ‘netwerkfilm’) zich tot aggregaten via nonlineaire connecties, en genereren 
zo causale dynamieken die de plotstructuur vormgeven. Deze dynamische beweging vormt het 
syuzhet tot een organisatietype dat verschil van narratief, zolang het proces zich niet 
conformeert aan causaal-logische interpretatiemogelijkheden en zich opent of vertakt, in plaats 
van zich naar een begin-midden-einde schema te voegen.  
 Zoals ik beargumenteer in Deel 3 baant het analyseren van individuele films door 
middel van een complex-systemische benadering een pad naar het beschouwen van cinema 
zelf als een complex systeem, waarin de huidige tendens van complexe films (die 
karakteristieken van eerdere tradities en stromingen combineren) hedendaagse en toekomstige 
filmpraktijken transformeert in termen van productie, distributie, en receptie. Als specifiek 
voorbeeld van deze overgang neem ik de film Gomorrah (Matteo Garrone, 2008), welke 
‘behoort’ tot de hedendaagse wereldcinema en karakteristieken deelt met verscheidene soort 
complexe narratieven. Opvallend aan Gomorrah is de ‘bottom-up’ en ‘obscure’ manier 
waarop de film zijn diegetische wereld vormgeeft als een ruimte die een senso-motorische en 
cognitieve investering vereist van de kijker om deze compleet te maken. Met Gomorrah als 
referentiepunt, maar met inbegrip van andere films uit deze categorie, suggereer ik dat 
beschrijving (een discours-modus die vooralsnog als ondergeschikt aan narratief werd 
beschouwd) meer pertinent aanwezig is in complexe films, die worden gekenmerkt door een 
discontinue (en daarmee samenhangend, een ruimtelijke) distributie van diegetische en 
filmische elementen—elementen die door beschrijving op een ‘bottom-up’ wijze worden 
samengevoegd. 
 In het concluderende hoofdstuk stel ik dat, vanuit een complexe systemen-benadering, 
zulke aggregaten emergente patronen zijn; instanties en agenten van een samenspel tussen 
orde en toevalligheid, contingentie en structuur, waardoor elk system, zoals cinema, zijn 
wereld vormt.  
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